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.ABSTRACT 
Whereas an extensive literature has developed on 
the broad conditions of crisis in South Africa in 
the seventies and eighties, and on the dynamic of 
state and popular responses to it, little focus 
has fallen .on the reactions . of the other key 
elements among the dominating classes. It is the 
aim of this dissertation to attempt to address an 
aspect of this lacuna by focussing on the 
Progressive Federal Party's responses from 1981 
until 1989. The thesis develops an understanding 
of the period as one entailing conditions of 
organ.le crisis. It attempts to show the PFP' s 
behaviour in the context of structural and 
conjunctural crises. The thesis periodises the 
Party's policy and strategic responses and makes 
an effort to show its contradictory nature. An 
effort is made to understand this contradictory 
character in terms of the party's class location 
with respect to the white dominating classes and 
leading elements within it; in relation to the 
black dominated classes; as well as in terms of 
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INTRODUCTION 
As South Africa enters the 1990s and there is the prospect 
of a resolution of its crisis, the predominantly white 
Democratic Party is riddled with uncertainty regarding its 
future. Both members of the party and outside observers are 
uncertain as to the role that this liberal institution will 
play in the unfolding of a post-apartheid country. The DP's 
dilemma is not something new to most of the members of the 
party who had previously made up its forerunner, the PFP. 
Something of an understanding of the future of the DP can be 
found in looking back at the history of the PFP during the 
turbulent years of the eighties. In this earlier period the 
PFP battled to come to terms with a rapidly changing context 
which placed unprecedented pressures on it and its dominant 
liberal ideology. This thesis attempts to deal with this 
process. 
An extensive literature has been built up over the years 
which investigates various aspects of the crisis of the 
seventies and the eighties. ( 1) Much emphasis in this 
literature has been placed on defining and analysing the 
broad structural parameters of the crisis. In this respect 
the structural weaknesses of the South African economy and 
the dominant system of social 





state initiative and popular resistance have also been 
1 The basic foundation discussion of the South African 
crisis is that of Saul and Gelb (1981 and 1986); see also 
Gelb (1987); Morris and Padayachee (1988); Cobbet, Glaser, 
Hindson and Swilling (1987); Wolpe (1987); Johnson (1988); 
Frankel, Pines and Swilling (1988); Swilling and Phillips 
(1989 a and b); Moss and Obery (1989); Hyslop (1989); Cassim 
(1986 and 1987); Hirsch (1988); Black and Stanwix (1987); 
Sutcliffe (1986); Moss and Obery (1987); Glaser (1987); 
Kaplan (1987); Gelb (1991); and Osborn (1991) 
1 
widely considered. ( 2) There has, however, been a lesser 
focus on the response of the dominating classes generally, 
and capital in particular. There has been some work on the 
politics of the white community and its varying responses to 
the unfolding conditions of struggle. In the main this work 
has focussed on dynamics within the National Party, and the 
white right. (3) 
With a few exceptions there has been no extensive 
consideration of the fortunes and responses of the 
Progressive Federal Party. (4) There has been some 
discussion of the experience of the liberal tradition in 
South Africa more generally, however. ( 5) Where this 
discussion has not originated from within the liberal 
community, it has been either superficial or limited in its 
focus. This leaves us with what is either a partisan 
appraisal of liberalism, or a confined focus on it. One 
notable exception has been the thesis completed by Brian 
Hackland on the history of the PFP until 1981. (6) It is a 
valuable contribution to the debate and has been of great 
benefit in the preparation of this dissertation. The period 
covered by it, however, covers the history of the PFP and 
2 For coverage of the development of popular class 
responses during the 1980s, see e.g. the contributions to 
various editions of South African Review, such as Barrell; 
Lodge; McCarthy and Swilling; Grest and Hughes (all 1984); 
Lodge; Collinge; and Dollie (all 1986); Lodge; Muller; 
Helliker, Roux and White; Chaskalson, Jochelson and 
Seekings; and Keenan (all 1987); Webster and Friedman; 
Lodge; Nasson; Boraine; and Seekings (all 1989). See also 
the contributions to Cobbett and Cohen's 1988 collection, 
including Lambert and Webster; Seekings; Swilling; Molobi; 
and Hyslop (all 1988) 
3 See Charney (1982); O'Meara (1982); Glaser (1986); Mare 
(1987); Freund (1986); Mann (1988); Welsh (1988); Sampson 
(1987) 
4 Welsh (1987); Shandler (1989) 
5 Godsell (1985); Bernstein and Godsell (1988); Butler, 
Elphick and Welsh (1987); Slabbert (1987 and 1988); Gerson 
(1987); Owen (1987); Simkins (1985); Glaser (1984 a and b; 
and 1989); De Beer (1984) 
6 Hackland (1984) 
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its forerunners from its establishment in 1959 until its 
election successes in 1981. As such, it does not cover the 
whole period of the eighties and the ultimate dissolution of 
the Party. 
Aims of the Dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to fill this gap by 
investigating the history of the PFP from 1981 until the end 
of the Party in 1989. Not only were these years of dramatic 
economic, social and political upheaval for the country as a 
whole, but they were also tumultuous in the history of the 
PFP. 
The thesis will attempt to come to terms with the dynamic 
interaction between the broad context of structural and 
conjunctural crisis within South Africa, and the impact on, 
and response of the PFP. It will attempt to show how the 
Party was greatly influenced by outside forces and 
developments. An effort will be made to illustrate the 
party's varying, and at times contradictory, responses to 
events and developments. In particular, a focus will fall 
on the PFP's response in terms of its character as a liberal 
institution. In this respect it will seek to understand the 
class nature of the party, as well as the key non-class 
determinants in its behaviour. 
The thesis does not purport to be an absolutely 
comprehensive history of the party during the period under 
review. Rather, it attempts to highlight key issues which 
illustrate the impact of the crisis on the party, and its 
most significant responses. 
3 
Sources and Methodology 
As a contemporary history this study suffers from a number 
of limitations. These are largely related to access to 
sources and information, as well as the "freshness" of the 
material. It was found during the study that while it was 
possible to gain access to certain valuable records of the 
PFP, it was not possible to make use of others. This 
related to the reservations that key PFP members had with 
divulging what was considered to be sensitive information. 
This applied as much to documentary sources as it did to 
interviews. In the latter case, interviewees were prepared 
to provide the researcher with sensitive information, but on 
condition that it remained "off the record". 
Despite the constraints, it was possible to develop a useful 
picture of the Party during the period under review. This 
was feasible as a result of combining a variety of primary 
and secondary sources. This task was further facilitated by 
maintaining a narrow focus on the specific themes selected 
for discussion in this dissertation. 
Primary sources used included a complete set of the official 
minutes of the meeting of the elected national structures of 
the Party, i.e. the Federal Executive, Federal Council, and 
National Congress. There was also access to a limited 
selection of correspondence, as well as internal memoranda. 
Interviews with key Party members, as well as selected 
members of the broader white liberal community provided 
important insights which provided an illumination of the 
written sources. Party newspapers and publications, as well 
as the commercial press were heavily drawn on. 
Extensive use was made of the secondary literature, 
especially with respect to the broad societal developments 
4 
associated with the country's structural and conjunctural 
crisis of the eighties. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The emergence of severe structural flaws within the South 
African economy in the seventies coincided with a major 
political challenge to the racially exclusive form of state 
from the black dominated classes. As Morris and Padayachee 
have put it 
"it became clear to all and sundry that the narrow 
structures of apartheid policy could no longer 
provide the social basis for political stability 
and sustained further accumulation. The social 
structure of accumulation which underlay the 
previous cycle of social and economic development 
brought forth more contradictions than it 
resolved. Hence a major restructuring by the 
state was required and a new social structure of 
accumulation had to emerge if the crisis that had 
been engendered was to be resolved." (7) 
\ 
The conflicts and contradictions associated with the crisis 
were rooted in the origins of the development of capitalism 
in South Africa. This development had been predicated on 
the system of migrant labour, or the "differential 
reproduction of labour power" ( 8) ; and, on the basis of 
South Africa's incorporation into the world capitalist chain 
whereby economic growth had been premised on primary 
production export earnings, most notably from the mining 
sector. The growth pattern under this framework depended on 
territorial segregation in the form of grand apartheid, and 
petty apartheid which excluded African workers from the 
"urban social welfare reproduction institutions reserved for 
whites". ( 9) Politically this social structure took the 
form of a racially exclusive state which provided conditions 
7 Morris and Padayachee (1988), p 1 
8 ibid 
9 op cit, p 2 
5 
of representative democracy for the white dominating 
classes, while excluding the masses of the dominated 
classes. 
The consolidation of the dominance of monopoly capital by 
the early seventies carried with it a key structural 
contradiction. Its requirement for skilled and semi-skilled 
black labour came to be restricted by the prevailing social 
structure. Migrant labour came to be a major obstacle to 
continued accumulation. In addition, the inability of 
manufacturing to realise profits internationally due to 
South Africa's disadvantaged position with respect to the 
world economy, meant that industry sought to develop an 
internal consumer market which was at that time restricted 
• 
to whites in the main. Furthermore, the country was 
dependent on imported capital goods and technology which 
limited its ability to raise the organic composition of 
capital and so become competitive internationally. 
A brief overview of selected key indicators give an 
crisis South Africa economic indication of the degree of 
faced in the early eighties. (10) According to Bethlehem 
the decline of the economy can be seen in comparing growth 
rates for the sixties, seventies and eighties. (11) Whereas 
South Africa experienced an annual average growth rate of 
5,7% from 1960 to 1969, this declined to 3,4% for the years 
1970 to 1979, with a further subsequent decline from 1980 to 










1983 and 1985. 
were years of 
These years 
coincided with recessionary conditions, and severe balance 
of payments crisis. The foreign debt crisis was stimulated 
10 Note that specific economic developments during the 
eighties will be dealt with in greater detail within the 
body of the dissertation. 
11 Bethlehem (1988), p 150 
6 
by large scale lending as a means to come to terms with 
economic decline. Between 1980 and 1985 foreign debt as a 
percentage of gross domestic product increased from 20,3% to 
50,0%. (12) Despite the increase in foreign debt, fixed 
investments declined by 3% in the years from 1980 to 1989. 
This compares with the increase in fixed investment of 6,9% 
p.a. between 1946 and 1971, and at 2,2% p.a. between 1972 
and 1979. (13) Coinciding with the increase in foreign debt 
was a decline in the value of the Rand which in 1980 was 
worth 88,63% of its value in 1971. (14) In 1985 this value 
had declined much further to 32, 14%. Associated with the 
conditions of economic decline was a dramatic increase in 
bankruptcies. Between 1980 and 1985 the insolvency rate 
increased by 500%. (15) There was also an increase in the 
rate of unemployment which Bethlehem estimated as being 37% 
in 1985, as compared to 27% in 1980. (16) 
These conditions of crisis within the South African economy 
coincided with the development of a nascent independent 
labour movement, as well as a resurgence of popular 
resistance from 1976. 
Increasingly the leading elements within the state came to 
see the need to take formative action to remedy the 
structural malaise within South African society. They were 
responding to the growing demands from leading sectors of 
monopoly capital for reforms which would ease the 
constraints that apartheid had placed on labour mobility and 
organisation, as well as on the development of a black 
middle class. Associated with the rise of monopoly capital 
had been the coming to maturity of an Afrikaans bourgeoisie. 
12 Hirsch (1988), p 20 
13 Azzar Jammine quoted in Financial Mail, 22 September 
1989 
14 Hirsch (1988), p 6 
15 Cassim (1986), p 7 
16 Bethlehem (1988), p 118 
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The interests of this class, which played a leading role 
within the ruling party, increasingly coincided with that of 
other sectors of the capitalist community. The late 1970s, 
then, saw an unraveling of the National Party's hegemony 
over an alliance of key Afrikaans class forces. The 
ascendance of the NP in the forties had been dependent on it 
forging a unifying discourse for Afrikaans workers, middle 
classes and an emergent bourgeoisie. Conditions of 
accelerated economic growth during the 1960s had seen the 
Afrikaans bourgeoisie come into its own, no longer dependent 
for its survival to the extent it had been in the past on 
the political support of the Afrikaans working, and lower 
middle, classes. The needs of this emergent class together 
with the consequences of the failure of · the policy of 
apartheid in ensuring conditions of continued accumulation 
in the seventies had seen the NP make its first tentative 
moves away from the policy tradition which had forged the 
historic bloc of Afrikaner nationalism. (17) 
In an effort to overcome the constraints of South Africa's 
structural crisis a new alliance was forged under the 
leadership of the National Party. An alliance of elements 
of both the English and Afrikaans bourgeoisies and middle 
classes backed the initiatives of the NP in its attempts to 
bring about reform. This was done under the leadership of 
PW Botha and in close partnership with the military 
establishment. 
The conditions sketched above were similar to those dealt 
with by Antonio Gramsci in his discussion of the concept of 
"organic crisis". (18) According to Gramsci 
17 See O'Meara (1983) for a detailed discussion of the 
rise of Afrikaner nationalism. 
18 This disertation draws heavily on the concepts 
developed by Gramsci and various "neo-Gramscians". Core 
texts drawn on were those of Gramsci (1971); Simon (1982); 
8 
"A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. 
This exceptional duration means that incurable 
structural contradictions have revealed themselves 
·(reached maturity), and that despite this, the 
political forces which are struggling to conserve 
and defend the existing structure itself are 
making every effort to cure them. These incessant 
and persistent efforts ... form the terrain of the 
'conjunctural', and it is upon this terrain that 
the forces of opposition organise. These forces 
seek to demonstrate that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions already exist to make 
possible, and hence imperative, the accomplishment 
of certain historical tasks ... " (19) 
9 
Within this context, Gramsci argued, 
fundamental classes would contest the 
the contending 
outcome of the· 
condition of crisis. Attempts would be made to resolve the 
crisis which would consist both of a coercive and a 
formative nature. According to Simon these attempts on the 
part of the ruling classes 
"will consist in the struggle to create a new 
balance of political forces, requiring a reshaping 
of state institutions as well as the formation of 
new ideologies; and if the forces of opposition 
are not strong enough to shift the balance of 
forces decisively in their direction, the 
conservative forces will succeed in building a 
new system of alliances which will reestablish 
their hegemony." (20) 
By "hegemony" Gramsci meant the "intellectual and moral 
leadership" of the dominating class, as distinct from 
"domination". In the Prison Notebooks he wrote that 
"the supremacy of a social group manifests itself 
in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual 
and moral leadership' . A social group dominates 
antagonistic groups, which it tends to 
'liquidate', or to subjugate perhaps even by armed 
Showstack Sassoon (1980); Merrington (1977); and Laclau 
(1977). 
19 Gramsci (1978), p 178 
20 Simon (1982), p 37 
force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A 
social group can, and indeed must, already 
exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental 
power this indeed is one of the principal 
conditions for the winning of such power) ; it 
subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises 
power, but even if it holds it firmly in its 
grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well." (21) 
In terms of this concept a class will, only become hegemonic 
if it gains the consent of other principal classes and 
forces through a process of political and ideological 
struggle. It needs to transcend its narrow sectional 
corporate interests through "taking into account the 
interests of other classes and social forces and finding 
ways of combining them with its own interests". (22) Laclau 
has described this process as a class attempting to 
"give coherence to its ideological discourse by 
presenting its class objectives as the 
consummation of popular objectives." (23) 
These processes can best be observed at moments of crisis as 
described above. Gramsci described the process whereby the 
capitalist class seeks to assert its dominance when its 
hegemony is threatened in times of crisis as a "passive 
revolution". Showstack Sassoon has summarised this process 
as follows: 
" .. the bourgeoisie will attempt a strategy of 
passive revolution whenever its hegemony is 
weakened or whenever its political superstructure 
in the integral sense (force plus hegemony) cannot 
cope with the need to expand the forces of 
production. If allowed to do so, the dominant 
class may find new forms of political domination." 
(24) 
21 Gramsci (1978), p 57/8 
22 Simon (1982), p 23 
23 Laclau (1977), p 109 
24 Showstack Sassoon (1980), p 210/211 
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A passive revolution is the characteristic response of the 
dominant class in times of organic crisis. It will involve 
wide ranging alterations to the country's economic and 
political structure from above, without the active 
involvement of the bulk of the people. (25) 
The efforts of the dominant class to retrace its hegemony 
and to bring about major changes to the social structure are 
what determine the "terrain of the conjunctural" which 
Gramsci refers to. It is in the space created by the ruling 
class's efforts at reform that the major contending forces 
in society consequently struggle. 
The response of the South African state to conditions of 
structural crisis similarly established this "terrain of the 
conjunctural" . The efforts of the state at reform were 
comprehensively rebuffed by popular oppositional strategies. 
This intensified the crisis, further distancing the ruling 
group from achieving its sought after hegemony. 
The response of the regime to the conditions of 
the eighties can be characterised as occurring 
phases, each of which created further and 





seventies until 1983/4 coincided with the emergence of the 
military dominance within the state and its programme of 
'total strategy'. The state's reform programme was built on 
an acknowledgement of African urbanisation, while remaining 
committed to the homeland policy. In addition, labour 
reforms permitted independent trade union organisation. 
Associated with these reforms was a stated commitment to 
reducing state involvement in the economy, as well as 
monetarist fiscal policy. Politically the state sought to 
coopt sections of the black dominated classes through the 
25 Simon (1982), p 49 
11 
introduction of the tricameral system, as well as Black 
Local Authorities. This period also saw the termination of 
the traditional Afrikaner nationalist alliance and a new 
alliance emerging as was discussed above. 
The second phase, partially coinciding with the first, can 
be dated from 1984 until 1986 and is associated with the 
failure of "total strategy" in the face of massive 












The final phase in the period covered by this dissertation 
coincided with the period of extended repression under the 
state of emergency, as well as a shift to executive rule and 
a significant rapprochement between the leading forces 
within the regime and those within the dominating classes, 
most notably large sections of the business community. The 
approach of the state in this period was also affected by 
economic crisis, popular opposition, and the gradual erosion 
of apartheid as an effective system of social organisation 
and control. (26) 
In the face of the state and dominating classes' attempts to 
"cure" the crisis, the black dominated classes played a 
significant role in the new conjuncture. Wide scale popular 
unity, politicisation and mobilisation provided conditions 
whereby the "forces of opposition" greatly limited the 
efforts at reform. At points during the period the balance 
of forces between the popular classes and the power bloc was 
one either of equilibrium, or shifting in favour of the 
26 The details of developments within each of these 
periods will be extensively dealt with in the body of the 
dissertation. 
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oppressed. This significantly shifted the character of 
struggle and created a new conjuncture. 
Alongside the efforts of the National Party, other central 
groups from amongst the dominating classes also attempted to 
influence the course of events. At times leading elements 
from the capitalist community differed dramatically from the 
course adopted by the regime. (27) The right wing, 
primarily in the form of the Conservative Party sought a 
reactionary strategy which would attempt to engineer South 
African society into a form it had earlier assumed. It is 
also within this spectrum of dominating class groups that we 
locate the efforts of the PFP. 
In a fundamental respect the PFP shared with other forces 
from within the white dominating classes a commitment to 
ensuring continued ca pi tali st production ·and accumulation. 
It differed significantly in its commitment to the objective 
of an inclusive non-racial democracy. In this respect the 
patterns and courses of the PFP response were in large part 
a function of the party's liberal character. This notion is 
best illustrated through an observation of the Party's 
response to conditions of crisis in the eighties. The PFP 
was not by any means the exclusive bearer of the liberal 
tradition in the South Africa of the 1980s. Numerous other 
institutions and groups could also be defined as liberal, 
the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Black 
Sash, the English universities and churches. The PFP, 
however, could be seen as the dominant public expression of 
the liberal tradition in South Africa. 
In order to understand the PFP's responses it becomes 
necessary to investigate the character of liberalism 
generally, and its South African experience. 
27 This will also be further considered elsewhere. 
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Liberalism 
Probably the most important aspect of liberalism as an 
ideology is its contradictory · nature. Manning has argued 
that to attempt to uncover the "essential liberal programme" 
would be "doomed to failure" since 
"in the case of liberalism both policies and 
theoretical foundations constantly change." (28) 
The contradictory character of liberalism can be found in 
the "historical tension" associated with its origins. As 
Hall has stated liberalism emerged out of an opposition to 
the "old order" of feudalism, and aligned to a new emerging 
bourgeois order. The tension between the oppositional and 
aligning characteristics incorporated within liberalism both 
a progressive aspect and an "establishment" component. (29) 
Reflecting on the various strands in the liberal tradition 
Macpherson also draws attention to the duality inherent in 
it. He wrote that 
"'liberal' can mean freedom of the stronger to do 
down the weaker by following market rules; or it 
can mean equal effective freedom of all to use and 
develop their capacities. The latter freedom is 
inconsistent with the former." (30) 
The dominant character ultimately assumed by liberalism has 
been one associated with the emergence and consolidation of 
bourgeois dominance in ca pi tali st society. Within this 
framework it has undergone numerous revisions and 
alterations in an effort to meet the challenge of changing 
times. Like all ideologies liberalism is historically 
contingent. As Hall has argued 
28 Manning (1982), p 32 
29 Hall (1986), p 39 
30 Macpherson (1977), p 1 
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"Ideologies retain their relevance to changing 
circumstances only by constantly revising and 'up-
dating' their basic concepts." (31) 
Its hegemony as the ideology of the market was promoted by 
the formative intellectual work of major thi:r:ikers such as 
Locke and Smith. (32) There was, however, a second strand 
of liberalism which emerged at the same time, most notably 
at the time of the English civil war. This strand laid 
greater emphasis on social justice and freedom from want. 
During the 19th century Mill maintained this .tradition with 
his stress on the need for liberalism to be premised on the 
development of human potential, something which the market 
was not always capable of providing. The market view of 
liberalism associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie has 
however become dominant. Liberalism, wrote Macpherson, 
"has 'consciously or 'unconsciously' been assumed 
to mean 'capitalist' . This is true even though 
ethical liberals, from Mill on, tried to combine 
market freedom with self-developmental freedom, 
and tried to subordinate the former to the 
latter." (33) 
In an attempt to reclaim liberalism's radical tradition, 
Macpherson was suggesting that a liberal stance 
"need not be taken to depend forever ori an 
acceptance of capitalist assumptions, although 
historically it has been so taken. The fact that 
liberal values grew up in capitalist market 
societies is not in itself a reason why the 
central ethical principle of liberalism the 
freedom of the individual to realize his or her 
human capacities - need always be confined to such 
societies." (34) 
31 Hall (1986), p 38 
32 ibid, p 50 - 53 
33 Macpherson (1977), p 2 
34 ibid 
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It can be seen then that, despite its dominant attachment to 
the market economy of capitalism, liberalism contains within 
it an oppositional strand. This paradox lies at the heart 
of liberalism and has given rise to decisive contradictions 
in its development. Liberalism has never been a static 
ideology; or, indeed, consistent in the stances it has 
adopted. The classical liberalism of the late 18 th century 
was revised in the development of democratic liberalism, and 
again with the development of welfarism and its opposite 
"nee-liberalism" in the twentieth century. A number of 
important concepts have emerged in this evolving process 
which will now be considered. (35) 
"Classical" liberalism was premised in the first instance on 
an opposition to the feudal order and also Catholic 
dogmatism. The primary starting point of liberalism was its 
opposition to the arbitrary power accorded authority within 
these orders . Liberalism responded by stressing the need 
for the "rule of law" . It also saw the need for an open 
society in which the contractual competitive principle was 
preeminent as opposed to prescriptiveness. In this respect 
it introduced a new concept of individualism foreign to 
feudalism and Catholicism. In its formulation the liberal 
idea placed the individual "in direct confrontation with 
God". ( 36) 
Society was determined in relation to the individual's right 
to maximum freedom. It followed that the state should 
interfere as little as possible in the life of the 
individual. The sphere of individual relationships was seen 
to be "civil society". Through its three major fields - the 
family, the market, and voluntary social and political 
35 The discussion of the key concepts of liberalism is 
drawn in the main from Hall (1986), pp 39 - 43. It should 
be noted that the focus of the discussion falls in the main 
on the British strand of liberalism. 
36 Hall (1986), p 39 
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association - civil society was placed above the state in 
importance~ This was a fundamental reversal of earlier 
doctrine. 
Individuals were accorded liberty. This was defined 
negatively as freedom from constraint, and the freedom of 
individuals to pursue their own drives and interests. 
Equality was subjected to this notion of liberty, such that 
individuals were deemed to be born equal. This didn't mean, 
as Hall points out, that 
"people must have equality so that they can 
compete equally; or that those who start from a 
poorer position should be positively 
advantaged ... " (37) 
A legalistic notion of equality was linked to the negative 
conception of liberty. In this respect the concepts of 
equality before the law, and the rule of law were advanced. 
While these approaches replaced the previous arbitrary 
nature of power, they established a decidedly unequal notion 
of equality - both the prince and the pauper are free to 
sleep under the bridges of Paris! 
Liberalism introduced the notion of strong but limited 
government. It is in ·this context that the division of 
powers between legislature, executive and judiciary was 
advanced. In addition to the concept of division of power, 
liberalism also introduced the belief in representative 
government. This, however, did not necessarily imply 
democracy. Many liberals feared that they would lose the 
rights accorded them by their liberalism if they allowed 
large groups of people not versed in their ideology the 
opportunity to elect their own government. Writes Hall 
37 ibid, p 41. It is important to note that this aspect 
of classical liberalism was subsequently revised in its 
consequent development. 
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"This is yet another tension in liberalism 
between its universalistic claims on behalf of all 
citizens and its alignments with the interests of 
particular sections ·of society; between its 
commitment to representative government and its 
doubts about universal democracy." (38) 
As well as the political, civil and legal rights established 
by liberal beliefs, there was also the crucial aspect of 
economic freedom - the right to own and dispose of property, 
to hire labour, to make profits. In this sen~e liberalism 
came to assume a very definite 
interests of the bourgeoisie. 
other aspects of liberalism can 
class component linked to the 
It should be noted that the 
be seen to comprise the non-
class aspects of the liberal discourses. These aspects, 
most notably that of equality, can be articulated to the 
int~rests of other classes. 
Classical liberalism underwent significant changes in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Under the pressure of 
industrial capitalism, increasing pressures for 
democratisation and equality emerged from the dominated 
classes. Two leading liberal philosophers - Bentham and 
Mill advanced thinking within liberalism to incorporate the 
notion of extending suffrage to classes previously not 
enfranchised. Mill was particularly important in developing 
a new model of man and change which provides the basis of 
modern day liberalism. Macpherson termed his approach the 
"developmental model" of liberalism. ( 39) According to 
this approach people were perceived to be 
"capable of infinitely developing their individual 
powers and capacities, in a society whose purpose 
must be to facilitate this life-·long educative 
process." ( 40) 
38 Ibid, p 43 
39 Macphenson (1977), pp 44 - 76 
40 Hall (1986), p 60 
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On the basis of this notion the idea of gradual evolutionary 
reform was advanced which would include the gradual 
extension of the franchise and democratic institutions. As 
Manning points out such extensions, according to the liberal 
outlook, would 
"materialize in human 





development ... " 
For Bentham, Mill and other nineteenth century liberals the 
advance of the franchise would need to be very carefully 
attempted for fear of losing liberal freedoms to a mass 
vote. The incremental notion inherent in this approach 
remains a central aspect of liberalism. It is well captured 
by Manning: 
"From the liberal point of view there is no way in 
which the human condition can be radically altered 
through an organised attack on imperfection. Man 
will never be eternally freed from the corruption 
of power, the exploi ta ti on of the weak and the 
tyranny of ignorance by resort to government 
oppression or revolutionary purge. The fight 
against deprivation and moral turpitude is the 
responsibility of every individual, and any 
attempt to transform the self-moving society into 
the directed society must necessarily destroy the 
harmony and balance of its rational order. 
Liberals believe that progress has been and will 
continue to be made in the quality of human life, 
but, from the liberal point of view, all such 
progress will be piecemeal and gradual." (42) 
Liberal democracy, while introducing important democratising 
elements into liberalism, incorporated within the ideology a 
range of what Hall has termed "compromises and 
postponements"; (43) or, quite simply, contradictions: 
"Liberal democracy has tried to temper democracy 
with_ meritocracy; leaven equality in one sphere 
41 Manning (1982), p 23 
42 Ibid, p 21 
43 Hall (1986), p 61 
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with inequality in others; emancipate majorities 
and protect minorities; look with hope to personal 
self-development and the education of sensibility, 
while in its actual arrangements propose to weight 
the talents of different classes differently; 
maintaining individualism at its centre while 
hoping to secure a more positive conception of the 
common good; maintaining intact an economic system 
based on competition and acquisitiveness while 
hoping somehow to constitute the conditions for 
the self-fulfilment and educative development of 
all." (44) 
The aversion to intervention by the state into civil society 
was one of the founding principles of liberalism. With the 
development of capitalism and imperialism in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, came severe social 
and environmental problems which the laissez-faire approach 
could not deal with. State intervention was called for. 
The emergence of the assumption of extensive duties and 
responsibilities by the liberal democratic state in the 
twentieth century was a reversal of the earlier model. In 
effect it amounted to a reconstruction of liberalism under 
the pressure of changing circumstances and increased class 
struggle. A redistributive element, consciously distanced 
from socialism, was also integrated into a strand of 
liberal thinking through the efforts of major theorists such 
as Hobhouse, Hobson and Keynes. Another strand of 
liberalism made a return to the more traditional laissez-
faire free market elements of the nineteenth century. This 
aspect of liberalism is best seen in the neo-liberal sub 
stratum of Thatcherism. 
The tracing of the elements of liberal discourse and their 
historically specific nature highlights the contradictory 
character of liberalism. Not only is it an ideology which 
has a clear class component in its commitment to the 
ca pi tali st mode of production, but it also contains very 
44 ibid 
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significant non-class components which stress such values as 
liberty and equality which can, and have been, articulated 
to an oppositional class discourse. Most important for our 
purposes, however, is to understand the widely divergent 
paths that different kinds of liberals can take while at the 
same time being avowed in their commitment to the same broad 
system of ideas. An understanding of the PFP' s behaviour 
can be found through an exploration of this tension within 
its liberalism. 
Liberalism in South Africa 
Within South African liberalism we also find the dichotomy 
between a clear class commitment and that which stresses 
other aspects of the liberal tradition. While liberalism in 
South Africa has been dominantly associated with the 
development of capitalist relations, a variant which might 
be termed radical or left liberalism has developed which has 
been partisan in its support for the struggles of the 
popular classes. Notable in this respect have been groups 
like the Black Sash, The National Union of South Africa 
Students (NUSAS), the English language churches, and 
individuals involved in the liberation movement. As 
opposed to the mainstream, or centrist liberalism of groups 
such as the PFP or South African Institute of Race Relations 
who exhibit a clear class "belongingness" in their advocacy 
of a pro-capitalist stance, many left or radical liberals 
are either neutral with respect to capitalism, or adopt an 
anti-capitalist position. It should be noted that the PFP 
was also home to numerous members of this group. A strong 
theme of welfarism, and even social democracy can also be 
associated with this group, often with very strong 
philanthropic and religious roots. 
Mainstream, or centrist, liberalism can be seen to be 
associated very closely with a key segment of the capitalist 
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class, most notably that linked to English-speaking monopoly 
capital. A pivotal aspect of this group's liberalism is its 
overt advocacy of capitalism, or the free market. Its 
aversion to the prospect of revolution caused this group to 
adopt various strategies which would either limit or isolate 
the liberation movement. In turn it has staunchly promoted 
an incremental course of action. 
The above categorisation, while crude, gives a sense of the 
diverse, and even contradictory, nature of liberalism in 
South Africa. Very often the two strands - class-conscious 
and non-class liberalisms - have coexisted, most notably 
within the PFP. The effect has been to establish a tension 
within South African liberalism which can be traced to the 
origins and development of the ideology internationally. 
Conditions of crisis such as those of the forties, the late 
fifties and early sixties, and the seventies and eighties 
have illustrated this internal incoherence and conflict. 
Just as it has done internationally, liberalism within South 
Africa has adapted to changing conditions. Its South 
African history has been remarkable for the many shifts and 
divisions it has taken. It is not intended here to provide 
a comprehensive historical overview of liberalism's South 
Africa experience. Rather an attempt will be made to 
briefly sketch the central trends which illustrate the 
tensions and contradictions within its history. 
The source of liberalism in South Africa is most often 
traced to the "Cape liberals" of the nineteenth century. 
(45) The key characteristics of this period was the colour 
45 For a discussion of the history of Cape liberalism see 
Rich (1984); Trapido (1980); Lewsen (1969 - 1970); and 
Davenport (1987). Other sources on the history of 
liberalism in South Africa include Godsell (1985); Rich 
(1989); Lewsen (1988); Robertson (1971); the contributions 
of du Toit, Elphick, Butler, Lewsen, and Irvine in Butler, 
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blind application of a qualified franchise within the Cape, 
as well as the strong evangelical and philanthropic roots of 
the liberalism. Missionaries, the bearers of this 
liberalism, were greatly concerned with black education. As 
Rich states, they were 
"strongly influenced by the mid-Victorian ideal of 
social upliftment through the instilling of values 
of hard work and self-help." (46) 
At root the liberalism of the nineteenth century Cape was 
predicated on an alliance between the Eastern Cape African 
peasantry and British mercantile capital. Trapido assessed 
its nature when he wrote that 
"unlike liberalism in Britain, Cape liberalism was 
not posited on the incorporation of wage-
labourers. On the contrary, Cape liberalism 
assumed a small prosperous peasantry which could 
act as a buffer against poor peasants and the 
already declining power of chiefs. Black wage 
labourers, on the other hand, presented no 
immediate threat and required no incorporating. " 
(47) 
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Cape liberalism came under threat in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century with the development of capitalist 
relations of production associated with the nascent diamond 
and gold mining industries. The political form associated 
with this development was the ultimate incorporation of 
South Africa, the establishment of African reserves as 
sources of cheap labour, and the constituting of a racially 
exclusive state. The development of capitalist relations 
was predicated on African exclusion and designation as a 
pool of wage labourers. Consequently, as Trapido put it 
Elphick and Welsh (1987); Adam (1979); and, Leatt, Kneifel 
and Nurnberger (1986). 
46 Rich (1984), p 1 
47 Trapido (1980), p 268 
"the franchise , legal equality and the market 
place could give them (Africans - DS) a strength 
that their early twentieth-century social 
situation did not justify. Little wonder, then, 
that liberalism in its incorporationist form would 
lose its prominence as an ideology of control in 
twentieth-century South Africa" (48) 
Segregationist ideologies and policies after union in 1910 
placed liberalism on the defensive. Liberals had failed to 
extend the qualified African franchise to the northern 
provinces at the time of union. As Rich has shown the 
"dominant political logic of segregationism ultimately 
defined the direction of political thinking amongst South 
African liberals ... " (49) This activity was largely led by 
individuals acting through the South African Institute of 
Race Relations and the United Party. Many of the ideas 
formulated at this time provided the basis of much of the 
National Party's apartheid policies. The dominant idea 
shared by liberals and the Nationalists was related to the 
belief that the reserves should be the site of African 
development and guidance to the acceptance of western 
civilisation. 
Another significant stream in the liberal response was that 
of the "left liberals" such as Margaret Ballinger. In 
reaction to the popular pressures of a nascent African 
nationalist movement in the late thirties and forties, and 
with the insertion of democratic ideas being developed 
internationally, they responded by seeking to extend African 
political representation. 
The success of the National Party in the 1948 elections and 
the earlier erosion of the Cape African vote encouraged the 
establishment of the Liberal Party, which drew together the 
two strands of the successors of the Cape liberal tradition. 
48 ibid 
49 Rich (1984), p 7 
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It sought once again to incorporate black voters on a 
qualified basis. In doing so it pursued a incremental 
constitutionalism in its strategy: 
"The parliamentary nature of the party indicated 
the continued survival of a Whiggish belief in the 
political potential of Westminster-style 
constitutional systems, and this was reflected in 
the protracted resistance put up by many liberals 
in the 19505 to the removal of the Cape Coloured 
voters from the common electoral roll. In an age, 
though, of the progressive devolution of control 
by the big colonial powers to newly independent 
states in Africa and Asia, cons ti tutionalism was 
still an important political creed which was not 
yet tarred by the failure of so many of the 
Westminster-style constitutions in the 1960s." 
(50) 
The Liberal Party had an uneasy relationship with the 
liberation movement throughout the fifties, although towards 
the end of that decade it considered adopting more militant 
strategies than it had first adopted. The major point of 
conflict between the Liberal Party and the Congress Movement 
was over the issue of communism. A strong trend in the 
Liberal Party thinking which has long existed in South 
African liberal thinking was its fervent opposition to 
communism. The Party alleged that the Congress alliance was 
dominated by communists with a hidden agenda. 
The entrenchment of political apartheid in the late fifties 
and the· crisis of the early sixties saw a watershed in 
liberalism within South Africa. Liberals found themselves 
caught between the contending nationalisms of Afrikaners and 
Africans. This dichotomy was present in the subsequent 
history of liberalism throughout the sixties, seventies and 
eighties. It served to provide the major points of pressure 
38 
so ibid, p 129 
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acting on the liberal tradition, causing internal tensions 
and divisions. 
The Liberal Party experienced internal ructions and 
di visions with the radicalisation of a large part of its 
membership. Younger members even resorted to the armed 
struggle in the form of the African Resistance Movement. 
Others moved over to the Progressive Party which came to 
assume the mantle ·Of the leading liberal institution in 
South Africa. As will be shown in the next chapter liberals 
within the United Party broke away in 19 5 9 to form the 
Progressive Party advocating the incorporation of blacks on 
the basis of a qualified franchise. (51) 
Another significant trend within South African liberalism 
emerged in the sixties under the influence of American 
modernisation theory. South African liberal modernisation 
theorists, most notably Michael O'Dowd of the Anglo-American 
Corporation, contrasted what they perceived to be the 
essentially illogical system of apartheid, with the 
ultimately logical and rational system of capitalism. (52) 
The irrationality of apartheid was seen to impair the 
operation of the market system. The argument was extended 
to contend that the rationalising impact of a market economy 
would ultimately eradicate racist intrusions into the 
market. Strategically the theory encouraged accelerated 
economic development as a means to do away with apartheid. 
While the theory held currency through much of the sixties 
and seventies, the intransigence of the apartheid regime led 
to holders of this view ultimately seeing the need for 
greater voluntarist involvement in the polity. Even though 
the theory had been superseded in many respects in the 
51 This will be more fully discussed in the following 
chapter. 
52 For an account of the liberal modernisation approach 
see O'Dowd (1978); also see Wolpe (1987) pp 25 - 28; and 
Lipton (1986) pp 3 - 5. 
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eighties there was a residual notion held within the liberal 
community that accelerated economic development, and in 
particular the advancement of free market policies, would 
effect an incremental challenge to the system of apartheid. 
(53) 
Liberalism came under fire from the black consciousness 
movement and the broader liberation movement in the sixties 
and seventies forcing it to lose many of its segregationist 
"throwbacks" and to assume a greater democratic content. 
One tendency saw left liberals develop within the churches, 
as well as through the universities and organisations such 
as the Black Sash. More conservative, or mainstream, 
liberals retreated to a more gradualist incremental politics 
within the PFP and Institute of Race Relations, very often 
with close links to the liberal capitalists located within 
the Anglo American Corporation. (54) 
The history of liberalism in South Africa has been a bumpy 
one, with liberals adopting varying positions contingent on 
particular historical circumstances. A significant trend 
has been the major impact of outside forces on the liberal 
community. The impact of the entrenchments of segregation 
and the racially exclusive state, the development of popular 
politics and the consolidation and success of Afrikaner 
nationalism all played a role in its evolution. 
When liberals in the PFP attempted to respond to the crisis 
of the seventies and the eighties, their response was 
overdetermined by this history of "historical tension" 
within their ideological foundation. And, just as liberals 
53 The editor of Business Day, Ken Owen was a strong 
advocate of this view, as was the Executive Director of the 
South African Institute of Race Relations, John Kane-Berman. 
54 For a useful consideration of the impact of black 
consciousness on liberals see Rich (1989). 
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in South Africa had always done, it adapted - for better or 
worse - to the changing conditions. 
The Thesis 
This dissertation addresses a number of basic questions: 
Why did the PFP respond in a contradictory way to the 
"organic crisis" in South Africa? What was the effect of 
outside forces on the Party? To what extent did the PFP 
promote or defend the interests of big business? What role 
did the Party's ideology of liberalism play in its 
responses? 
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The dissertation will attempt to answer these and other 
questions. It takes as its starting point the varying 
responses of the Party to the conditions of structural and 
organic crisis in the eighties. The argument is advanced 
that these responses should be understood in terms of the 
nature of its liberal ideology. As I have attempted to show 
above, liberalism should be seen as an historically 
contingent ideology which is saturated with contradictions 
and tensions. This is the case for the PFP as well as where 
the tension between the class-specific and non-class 
elements of liberalism give rise to varying responses to the 
conditions of crisis, and in relation to the primary 
contending social forces. 
into sharp relief the 
The situation of crisis brings 
contours and fissures of this 
ideology, as the PFP as a political entity located within 
the dominating classes, sought to contest the outcome of the 
country's malaise. 
The class character of the Party will also be considered, 
and an attempt will be made to show that it cannot be 
reduced to being understood as a party of big business. 
Rather, its class character should be found in the nature of 
its positioning with respect to core class forces within 
both the dominating and dominated classes. As will be shown 
there was a tension within the PFP as to where it should 
locate itself. 
The dissertation follows a broadly chronological pattern as 
it investigates the most significant aspects of the Party's 
behaviour in the context of crisis and polarisation. It 
shows how the Party moved from its firm location of 
contesting the form of state within the context of the 
dominating classes; to its confused attempts to transcend 
these limits with the gradual deracialisation of politics, 
and the ascendancy of popular resistance; and finally its 
muscular assertion of a non-racial class-conscious 
liberalism in response to its gradual decline in importance 
within the context of class and popular struggle within the 
country as a whole. 
Chapter Structure 
Chapter one covers the period from the formation of the PFP 
until the 1981 general election which saw a high point in 
support for the party. This chapter will provide a context 
for understanding the Party in the eighties. 
Chapter Two considers the Party's response to state 
restructuring and reform in the early eighties. It shows 
the contradictory nature of the Party's liberalism, as well 
as its non-liberal element. 
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Chapter Three covers the crucial period from 1984 until 1986 
which saw a deepening of crisis in South Africa. It 
explores new conjunctural pressures placed on the party and 
its attempt to compete as a "third force" with both the· 
regime and the liberation movement. The period ended with 
this approach in tatters and the resignation of the leader 
Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert. 
Chapter Four examines the response of the party to its 
crisis of legitimacy in the wake of the developments in the 
immediately preceding period. It shows the polarisation 
within the party between centrists and its left wing, its 
poor election performance in 1987, and ultimately the 
establishment of the hegemony of centrist liberals within 
the party. 
Chapter Five traces the consolidation of the centrist 
liberal trend and the ultimate dissolution of the PFP in 
favour of broader reformist unity. 
The conclusion pulls together a discussion of the major 




A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PFP: 1959 - 1981 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early eighties the PFP was confronted by the need to 
respond to: growing conditions of economic and politic al 
crisis; the state's reform programme; and an ascendant 
liberation movement. Its tradition of Parliamentary 
opposition with an emphasis on gradual incrementalist 
strategies would be brought into question by the course of 
events. The eighties were, indeed, the most vigorous and 
demanding years of the Party's existence. 
Before looking at these years, however, it is necessary to 
briefly survey the preceding period in the its history. 
This chapter attempts to identify the major trends in the 
two decades from the Party's formation as the Progressive 
Party in 1959 until the early eighties. It is not intended 
that this be a comprehensive or detailed history. Rather it 
is the intention to very briefly and somewhat descriptively 
sketch the main trends in the Party's early history. As 
such many events may not be covered, but rather subsumed 
into a discussion of the broader trends associated with the 
ebb and flow of the Party story. (1) 
1 This Chapter is almost entirely drawn from Hackland 
(1984). For this reason it should be assumed that all 
sources should be attributed to his comprehensive thesis. 
THE FORMATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, 1959 
The Progressive Party was formed after the United Party 
Congress held in August 1959. At this congress debates 
which had been simmering within the UP between liberals and 
conservatives came to a head. The right wing of the UP, 
rooted mainly among Natal farmers, subscribed to crude 
views of white domination, and at the Congress launched an 
attack on the National Party government for granting more 
land to Africans as part of the homeland consolidation 
scheme. The left favoured an extension of land to Africans, 
while the centre vacillated and tried to reconcile the two 
opposing wings. 
While the right wing of the UP identified closely with the 
policies of apartheid, language and cultural differences 
prevented them from joining the National Party. The 
liberals who although, coming from all provinces, could be 
seen to be the political descendants of the Cape liberal 
tradition. They were predominantly professionals, with a 
sprinkling of industrialists and farmers. The split within 
the United Party can in part be reduced to the distinction 
in the class base of the contending groups in which 
"policy disagreements between liberals and 
conservatives broadly coincided with the different 
interests of urban-based, high technology 
producers, mainly commercial and industrial 
capitalists, and rural-based and labour intensive 
producers." (2) 
The di visions· came over issues of race policy. This was 
provoked by the massive increase in black urbanisation and 
proletarianisation in the forties and fifties. This had 
been associated with increased concentration of capital, 
2 Hackland (1984), p 45 
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especially within the manufacturing sector. The response of 
the government had been to implement the policy of 
apartheid, both as a means to entrench white domination, and 
a way to ensure political and economic control over the 
black dominated classes. The rise of African nationalism in 
the 1950s was in large part accelerated by this. Within the 
UP disagreements revolved ar.ound the most appropriate way to 
respond to this situation. This debate became particularly 
acute in the light of the declining electoral fortunes of 
the Party between 1948 and 1958. Conservative UP members 
advocated that the Party adopt a more conservative stance. 
Liberals believed that the best means of dealing with the 
threat of African nationalism was through the development 
and cooptation of a black middle class. The repression of 
black political aspirations, they believed, was no longer 
appropriate. 
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In August 1959, a group of liberals left the UP. A 
Progressive Steering Committee was established, and in 
November 1959 the Progressive Party was launched with Jan 
Steytler as its leader, and with nine members of Parliament. 
The Party was also founded with the support of the chief 
funder of the UP, Harry Oppenheimer. The primary policy 
platform was that the country should depart from racial 
discrimination in the form of the colour bar, towards a 
"civilisation bar" based on merit. The implications of this 
basis for policy was that the Party promoted the gradual 
extension to blacks of economic and political rights denied 
them in the past. The means whereby this could be achieved 
was a qualified franchise, and the advancement of education 
and training for blacks. 
This stance was in keeping with the paternalism and 
segregationist notions associated with a central trend in 
South African liberalism. Whereas the PP became the heirs 
to this trend, the Liberal Party, increasingly radicalised 
during the fifties, extended the left liberal tradition. At 
the same time as the PP was calling for a qualified vote, 
the Liberal Party adopted the policy of a universal 
franchise. It is not, therefore, surprising to see that the 
Party called for residential segregation, as well as 
separate schools and amenities for the different race 
groups. The Party went as far as to provide for separate 
black and white branches within its own structure. 
Harry Oppenheimer described the Party as "conservative" in 
the sense that it sought to protect the interests of 
capitalism. ( 3) The PP sought to protect "western 
civilisation" and ward off the threat of communism. It 
believed that through the cooptation of a black middle 
class, the protection of individual rights while protecting 
racial "minorities", the threats of African nationalism and 
communism could be defused. Oppenheimer's views were far-
sighted by the standards of capitalists at the time. As a 
consequence of the views held by Oppenheimer not being 
dominant among capitalists at the time, the Party failed to 
make much of an impact within the business community, which 
was in the main divided in its support between the National 
Party and the United Party. 
THE EARLY YEARS: 1960 - 1966 
The electoral performance of the Party in the sixties 
reflected broader developments within the country. In the 
period immediately after its formation the country was 
thrown into the post-Sharpeville crisis which included the 
banning of the ANC and PAC, as well as a flight of capital 
from the country. The PP rejected the declaration of a 
3 ibid, p 158 
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state of emergency and the bannings of organisations as 
these actions ran counter to the liberal values of freedom 
of choice and association. The PP was the only white party 
to unequivocally oppose the state on these points, and 
because of this it attracted considerable support at the 
1961 elections. Although the Party only managed to hold 
onto the seat of Helen Suzman in Houghton - a stronghold of 
liberal capitalists - it nevertheless managed to win 8,6% of 
the vote. ( 4) It gained in votes at the United Party's 
expense such that in the seats contested by both parties the 
UP received 83 000 votes, as opposed to the 56 000 of the 
pp. ( 5) 
The Party made important organisational gains in the early 
sixties. It doubled its membership between November 1960 
and March 1962, while at the same time increasing its number 
of branches by 50% (6) This growth was almost exclusively 
amongst affluent English-speaking city dwellers. 
The organisational growth, however, did not match what 
became a declining electoral performance. In the 1966 
general elections, as in 1961, Helen Suzman managed to win 
her constituency, but the total vote for the Party declined 
by 43% despite an increase in the number of seats contested. 
( 7 ) 
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A significant trend of this period was the very close 
relationship between Harry Oppenheimer and the Party. He 
played an important consultative role in the formation of 
the Party, as well as in the development of policy. Not 
only did the PP closely represent the interests of large 
scale capital such as his Anglo American at the policy 
4 ibid, p 162 
5 ibid, p 164 
6 ibid, p 173 
7 ibid, p 184 
level, but it was also heavily dependent on his financial 
patronage. In 1966 his personal contribution to the Party 
coffers amounted to 80% of its income. He also influenced 
the Party to seek a closer relationship with businesspeople 
who were considered to make up a "natural constituency". 
At the ideological and policy level the Party advocated a 
view which defended and promoted the interests of 
businessmen. At the time of the Sharpeville crisis the 
Party focussed on the argument that the economic damage 
caused by the prevailing conditions was rooted in apartheid. 
When the economy picked up in the mid-sixties the Party, in 
keeping with liberal modernisation theories then the vogue, 
argued that accelerated growth would lead to the demise of 
apartheid. 
The Party had a vacillating relationship with the black 
community. After its formation the PP sought an interactive 
relationship with the liberation movement. The ANC responded 
positively to this. After the banning of the ANC and PAC 
and the turn to armed struggle the stance of the Party 
changed dramatically. The PP no longer saw itself as a white 
group sympathetic to the call for black rights, but rather 
as a bastion of "western civilisation" against the extremes 
of African and Afrikaner nationalism. Not all in the Party 
agreed with the view that it should distance itself from the 
liberatory organisations. A memorandum drawn up by Donald 
Molteno and Peggy Roberts argued that PP success in the 
white community would flow from it being seen by voters as 
able to resolve the South African conflict through having a 
close relationship with leading elements in the black 
community. Since they felt that the Party was unlikely to 
recruit a significant number of black members they argued 
for a close working relationship with black political 
organisations. the Party after some debate rejected this 
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view in the belief that it should have an independent 
identity. 
The Party never succeeded in recruiting many African members 
despite attempting to do so in competition with popular 
resistance organisations. This was at the same time as it 
was gradually taking a harder line view in opposition to the 
liberation movement. Party leaders travelled abroad to 
oppose the diplomatic initiatives of the ANC and PAC, 
especially the campaign for sanctions. 
In the face of a poor performances in winning white support 
the Party, the PP decided to contest the four Cape 
Provincial "coloured seats" in 1965. Since 1956 there had 
been a boycott of these seats by many in the coloured 
community, and at its formation the Party decided to respect 
this situation. During the course of the years that 
followed, as the animosity between it and radical 
organisations grew, the Party became more comfortable with 
the idea of contesting these. It launched what became a 
successful membership drive in the coloured community in 
1964 with ten new branches being established that year. It 
won two of the seats in the Cape election in 1965. 
Motivated by this success and by growing links with the 
anti-apartheid Transkei Democratic Party, the PP positioned 
itself more firmly in antagonism to Afrikaner nationalism on 
the one hand, and the liberation movement on the other. It 
assumed a stance as a "third force" in South African 
politics, and believed that this would stimulate white 
electoral support for it. This was, however, not to be. 
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REORGANISATION: 1966 - 1973 
The late sixties and early seventies were years of relative 
stability in the economic and political arenas, which were 
reflected in a slowdown in the performance of the Party. 
The poor electoral performances of the immediately preceding 
period played itself out in a leadership crisis and 
financial insecurity. 
Following the 1966 elections Oppenheimer had made it clear 
that his continued patronage would be conditional on the 
Party improving its organisation and electoral strategy. 
Colin Eglin took over as leader in 1971 and set about 
redirecting party energies. The target constituencies of 
the Party were more closely identified and a decision was 
taken to concentrate especially on the business community 
and the youth. Zach de Beer's argument was accepted that 
it was necessary for the Party to seek a secure base among 
the progressive elements of the white community, most 
notably businessmen. He argued that this group, while small 
in numbers, constituted the "trendsetters" in society 
seeking progress, technology and a new urban industrial 
South Africa. This group was the closest to "the people of 
the great western nations - the nations who support the same 
ideals as do the Frogs". (8) 
In addition to focussing its target group, the Party also 
decided to focus on six or seven key constituencies in 
affluent English-speaking urban areas. It was in these 
seats that it had historically received its greatest 
support. 
8 ibid, p 287 
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As a result of the reorganisation the Party, while not 
improving on its sole Parliamentary seat, significantly 
improved its performance in the 1970 General Election. It 
improved its vote in six priority seats by an average of 
nearly 2000 votes per seat as compared to the 1966 results. 
It received a total of 51 760 votes for its 19 candidates, 
as against the 41 065 it received for 28 in the 1966 poll. 
( 9 ) 
Following the elections the Party, motivated by its improved 
performance, embarked on a new programme to attract 
Afrikaner support and to interact with homeland leaders. 
This was possible on account of the fact that Harry 
Oppenheimer agreed to continue being the primary funder of 
the party at a rate twice that in 1966. 
CRISIS AND SUCCESS: 1974 - 1981 
A decline in the cohesiveness of the white dominating 
classes which was associated with the emergence of severe 
structural and conjunctural crisis in the seventies resulted 
in the Party becoming the Official Opposition in 1977. This 
came after a five year period which saw the development of 
severe constraints on continued accumulation as a result 
both of South Africa's location in the world economy, as 
well as the structural inability of apartheid to ensure the 
necessary conditions for the supply of labour and domestic 
consumption. Capitalists increasingly came to see the need 
for an increase in the supply of skilled labour. This was 
necessitated by increased monopolisation and the relative 
growth of the manufacturing sector. The emergence of 
nascent labour organisation and industrial action placed 
9 ibid, p 290 
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capital on the defensive. Politically the period saw the 
gradual reemergence of political militancy among the 
dominated classes. The rise of black consciousness, the 
impact of the success of the liberation movements in 
Mozambique and Angola, and the wave of resistance which 
started in Soweto in June 1976 made this a period which was 
dramatic in it proportions, and extensive in its impact. 
The Progressive Party capitalised on the United Party's 
inability to cohere in its efforts to respond to the 
changing situation in the seventies. Following the 1973 
strikes, the 1974 elections saw a significant number of 
former UP voters switching allegiance to the Progressive 
Party. As it had in the early sixties, the PP also received 
support from voters fearful of the implications of a rising 
working class following the strike wave of 1973. The Party 
won seven seats in the 1974 General Election, taking 6,42% 
of the vote as compared to the 3,5% it registered in 1970. 
(10) Shortly after the elections the Party won another seat 
in a by-election. 
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In the period before and after the 1974 election the Party 
engaged in a programme of contact with homeland leaders. 
This came in the wake of the PP becoming a whites-only party 
following the 1968 legislation outlawing mixed parties. It 
returned to the strategy it had rejected in 1962 - to seek 
cooperation with black political organisations. In an 
attempt to show that there was black support for its 
policies, the Party from 1973 held a series of high-profile 
meetings with leaders of African countries, as well as with 
the leaders of South Africa's bantustans. In particular a 
close relationship developed with Chief Minister Buthelezi 
and the Inkatha movement. No effort was made to make 
contact with black consciousness and other radical groups. 
10 ibid, p 327 
This served to alienate the Party from the liberation 
movement. 
The gathering crisis set in process major developments for 
the Party. Within the sphere of white Parliamentary 
politics the United Party was increasingly wracked by 
divisions. In 1975 a group of reformists within its ranks 
broke away under Harry Schwarz' s leadership to form the 
Reform Party. After negotiations the PP and the new party 
agreed to merge and form the South African Progressive 
Reform Party under Eglin's leadership. The Party now had 11 
MPs, 12 MPCs, and one. senator. The image of a potentially 
effective Party boosted its support such that in 1975 23% of 
white voters backed it. The 1976 uprisings brought further 
shifts in opposition ranks. The United Party split under 
the pressure of financial bankruptcy and the withdrawal of 
important business support. Enlightened reformists who had 
remained in the UP after the Reform Party split in 19 7 7 
merged with the PRP to form the Progressive Federal Party. 
They brought with them five MPs, one senator and one MPC. 
The 1977 elections, called early by Vorster in the hope of 
capitalising on the opposition disunity saw the PFP become 
the Official Opposition with 18 seats, compared with the 17 
it entered the elections with. The PFP vote was double that 
of the PP in 1974, while the NP achieved its biggest ever 
majority, increasing its number of seats .from 116 to 134. 
The two other of £shoots from the UP reduced their standing 
with the New Republic Party winning 10 seats as opposed to 
the 23 it had before the election; and the South African 
party reducing its seats from six to three. (11) 
The Party responded to the Soweto resistance with a 
combination of calls for reform, and for the convening of a 
11 ibid, pp 364 - 365 
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National Convention, as well as hardline appeals for law and 
order. The context after Soweto, however, presented a new 
scenario for the Party both in its relation to black 
demands, and with respect to the development of a reformist 
programme by the government. 
At the policy level the Party shifted from the call for a 
qualified franchise and provisions for "voluntary" 
segregation. Following a constitutional study by a rising 
figure in the Party, Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, a framework 
of consociational democracy was adopted as PFP policy. This 
approach would be based on a universal franchise, but sought 
to avoid majority rule and "black domination" through a 
combination of provisions for federal decentralisation, and 
minority vetoes, the size of which were not specified, but 
assumed to be 15%. While the policy was an attempt to 
accommodate the rising demands of democracy from the 
dominated classes, black leaders were not forthcoming in 
support of the proposals. 
Party policy also came to assume a closer reflection of the 
broad needs of capitalist development than in the past. The 
Party echoed closely the calls of business leaders for urban 
upgrading, and the extension of trade union rights. It 
joined the chorus of appeals for investment in South Africa, 
and opposed disinvestment. This was motivated on the 
patronising basis that it was in the interests of black 
South Africans that the economy not be threatened. The 
fears of a radicalisation in black politics and the rise of 
a potentially revolutionary working class movement saw 
increasing appeals by PFP public representatives for a 
decisive move away from apartheid so that "free enterprise" 
not be threatened. It was in this context that the Party 
developed an economic programme strongly committed to market 
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relations, but which incorporated significant welfare 
provisions. (12) 
The development of the regime's reform strategy established 
fears that the Party would be superseded by the National 
party in harnessing white supporters of political change. A 
particular point of concern was that the Party was not 
attracting sufficient Afrikaner support. It was in this 
context that Van Zyl Slabbert was elected as the Party 
leader in place of Colin Eglin in 1979. Despite this move, 
internal divisions were emerging within the Party. 
A number of reformists who had joined the Party from the 
United Party increasingly identified with the state's 
attempts at reforming provisions for industrial relations, 
influx control as well as the initial discussions on 
constitutional reform. An MP, Jappie Basson, was expelled 
from the Party as he disagreed with the Party's negative 
response to the establishment of the President's Council to 
investigate a new constitutional dispensation. The PC, 
while incorporating coloureds and Indians, excluded the 
participation of Africans. The Party was divided in its 
response. Helen Suzman represented a faction vehemently 
opposed to participation in this structure as she feared it 
would increase racial polarisation. Slabbert' s approach, 
which held sway, sought to encourage the government's steps 
towards reform but would not participate in the structure as 
it excluded a major section of the population. Basson 
refused to accept this view and was forced to leave the 
Party in 1980. 
The division and mixed messages from the Party over its 
response to government reforms set the stage for the 
eighties. Its initial test was to be in the 1981 General 
12 This is extensively discussed in Chapter Two. 
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Election called by Prime Minister Botha 18 months ahead of 
the required date. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESPONSE TO REFORM: 1981 - 1983 
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
The early years of the 1980s were marked by the state's 
efforts at implementing a reform programme as part of its 
"total strategy". These developments played themselves out 
against a background which quickly moved from ill-founded 
gold-boom optimism to looming economic crisis. A new spirit 
of resistance grew amongst the black dominated classes as 
they responded to the new conjuncture established by the 
state's efforts. The period also saw long standing 
alliances within the dominating classes come to an end, and 
new ones established. 
The economy during this period was initially propelled by a 
short boom in 1980 and 1981 associated with a sudden 
increase in the price of gold. This upswing served to mask 
a deeper malaise within the economy which soon became 
evident. The gold boom encouraged increased domestic 
spending which was financed by a dramatic rise in foreign 
borrowings. Balance of payments deficits resulted in 1981 
and 1982 as the country slowly slid into a recession. In 
both 1982 and 1983 there was a negative growth rate. 
Encouraging the recession was the Reserve Bank's monetarist 
fiscal policy approach which sought to control the growth in 
the rate of money supply, and saw the bank rate rise from 
9,5% to 17% within 1981 alone. (1) Employment opportunities 
dried up as the unemployment rate reached an estimated total 
of 21% in 1981. ( 2) Economic policy shifts in early 1983 
saw the abolition of the financial Rand giving rise to an 
1 Cassim (1986), p 7 
2 Charles Simkins quoted in Wilson and Ramphele (1989), 
p 85 
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outflow of foreign capital. The business community 
immediately sought to compensate by once again going abroad 
in pursuit of loans. Not only did this accelerate the 
importation of world recessionary conditions, but it also 
established a platform for further economic decline and 
crisis. 
It was in these conditions of negative growth that the 
government initiated a number of reforms responding, in 
particular, to the demands of an ever more anxious business 
community. This phase of the reform programme, bearing many 
of the hallmarks of a "passive revolution" (3) can be termed 
"total strategy" after the name given it by the security 
establishment. The origin of this phase of reform can be 
traced to the Vorster government, which had embarked on 
reforms most reluctantly. The security establishment 
assessing the situation under Vorster to be amounting to an 
inadequate response appealed for a comprehensive state 
response which was termed "total strategy". This approach 
came to be dominant within the state with the coming to 
power of PW Botha in 1978. It was envisaged as a 
comprehensive response to the growing crisis, and attempted 
to overcome the limits in the political economy and system 
of control associated with apartheid. 
The "total strategy" reforms were cast firmly within the 
framework of Grand Apartheid. They included key 
developments with respect to the controls and organisation 
of labour formulated in the main by the 1979 Wiehahn and 
Riekert Commissions of Inquiry. As well as legalising 
African trade unions, the reforms also acknowledged the 
permanence of urban Africans, while still being wedded ·to 
the notion of bantustan economic viability and political 




representation. According to Morris and Padayachee this 
phase of reform could be characterised as 
"a kind of 'selective Fordist' response; an 
attempt at incorporating a protected 'insider' 
urban black population, whilst compartmentalising 
the marginalised, unemployed, unemployable 
population in the bantustans. The basic idea that 
knitted it all together was for the economic and 
political policies to stimulate new demand, 
arising out of the increased wages for the 
'insiders', at least part of which would pe offset 
by increases in productivity." (4) 
Associated with the' Riekert reforms was a switch to 
increasingly monetarist free market economic policies 
whereby important financial protections were lifted in the 
hope of alleviating the pressures on the previous growth 
model which had been highly dependent on interventionist 
policy. As has been shown above this did not prove to be 
the case. 
The principal political aspects of "total strategy" were the 
establishment of Black Local Authorities intended to provide 
a forum for local level African representation; and, the 
tricameral Parliament which, while retaining the absolute 
dominance of the white regime, incorporated coloureds and 
Indians as junior partners. Associated with these 
developments was a degree of political liberalisation which 
provided legal space for the growth of mass popular 
resistance. Repression was, however, not removed from the 
state's repertoire of tactics in dealing with the dominated 
classes. 
The "total strategy" reforms defined a new conjuncture which 
saw a resurgence in popular resistance. At the forefront of 
this wave was the independent trade union movement which 
exploited the possibilities offered by the Wiehahn reforms. 











residence in urban areas, and also migrant workers who were 
not. Growing quickly in the early eighties, labour 
organisation received a boost with an unprecedented strike 
wave lasting from 1981 until 1983. Despite divisions within 
the labour movement regarding the political role of trade 
unions, there was extensive political activity by organised 
labour in antagonism to the state. (5) 
Alongside the growth of industrial organisation, community 
and student organisation also grew in this period, at first 
focussing on issues of local concern, and later expanding to 
encompass national demands for democracy. This movement 
came to fruition with the formation of the United Democratic 
Front in 1983. As an alliance of unions, community, 
student, youth and professional groups it constituted a 
significant challenge to the state reform programme, and 
would in future years contribute significantly to its 
failure. Politically, the UDF represented a revival of the 
non-racial Charterist tradition established by the Congress 
Alliance in the fifties. The ANC at this time was focussing 
its energies on building an underground movement in the 
country, while also accelerating the armed struggle, 
especially at the time of the introduction of the new 
constitution. Black 
still a force and was 
Peoples' Organisation 
National Forum. 
consciousness, while on the wane, was 
represented in the main by the Azanian 
(Azapo), and the alliance known as the 
Significant changes were also occurring within the 
dominating classes, most notably the readjustment in the 
5 Debates within the Trade Union movement were well 
covered by the South African Labour Bulletin during this 
period. See e.g., Forster (1982), Food and Canning Workers 
Union (1982), General Workers Union (1983), and Njikelana 
(1984) 
hegemony of the leading elements of the National Party. The 
1981 elections can be seen as marking a decisive moment in 
the unravelling of the National Party's hegemony over an 
alliance of Afrikaans class forces. The ascendance of the 
National Party in the forties had been dependent on its 
forging a unifying discourse for Afrikaans workers, middle 
classes and an emergent bourgeoisie. Facilitated by 
conditions of accelerated economic growth during the 1960s, 
the Afrikaans bourgeoisie come into its own. No longer was 
it dependent to the extent it had been in the past on the 
political support of the Afrikaans working and lower middle 
classes. The needs of this emergent class together with the 
consequences of the failure of the policy of apartheid in 
ensuring conditions for continued accumulation in the 1970s 
had seen the NP make its first tentative moves away from the 
policy tradition which had forged the historic bloc of 
Afrikaner nationalism. (6) 
In effect a new alliance of big Afrikaans and English 
capital, together with key sections of the white middle 
classes came to be represented by the regime. The 
"verkramptes" within the National Party broke away in 1982 
to form the Conservative Party. In doing so they were the 
heirs to the Afrikaner Nationalist tradition, albeit on a 
new social basis in that principal class forces previously 
part of the Afrikaner historic bloc, now stayed with the 
National Party. The formation of the Conservative Party 
brought about a realignment of forces within the white bloc 
such that the National party assumed the mantle of being the 
centre party with the CP and PFP on either side of it. This 
location served to draw significant support away from the 
PFP as will be shown in this chapter. 
6 See O'Meara (1983) for a detailed discussion of the 
rise of Afrikaner Nationalism. 
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As has been mentioned a key component of the realignment in 
the base of the NP and in its reform programme was a 
concerted effort to woo the business community. Since 1976 
leading elements within capital had been calling for 
increased reform in order to ward off the possibility of 
revolution, and to ensure continued accumulation. While the 
response from within this class cannot be considered to be 
entirely homogeneous there existed considerable 
differences regarding emphasis and, indeed, vested_ interests 
it remained the case that there was an overwhelming 
orientation towards gradual top-down incremental change. An 
important focus of attention was on the system of influx 
control and labour relations which had not only proved to be 
politically explosive, but also threatened the ongoing basis 
of capitalist growth. That government responded to these 
demands from business was indicative of its enthusiasm to 
consolidate a base within the business 





business community. Notable events in the increased linkage 
between the state and business were the summit conferences 
at the Carlton Hotel in 1979, and the Good Hope Centre in 
1981. 
At the first conference the government announced plans for 
the removal of restrictions which inhibited the operation of 
free enterprise, the establishment of the Small Business 
Development Corporation, rationalisation of state 
development corporations as well as programmes to develop 
rural areas in conjunction with "homeland" governments. (7) 
The Good Hope Conference saw the government introduce a 
major economic decentralisation package which sought to 
divide South Africa into eight development regions. Also on 
the agenda were the discussion of the removal of 
restrictions on free enterprise, the provision of skills 
7 Indicator SA, 4 (4) 1987, p 34 
training to alleviate black unemployment and the elimination 
of "unjustifiable" racial discrimination in order to 
, increase economic freedom. (8) 
Both conferences were cautiously welcomed by business 
leaders, although there was general disappointment expressed 
after the Good Hope Conference at the slow pace at which 
reform was taking place. According to the Anglo American 
Corporation chairman Harry Oppenheimer, there was not a 
single business leader at the conference who did not support 
an end to racial discrimination. He said that the general 
feeling was that racial discrimination was not being removed 
fast enough. He also stressed the need to accelerate reform 
with respect to the mobility of labour, a view echoed by the 
Chairman of Barlow Rand, Mike Rosholt, in. a speech to the 
conference. The need to provide training to advance the 
·skills of black workers was also stressed by Rosholt. ( 9) 
He also expressed the view of many within business when he 
called for a clear statement of government's reform 
programme: 
"Business believes there is an absolute necessity 
for Government to spell out in detail its long-
term strategy both political and socioeconomic, 
because without this basic data it cannot plan its 
own long-term." (10) 
Despite these reservations the business community provided 
an ongoing source of support for government culminating in 
its majority backing of the tricameral constitution at the 
referendum in 1983. 
This chapter in the history of the PFP was most 
significantly informed by the government's reform programme. 
8 ibid 
9 South African Foundation News, 7 (12) 1981 
10 ibid 
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It provided a new challenge to the party as the regime was 
now moving into the policy territory traditionally occupied 
by the PFP. At times the Party seriously considered 
endorsing the major aspects of government's reform 
pro9ramme; at others it considered the possibility that it 
could enter into an alliance with the regime. As a 
consequence the Party experienced internal conflict and 
division regarding its response to reform. Two themes can 
be isolated which illuminate the Party's experience during 
this time. 
The first concerns the make-up of the Party at this time as 
a loose amalgam, which although predominated by liberals, 
also included a significant number of reformists not as 
dedicated to the liberal tradition. When the Party was 
farced to respond to government reform moves, there was a 
natural process of attrition which saw the loss of these 
reformists. 
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The second, and possibly more significant, theme is that 
related to an understanding of the nature of the liberalism 
of the Party at this time. The question could be asked as 
to why a Party which was avowedly liberal could contemplate 
supporting the apart:\'leid government at times, as it did 
during the period reviewed by this chapter? 
The class-conscious nature of the Party's liberalism 
dictated the terms of its interactions at this time. While 
the non-class elements of its discourse remained intact, 
there was an overriding emphasis during this period on 
incremental reform and opposition to revolution. Despite 
not sharing a complete coincidence in thinking with the 
business community on many aspects of economic policy, the 
Party was ultimately committed to a path of capitalist 
development. Politically this stance manifested itself in 
the style of constitutional incrementalism long a hallmark 
J 
of liberalism. In so doing it countenanced the real 
possibility of close cooperation with the regime if this 
would gradually shift the country away from apartheid. The 
relationship between the PFP and the ruling party could in 
this sense be described as being one of difference rather 
than being based on a fundamental antagonism. Both the NP 
and the PFP were ultimately committed to continued capital 
accumulation. 
The question might be asked then: Why did the PFP 
eventually not throw its weight behind the regime's 
initiatives? The answer might be found in considering that 
the Party's response was overdetermined by the non-class 
components of its discourse most notably those associated 
with civil rights and. non-racialism. This overdetermination 
saw to its opposing most government moves. 
The duality in the PFP's response was based in this tension 
which this chapter intends to highlight. In subsequent 
chapters it will be shown how the ten·sion severely 
incapacitated the Party. 
The chapter considers the following developments: the 
Party's successes at the 1981 General election and its 
subsequent debate concerning its response to the government 
reforms; the consideration of an alliance with the regime in 
the "balance of power" strategy"; the response to the 
referendum on the new constitution; the PFP's relationship 
with the business community; and, its links with the black 
popular classes. 
IN THE WAKE OF THE 1981 GENERAL ELECTION 
The 1981 election results consolidated the PFP as the 
official opposition in the House of Assembly. It also 
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marked the growth of a right wing, both within the National 
Party and outside of it, mobilised by the increasing moves 
towards political reform advanced by the dominant verligte 
faction within the governing party. This situation posed 
new opportunities and challenges for the PFP. 
The 1981 General Election results were most notable for 
marking a decline in the fortunes of the National Party, a 
rise in support for right wing parties, and a consolidation 
of the PFP as the official opposition. 
The campaign was hard fought with only 14 uncontested seats 
as against 44 in 1977. The PFP contested 76 seats as 
opposed to the 59 it fought at the previous poll. 
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While the NP gained 56% of the vote (65% in 1977), the PFP 
improved its share from 17% to 19%. (11) This translated 
into 26 seats, up 9 on its 1977 performance. Because the 
Party contested many previously uncontested seats the 
percentage gains in other seats are masked by the overall 
national performance. In those seats that it contested both 
in 1977 and 1981, the PFP's share of the vote went up from 
13,8% to 19,9%. (12) The Party made important gains in most 
cities. In Johannesburg it drew votes away from the NP and 
NRP in many constituencies. In Bezuidenhout it made a gain 
of 10%, as it did in the wealthy constituencies of Bryanston 
( 9%), Sandton ( 21%), and Edenvale ( 26%). ( 13) It made 
inroads into affluent Pretoria seats such as Waterkloof, 
while in Cape Town it registered gains in every seat ranging 
between 6% and 21%. (14) 
11 Charney (1982), p 530 
9 ibid, p 530 
10 ibid, p 530 
14 ibid, p 530 
The Party made its hoped-for breakthrough in Natal, where it 
had strategically focussed in the main on the parliamentary 
elections leaving the NRP free to take control of the Natal 
Provincial Council. Whereas the PFP held only one Natal 
seat going into the election, it emerged with six new Natal 
MPs. ( 15) 
The Party also won the traditional opposition seats of 
Albany, Walmer and PE Central which had been lost in three-
cornered fights at the 1977 elections. (16) 
Nationally the PFP's gains were made· largely at the expense 
of the NRP' s losses. Charney estimates that 50% of the 
PFP's net gain came as a result of NRP losses. This meant 
that there was a real swing from the NP to the PFP of only 
about 3%. ( 17) In effect the 1981 election consolidated 
the PFP's position as the official opposition while the real 
fight that was emerging in white politics was that between 
the ruling NP and the emergent right wing. The NRP was fast 
going into decline with its voters largely defecting to the 
PFP on its left and the NP on its right. 
At the time of the 1981 elections the right was represented 
by the HNP and Connie Mulder's Conservative National Party, 
the forerunner of the Conservative Party. While the right 
did not take any seats they considerably dented the 
performance of the NP in traditional Afrikaner nationalist 
seats. While the NP held onto these seats it was 
considerably shaken by the performance of the right wing. 
The electoral consequence of the NP's gestures towards 
reform had seen the right wing parties improve their vote 
from a mere 3% in 1977 to 15% in 1981. This translated into 
15 Hackland (1984), p 398 
16 Charney (1982), p 531 
17 ibid, p 531 
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200 000 votes. ( 18) In certain farming and mining seats 
the HNP's share of the vote rose from a low of between 3% 
and 10% to 30%. The scale of the threat to the National 
Party from the right was further highlighted by internal 
division between party verligtes and verkramptes. 
Increasingly a vocal and militant right wing within the 
National Party was mobilizing and would subsequently break 
away a year after the election. (19) 
In managing the emerging crisis within white politics the 
National Party under PW Botha attempted at the same time to 
appeal to both verligte and verkrampte voters. An opinion 
poll taken by The Star six weeks before polling day in 1981 
showed that 71% of verligte voters, as well as 68% of 
verkramptes felt that PW Botha was moving in the right 
direction. (20) But the efficacy of this course of action 
would be greatly limited by the split in the National Party 
· and the formation of the Conservative Party as the standard 
bearer of the traditional Afrikaner nationalist discourse, 
albeit on the basis of a class alliance which excluded key 
sectors associated with its rise. Most notable in this 
respect was the now mature Afrikaans bourgeoisie whose 
interests coincided increasingly with those of other sectors 
of capital, and not with the concerns of the Afrikaans 
working and lower middle classes. 
The National Party in the meantime was beginning to forge a 
new alliance made up in the main of elements of both the 
English and Afrikaans speaking bourgeoisie and middle 
classes. With the cautious approval and support of the 
business community the NP set about building a new historic 
bloc to power its reform programme. 
18 Charney (1982), p 529 
19 Lemon (1982), p 512 
20 Charney (1982), p 539 
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The approach of the PFP after the elections was heavily 
informed by these developments. The primary focus of PFP 
action and policy was the National Party government. In 
this task the party was dealing with a different animal from 
that of the past. With the growing crisis of apartheid 
government had started edging towards a reformist programme. 
To the extent that this policy marked a departure from 
apartheid, government moves were now encroaching in what had 
traditionally been the exclusive terrain of the PFP within 
white politics. A creative response was called for. 
Slabbert spelt out three areas for the Party to concentrate 
on in the period immediately after the 1981 elections. 
These were to "clearly and understandably state alternatives 
to the government's policies"; "expose sham reforms and keep 
up the pressure for genuine and fundamental reforms"; and, 
"combat racial polarization and extremism by keeping open 
dialogue and emphasising the need for negotiation." ( 21) 
Another strong theme in PFP thinking was that it should give 
support to government in its reform moves. 
A common theme in PFP thinking at the time was that of 
ongoing structural changes within the society that had to be 
imaginatively met by government with visionary policy. A 
failure to meet the imperatives of a growing population, 
unemployment and the need for high level skills would mean 
that the contradictions of apartheid would become acute. 
The Party's approach reflected the dominance of a centrist 
class conscious liberalism discourse within its ranks. 
Whereas the Party at times adopted positions at variance 
with the demands of many capitalists, as will be shown 
below, it operated within a broad rubric which stressed 
incremental change, most notably at the socioeconomic level. 
In this respect its thinking coincided with the emerging 
21 ibid 
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thrust within the bourgeoisie which advocated gradual reform 
and accelerated economic growth as a basis to move away from 
apartheid. While this thinking differed in many respects 
from the liberal modernization theories of the sixties and 
seventies, it retained important residual elements of it. 
In this sense Slabbert indicated that it was important that 
government be in a position to initiate evolutionary changes 
in advance of structural pressures and so avoid "revolution, 
violent or subversive change". ( 22) This would raise the 
likelihood of evolutionary and predictable change. He went 
on to note that to ensure evolutionary change, 
"the responsibility and initiative for such change 
must come from the white parliament, for it alone 
.has the sovereign power to create the conditions 
for such change." (23) 
The rationale behind this stance was explained by Slabbert 
in terms of the immense hold that the state had over the 
power of coercion which would make change from below by the 
black community, i.e. revolution, highly unlikely. He later 
explained this thinking when he argued that: 
"Given the constellation of power - the control 
over the instruments of coercion, the power of the 
state - you couldn't really open up the situation 
unless there was an initiative from those in 
power", and that 
"the dynamics of the situation were such that I 
never accepted that a revolutionary collapse was 
objectively possible." (24) 
While it was necessary for whites to take the initiative in 
reform it was stressed elsewhere by Slabbert that this group 
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"A start would be to recognise that the 
acceptability, adequacy and success of reform does 
not, and cannot, depend on one group alone in 
South Africa. It must at least lie in the dynamic 
interaction between white initiative and black 
response to it." (25) 
Despite this qualification, Slabbert saw the responsibility 
for change as resting primarily with the contesting groups 
within the white power bloc. This aspect of PFP policy was 
an essential characteristic of the Party's response to the 
crisis in the early eighties. In the absence of a coherent 
and mobilised liberation movement amongst the popular 
classes, it was comfortable for the Party to maintain what 
amounted to a residue of South African liberalism's tendency 
towards paternalism. The argument went that since the 
government was not perceived to be succeeding in the task of 
initiating change from above, the PFP was to encourage it to 
do so. The idealistic belief was expressed that government 
would do so since "ultimately people will resort to reason 
to resolve problems". (26) 
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Drawing on the Party's history, the notion was also advanced 
that the PFP should be an "effective opposition". This view 
is perhaps best understood when seeing it not in the 
negative sense of opposing government, but from the 
increasing references to the Party as encouraging government 
in its reform process. Slabbert argued that the PFP should 
not completely reject government reforms but needed to judge 
their adequacy on criteria that should not be based on the 
"quagmire of party political relativity". (27) Drawing on a 
liberal philosophical base the criteria according to which 
government reforms should be assessed were four-fold: 
25 Leadership 1(4) 1982 
26 Rand Daily Mail, 30 May 1981 
27 Leadership, op cit 
1) the reform should ensure the rights of citizenship 
for all; 
2) it must not exclude any group from constitutional 
bargaining on racial or ethnic lines; 
3) it must not place or maintain any racially 
discriminating measure in the way of anyone's 
economic progress; and, 
4) it must not increase or maintain social 
deprivation in respect of education, welfare, 
housing, transport, etc. (28) 
, 
The PFP thus set out in the period after the elections both 
critical of government, but also willing to engage closely 
with it in the pursuit of political reform. 
THE BALANCE OF POWER STRATEGY 
The long-brewing split in the National Party eventually 
occurred on 23 February 1982 when Andries Treurnicht led a 
group of 23 MPs from the NP's caucus. Later a group of 16 
MPs formed the Conservative Party at a gathering of 10 000 
supporters in Pretoria. ( 29) The impact of these 
developments severely affected the strength of the National 
Party. Up to 25% of 'the NP's branch and district structures 
in the Transvaal deserted to the Conservative Party, while 
the joint vote of the CP and HNP in by-elections in the 
secure NP seats of Germiston District and Bothaville 
outnumbered those of the governing party. 
As PFP spokespeople were quick to point out opinion polls 
showed that for the first time since 1948 the National Party 
did not have the outright support of a majority of white 
28 ibid 
29 Charney (1982), p 143 
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voters. (30) Slabbert moved fast to convince the party 
that this situation provided the party with an opportunity 
to move out of a position of being merely the Official 
Opposition. It could now potentially hold the balance of 
power in Parliament if after an election the NP had less 
than an outright majority. (31) In this situation "both 
the reformist PFP and the reactionary right wing hold the 
balance of power in a parliamentary situation". (32) Said 
Slabbert, 
"This means that to have a particular measure 
adopted the Government will have to consult and 
negotiate with whichever party it hopes to get 
support from for its measure." (33) 
Since the PFP was in favour of reform, he went on, and since 
the "majority" wanted it, it was "logical" for government to 
move in the direction of his party. ( 34) This strategy 
reflected a party immersed in a liberal constitutional 
incrementalism predicated on the exclusive form of. state 
within South Africa. It was a logical course for the party 
to take given its location within the context of the 
dominating classes; 
strategy outside of 
contradiction. The 
it was situating its objectives and 
the dynamic of the people/power bloc 
stress fell on contesting the game of 
Parliamentary and electoral politics with the ultimate prize 
being a decisive role within the exercising of state power. 
30 The April 1982 poll conducted for Rapport newspaper 
showed the following breakdown in support patterns: 
National Party 43% 
Progressive Federal Party 21,7% 
Conservative Party 18,3% 
New Republic Party 5,6% 
Herstigte Nasionale Party 2,7% 
New Conservative Party 0,5% 
Quoted in Deurbraak, July 1982 
31 See his speech to the Natal Party Congress, Sunday 
Tribune, 17 October 1982 





Believing it stood a good chance of achieving a balance of 
power the PFP identified a further 37 seats in which to 
apply its energies in addition to the 26 seats it already 
held. It sought an 8% percent increase in its electoral 
support which would put a total of 45 seats within its 
grasp. ( 35) 
According to this game plan the PFP would relocate itself 
from the ranks of opposition into a position of influence to 
significantly impact on the exercise of state power. It 
would no longer be simply a moral reminder to government of 
the need for reform but could, rather, actively influence 
the direction the government was going in. In his speech to 
the 1982 Natal Congress of the party Slabbert said that, 
"a vote for the Official Opposition is no longer 
simply a vote for only what one believes to be 
right and defensible without the prospect of it 
being implemented. Now that vote has the real 
prospect of influencing a course of political 
development and decisions." (36) 
The idea was projected that the dichotomy between government 
and opposition would break down into a new mode of politics 
"where you don't have simple two party majoritarianism in 
operation". ( 37) It was 
"a new ball game in which the old style 'opposition 
vs Government confrontation politics will 
increasingly be substituted by horse trading, 
negotiation and compromise." (38) 
In essence Slabbert was calling on his party. to enter into 
an alliance with its arch enemy if the opportunity presented 
itself. The government was therefore perceived. not as an 
35 ibid, and Sunday Tribune, 17 October 1982 
36 Sunday Tribune, 17 October 1982 
37 Deurbraak, September 1982 




as much as a group with whom the Party had 
- but also points of commonality. The most 
significant point of· convergence was an apparent common 
commitment to the maintenance of continued accumulation. 
Slabbert stressed that adopting· such a course of action did 
not mean that the party would forego ~ts moral positioning; 
rather it was a strategic shift which was being 
countenanced. He called on the party to be 
"tough on principle but flexible on strategy. 
There are a number of ways in which one can 
realise the same principle or implement the same 
principle and one should be flexible in exploring 
these without having to sacrifice fundamental 
principles." (39) 
While the party adopted the strategy of going for the 
"balance of power" not all in the party believed it be 
viable. Harry Schwarz said that the approach was 
"the projected philosophy to the public as far as 
the leadership was concerned. But, I think that 
the majority of the office bearers and people who 
were involved in the party ever seriously 
believed that there would be a balance of power 
and, secondly, if there was a balance of power, 
how it would exercise it." (40) 
There was a lack of confidence in the strategy from the 
longer standing members of the party with deep aversions to 
any co-operation with the government. To them the espousal 
of their liberal values would be threatened by "doing a 
deal" with the traditional opponent of those values. Years 
of opposition to what was perceived as an intransigent 
government had left their mark. The strategy according to 
Colin Eglin implied 
39 Deurbraak, September 1982 
40 Interview with Harry Schwarz, 14 May 1990 
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"that you have got to team up with somebody. It 
implies that you are gong to team up with the 
National Party ... (that) There is in fact a 
relationship between yourself and the Nationalist 
Party. So, while they are your chief opponents 
at the ballot box, you are also saying to the 
public, "well by the way they aren't all that bad 
because in certain circumstances we would team up 
with them" . ( 41 ) 
It should be stressed at this point that the PFP was not at 
this time ignoring the domain of black politics. Rather, 
the overwhelming stress of its activity fell in the arena of 
white politics. Its notion of political change was premised 
on the concept of white initiative and black response in 
which Parliament was perceived as the site of political 
change. The ultimate test of the efficacy of going for "the 
balance of power" was whether the constitutional environment 
would accommodate such a strategy. In this vein Slabbert 
stressed that there was one proviso on the proposed course 
of action which was that if the "rules" should be changed to 
such an extent that in a new constitutional dispensation 
then there would be no scope for the Opposition to hold the 
balance of power. (42) The potential of the PFP to hold a 
decisive sway over state power was ultimately dependent, 
therefore, on the Westminster constitutional system 
associated with the semi-colonial character of South African 
state formation. 
The Party, under Slabbert's leadership, was never presented 
with the opportunity to test the strategy. Shortly after 
starting on the road to potentially holding the balance of 
power, the PW Botha government introduced its proposed new 
constitution and later called a referendum to test its 
support. This "changing of the rules of the game" forced 
the PFP onto a new footing. 
41 Interview with Colin Eglin, 25 April 1990 
42 Sunday Tribune, 17 October 1982 
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THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN 
Following the announcement of the National Party's outline 
of constitutiona_l reform in 1977, the President's Council 
was established to develop an outline of a new constitution 
for South Africa. The bulk of the President's Council's 
recommendations were accepted by the National Party in July 
1982. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill was 
placed before Parliament in May 1983. During July of that 
year a Parliamentary Select Committee considered evidence on 
the Bill, and in August 1983 it was debated in parliament. 
During the debate Prime Minister Botha announced that a 
referendum for white voters would be held on 2 November 
1983. 
The proposed constitution departed from the Westminster-
style system then in place in South Africa. The major 
features of the constitutional proposals were the following: 
* A single parliament with separate chambers for whites, 
coloureds and Indians, with white representation being 
greater than that of the other two put together; 
* An executive President elected by an electoral college 
made up proportionally of the leading parties of all 
three Houses. This would ensure that the candidate 
favoured by the white chamber would be elected; 
* A multi-racial cabinet; 
* Joint committees of all three houses to determine 
amendments to legislation; 
* A President's Council to act, in part, to resolve 
disputes not solved in joint committees. As well as 
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the numerical majority of whites in this Council, the 
President would nominate a further 25 members. In 
effect this body would have a preponderance of members 
supportive of the Government. 
When the government announced the broad outlines of its 
constitutional intentions in 1982, Slabbert immediately 
criticised the plan on three main grounds. These were that 
they would increase racial polarisation, entrench racial 
discrimination, and undermine people's rights to 
citizenship. (43) 
Earlier in Parliament Slabbert outlined the PFP's 
perspective on the minimum requirements for a successful 
constitutional initiative. These highlighted the view that: 
* negotiating a new constitution had to involve all of 
South Africa's population groups; 
* all should have access to South African citizenship; 
* the vote for all could not be ignored, falsified or 
disguised in a new constitution; and 
* minorities needed to be protected and domination 
avoided under such a new constitution. 
Slabbert argued that the government needed to incorporate 
these principles if it were to unite moderates of all 
persuasions and colours. It would also indicate to 
extremists, both black and white, that the search for a 
constitutional solution was a serious one. (44) 
43 Rand Daily Mail, 26 May 1982 
44 Star, 16 May 1982 
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In keeping with this framework of thinking, the Natal, Cape 
and Transvaal PFP Congresses rejected the constitutional 
proposals in their existing form. Slabbert warded off 
criticisms from the National Party-supporting Press and 
certain traditional opposition-supporting newspapers such as 
the Sunday Express that the party was boycotting the 
constitutional process. In his speech to the Transvaal 
Party Congress he stressed that the Party was going to stay 
on in the process of negotiating a new constitution. This 
it would do cautiously. It would not simply "oppose issues 
for the sake of opposition." (45) He explained that there 
would be three stages to the PFP's response to the 
constitutional proposals. The first stage was the Party's 
initial response in which it decided that the proposals in 
their initial form could not be supported. The proposals 
had been closely studied and not rejected out of hand. 
Slabbert stressed that an "all or nothing approach" had 
deliberately not been adopted. The government's proposals 
did not have to respond to the PFP's constitutional 
guidelines in all respects; rather points of correspondence 
were looked for. After weighing up the pros and cons it 
had been decided not to support the proposals in their 
current form. (46) 
The Party, he went on, had not removed itself from the 
constitutional debate. Rather, it would now enter the 
second stage of its response. This Slabbert described as 
the period of negotiation and bargaining. It would engage 
government and other interested parties on ways to improve 
the constitutional proposals. It would promote public 
debate through the forum of Parliament. The PFP would 
participate in the relevant Select Committees where it would 
be possible to get away from the confrontation of the 
Assembly and get down to "horse trading". At this stage the 
45 Argus, 9 November 1982 
46 ibid 
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PFP would push for the inclusion of its constitutional 
policy, central to which was the idea of a National 
convention. (47) 
The ultimate stage of the PFP's response would be to make a 
final decision on whether to support the new constitution 
and whether to participate in it. 
The period from November 1982 until the conclusion of the 
constitution debate was a difficult time for the Party. 
This point was highlighted by a member of the PFP's Federal 
Executive Committee who in November 1982 warned that both 
the Party membership and its public support base would have 
difficulty in formulating a response to the constitutional 
proposals. (48) The Party had since its inception promoted 
the cause of constitutional reform. Now that the Government 
was eventually getting around to this task it created 
confusion for those who were PFP supporters. As early as 
August 1982 the Sunday Tribune found that half of the PFP's 
supporters backed the constitutional proposals. (49) In a 
survey conducted by Rapport at the beginning of 1983 it was 
shown that 57% of PFP supporters wished to co-operate with 
the government's constitutional plans. (50) 
For more than twenty years the PFP had been the only, or 
leading, proponent of reform within the white power bloc. 
It had consequently gathered around it the core of white 
class forces favouring such a course of action. Now that 
the National Party had outgrown its original class base and 
was rearranging a 
a new hegemonic 
constituency with 
47 ibid 
set of more progressive class forces into 
bloc, it started to overlap in its 
that of the PFP. The debate between these 
48 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 7 November 1982 
49 Die Burger, 11 November 1982 
50 Rapport, 16 January 1983 
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two competing forces was no longer about the need 
reform. Rather, it was concerned with the· pace 
character of reform as Slabbert would state after 
referendum campaign. After defining reform as 
"any kind of development which would lead, in the 
different spheres, economically, politically and 
socially, to a sharing of opportunities, to a 




Slabbert stressed that the PFP had introduced the idea of 
negotiation, reform and consensus into parliament. Now the 
debate was about the speed with which reform was 
implemented. Given that this generalised and vague concept 
of reform was capable of accommodating a broad array of 
interpretation, it is understandable that the National Party 
was able to draw support away from the PFP. Both parties 
were competing to establish their dominance within the white 
power bloc and so apply their differing interpretations of 
reform. Both were attempting this course of action in order 
that the country could extricate itself from the crisis it 
was in and so ensure the continuance of the capitalist 
system of production. For the National Party the exigencies 
of white group survival and domination overdetermined their 
course of action. For the PFP, however, the liberal 
·imperative of a common citizenship and equality before the 
law overdetermined its approach to reform. But any 
incremental step towards reform, even originating from 
within the National Party, was openly considered as possibly 
promoting a liberal outcome. It is against this background 
that the rationale and character of the PFP's eventual 
approach to the new constitution and referendum campaign 
needs to be .understood. Both within Party ranks and within 
the ranks of its supporters the PFP experienced a bumpy and 
divided ride in its response to the new deal. 
51 Slabbert (1985 a), p 38 
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Divisions were reported regarding the Party's response to 
the Constitution Bill when it was debated in Parliament 
between May and August 1983. The motion put by the Party in 
response to the second reading of the Bill - that the bill 
be read " this day, six months hence" was the strongest 
possible form of parliamentary protest. The formal stand 
taken by the Party in this debate was supported by a 
majority of the PFP parliamentary caucus, while it was 
reported that Harry Schwarz and four other members opposed 
such a strong form of opposition. (52) This division 
reflected the difficulty that the Party was facing during 
this time. The differences within the Party were reflected 
in the debate on what the Party's response to the referendum 
call should be. 
On 24 August 1983 Prime Minister Botha called a referendum 
for 2 November that year. The question to be placed before 
the white electorate was: 
"Are you in favour of the implementation of the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act as 
approved by Parliament?" 
The question was deliberately narrowly phrased in order that 
it serve to draw support from those who were.hesitant about 
reform, as well as those who saw the new constitution as a 
step towards further reform, thus cutting into the PFP' s 
support base. Slabbert, in response, stressed that this 
ambiguity would make it difficult to know who was supporting 
the constitution on the basis that it kept blacks out of 
government, or on the basis that it was a stepping stone to 
let them in. (53) He had a few weeks earlier, during the 
parliamentary debate proposed that three questions be asked 
of all South Africans, and not only whites. The proposed 
questions were: 
52 Die Burger, 5 September 1983 
53 Slabbert (1985 b), p 111 
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"(a) Do you believe that only whites should 
participate in Parliament?; (b) Do you believe 
that only whites, Coloureds and Asians should 
participate in Parliament?; (c) Do you believe 
that whites, Coloureds, Asians and blacks should 
participate in Parliament without one group 
dominating the others?" (54) 
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In proposing that the referendum questions be posed in this 
way Slabbert was seeing the need for South Africans to 
assess the principle of reform and not a specific Act of 
parliament. In so doing it would be possible to distinguish 
between those who wanted reform and the nature of the reform 
they desired. The fact that the referendum question as 
decided by the Government did not do so created a difficulty 
for the Party. 
Many in the Party's support base believed that the new 
Constitution, which although greatly faulted, was a "step in 
the right direction". Most notable in this respect was the 
response of traditionally opposition supporting newspapers 
who adopted this posture. Liberal newspapers who 
recommended that voters support the new deal included the 
Sunday Times, Sunday Express, Daily Despatch, The Friend, 
Natal Mercury, Financial Mail, and Finance Week. (55) 
Within the Party's Federal Executive there was an extended 
debate on what the Party's response to the referendum 
question should be. 
Two motions were put before the Federal Executive at its 
September 1983 meeting. The motion put by Colin Eglin was 
eventually carried nem con, only after a counter motion put 
by Harry Schwarz was defeated after a reported six members 
54 ibid 
55 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1983 
of the Executive supported it while an unidentified number 
abstained. (56) 
Eglin's motion read unambiguously that, 
"The Federal Executive of the PFP resolves to urge 
the voters of South Africa, irrespective of their 
Party political affiliation, to vote no to the 
constitutional proposals on November 2." (57) 
In response Schwarz proposed an amendment which would allow 
voters the leeway of deciding which way to vote. It called 
on the Federal Executive to resolve that: 
"the issue whether the constitution should or 
should not be accepted is a matter going across 
Party lines and it recommends to the electorate 
that the constitutional proposals of the 
government do not off er a solution to South 
Africa's problems and that there are other and 
better alternatives particularly the proposals of 
the PFP . " ( 5 8 ) 
While Schwarz's motion was defeated, it reflected the 
ambiguity within the Party and amongst its supporters 
. regarding an outright condemnation of government's reform 
initiative. According to Schwarz the Party caucus had 
earlier been evenly divided on whether to support the "new 
deal" as a step in the right direction. ( 59) A further 
example was the case of a PFP candidate for Sunnyside in the 
1981 elections, Errol Musk. He resigned from the Party in 
response to the call for a "no" vote. He argued that he had 
joined the PFP three years earlier because he believed in 
the need of people of "race groups other than white" 
participating in government. Now that this appeared to be 
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the leader of the NRP that the constitution, while not 
ideal, was a step in the right direction. ( 60) These 
incidents illustrate the contradictory interpretations 
inherent in the party's incremental liberalism. 
Divisions also emerged on the left of the Party where there 
was the feeling that the PPP took too long in coming out 
unequivocally against the new deal. According to Tiaan van 
der M~rwe, the Party's drawn out process of coming to a 
conclusion in its debate on the constitution allowed other 
parties who were potentially opposed to it, to ultimately 
support it and thus weaken opposition to the government's 
proposals. He said that the Labour Party had taken their 
decision to enter the tricameral system on the basis of the 
government's guidelines and not the finally drafted 
constitution. He recalled how he had told his colleagues 
"that the PPP at the time could well have 
prevented that from happening, if we took a tough 
enough critical stand in that previous year when 
those guidelines appeared but the sort of 
gurus of the Party at the time, the leadership, 
felt that we should not knock these things down 
before we have seen more detail ... they may have 
just felt that was a r~asonable thing to do; they 
may well have felt that the reform thinking in the 
minds of the Nationalists at that stage was a very 
vulnerable thing and that they should not be too 
destructive." (61) 
The Party set about its referendum "no" vote campaign with a 
degree of trepidation. The Federal Executive stressed the 
need for the Party campaign to emphasise that it was a 
positive step to vote "no". The PFP campaign's criticism of 
the constitution focussed on three appeals: "no to racial 
conflict"; "no to one-party dictatorship"; and, "no to 
Apartheid '8 3" . ( 6 2) This critic ism of the new deal was 
60 Argus, 4 October 1983 
61 Interview with Tiaan van der Merwe, 6 March 1990 
62 Minutes of PPP Federal Executive, 3 September 1983 
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wrapped up in an overall message to government 
incorporate all South Africans in the drawing up of a 
constitution. A Party pamphlet during the campaign made 
following appeal: 
"70% of the population would say NO if they were 
allowed. You can say NO. 
"So don't be misled. Say no to the Nat plan and 
make them start again with all the people who 





Elsewhere the Party stressed its own constitutional 
proposals and called for a National Convention as a means to 
formulate a new constitution. (64) 
The PFP campaign departed f ram traditional election 
campaigns in two important respects . These were the focus 
on talking to the business community, and in having joint 
public meetings with moderate black leaders, or having them 
address PFP gatherings. (65) 
In a percentage poll of 76% of the electorate, 65,95% of 
voters voted "yes", while 33,53% showed their opposition to 
the constitution. While there was no party political 
breakdown of the vote it was clear that large numbers of 
voters who had supported the PFP in 1981 backed the 
government in the referendum. PFP leaders admitted that 
this was the case and expressed the hope that these voters 
were not lost to the Party. ( 66) Dr Dirk Laurie of the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research concluded 
that more than half of PFP supporters voted yes; 40% who had 
63 PFP, "The Constitution has changed but not the 
problem", 1983 
64 PFP, "The most crucial challenge for South Africa - an 




These two areas are discussed extensively below. 
Cape Times, 4 November 1983, and Comment, December 1983 
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voted for the Party in 1981 stayed away; and of those PFP 
supporters who voted, ·there were five votes against the 
constitution for every seven in support of it. (67) 
Assessing the referendum result, Slabbert admitted that the 
PFP had fared worse than expected. ( 68) A task for the 
Party in the post referendum period would consequently be to 
persuade PFP supporters who had voted "yes" that the PFP was 
their "political home". They had voted "yes" on the basis 
of "good·solid PFP sentiments; they hoped for reform, for a 
step in the right direction, for constructive peaceful 
change, etc." (69) 
Despite the fact that the National Party was still devoted 
to apartheid many PFP supporters had voted for it. Slabbert 
in a speech to the Party's 1983 Federal Congress identified 
four reasons why this was the case: (70) 
1) The split in the National Party and the formation of 
the Conservative Party had meant that the National Party had 
come to assume the middle position in white politics. All 
opposition was consequently seen as extreme, a factor which 
the NP capitalised on in its propaganda. 
2) The National Party has marketed its leadership 
successfully, rather than 
marketing campaign the NP 
its policies. Through its 
had hijacked the language of 
reform, negotiation and consensus politics. The government 
had thus "sold" the idea of reform, rather than the 
constitution itself. As a consequence strong opponents of 
the constitution, eg. those in the business community, still 
voted for it. 
67 Star, 12 November 1983 
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3) The decision of the Labour Party to participate in the 
new constitution on the basis of the guidelines served as a 
blank cheque for government to accelerate the process. The 
PFP had not been prepared to take such a decision without 
having seen the constitution. 
4) The response of the CP had been hysterical driving many 
PFP voters into supporting the new deal. 
Slabbert's interpretation of the political moment guided the 
Party's uncontroversial decision to participate in the new 
constitution. He said that 
"we are now moving out of the raising-of-
expectations phases as far as reform is concerned 
and into the delivering-of-the-goods phase" (71) 
This would present new opportunities for the PFP. It had 
become necessary for the Party to participate so as to 
"explore every possible opportunity to pursue its principles 
and ideals." (72) Not to do so would be to "abdicate all 
hope for peaceful, non-violent change towards our future". 
(73) This stance recalls the constitutionalism inherent in 
earlier statements on the nature of change being necessarily 
rooted in white action and along a path which should at all 
costs avoid revolution. 
With very little debate the Party saw it as logical for it 
to continue its opposition role from within the precincts of 
the new constitutional system. According to a resolution 
taken at the 1983 Federal Congress it was argued that 




more necessary". ( 74). Participation was all the more 
important to ensure that the process of reform was 
expedited. The new constitutional environment, wrote 
Slabbert shortly after the referendum, represented 
"quite a significant shift away from a situation 
where the white parties in Parliament 
predominantly argue amongst themselves on how to 
structure the system of racial domination more 
effectively". (75) 
Slabbert stressed the need for greater linkages or contact 
with the black community in order to work against 
polarisation between the races: 
"It is true that the referendum has contributed to 
white-black polarisation - we have seen all the 
signs of it. If the PFP has a special 
responsibility and a task which it set itself 
right from its inception, it is to counteract 
polarization and to keep the spirit of reform and 
negotiation politics alive. This must remain a 
priority." (76) 
But one of the first priorities, according to Slabbert, was 
to deal with the outstanding issues of influx control, rural 
poverty and homeland development, urbanisation and housing, 
land, transport and other issues. For the PFP it was 
necessary to bring pressure to address deficiencies 
associated with these issues. A solution to them would 
"affect economic growth, industrial relations, 
urban and metropolitan stability and all of us 
have a vital interest in these issues and are 
affected by them." (77) 
The second priority was to promote the debate about African 
political incorporation. Thirdly, the struggle for civil 
74 Minutes and Resolutions of 1983 PFP Federal Congress 




liberties and an end to racial discrimination had to 
continue. 
Despite experiencing a setback at the referendum the PFP 
continued to locate itself firmly as a competing element 
within the white power bloc, albeit with a new commitment to 
reach into the realm of black politics. 
THE PFP AND BUSINESS 
The referendum campaign marked a crucial moment in the PFP's 
outreach to the business community. In the period between 
the 1981 elections and the referendum the Party did not 
specifically identify this ·sector for special treatment, 
although policy development and debate reflected varying 
responses to the interests of capital. 
At the Party's Federal Congress in November 1981 it accepted 
the Charter for Social and Economic Progress based on the 
report of the Economic Commission of the PFP under the 
chairmanship of Harry Schwarz set up at the 1978 Congress. 
The document proposed a form of welfare capitalism for the 
country. 
The policy made provision for an urban-based market economy 
which would encourage private competition at the same time 
as providing for social welfare services. Care would be 
taken to avoid abuses and exploitation rooted in 
monopolisation and concentration of economic power. 
Corporatist structures of economic control would be 
encouraged with the focus being on a partnership between 
capital, management and labour. 
termed economic democracy was, 
The objective of what was 
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"to create an economic environment which will 
facilitate the achievement of economic well-being 
by all and to lay the foundations for a society in 
which there is no discrimination based on skin 
colour or sex and no privilege by reason of class, 
race, birth or sex; a society in which there is 
true equality of opportunity in an economic system 
in which we aim for as high a degree of efficiency 
as is compatible with an acceptable level of 
economic justice, in which poverty is eliminated 
and in which there is incentive for the 
industrious and protection for the disadvantaged." 
(78) 
As well as calling for the elimination of all forms of 
and the equalisation of access for all to 
policy document also called for provisions 
control economic relations such that 
discrimination, 
the market, the 
to be made to 
competition "is fair and uninhibited by cartel, monopoly or 
other abuse of power concentrations". ( 79·) Monopolisation 
was to be subject to the same public scrutiny as that for 
political concentration. The right to work and access to 
benefits for the unemployed were also incorporated into the 
document. A minimum wage would also apply under such a 
policy. 
The PFP policy further went on to recognize the need for 
"the creation of a realistic and fully operational system of 
labour relations". (80) While nationalisation was 
rejected in general, the state was to be accorded a role in 
providing goods and services not, or incapable of being, 
provided by the private sector. Perhaps the most 
significant aspect of the policy was the stated desire for 
participative management. This preceded the trend towards 
this policy formulation within the business community by at 
78 PFP, "Economic Democracy - The Progressive Federal 





least five years. At a time when the advanced sections of 
capital were calling for the regularisation and legitimation 
of trade union rights and collective bargaining within the 
South African economy, the document penned by Harry Schwarz 
called for 
"the establishment of a relationship between 
capital, management and labour based on the 
recognition that each have an interest in the 
welfare of others. Processes towards industrial 
democracy should be encouraged. Share option 
schemes and worker participation for all employees 
and workers are also matters to be developed." 
(81) 
The motivation for social welfare provisions argued for a 
"caring society" which would provide for those who could not 
for reasons of ill health, disability, age, or inability to 
find employment. 
The policy document saw economic development and growth as 
being city based and that it would inevitably imply growing 
urbanisation. It was seen as 
"important that provision be made for this process 
and that an environment be created in which both 
the public and private sectors contribute and in 
which individuals can be helped to house 
themselves". ( 82) 
Harry Schwarz described the economic policy as drawing on 
the best aspects of both capitalism and socialism without 
complying with any one economic doctrine. While the policy 
referred to the reallocation of resources by the state, this 
would not mean "taking from the rich and giving to the 
poor". Ultimately the policy was concerned with ensuring 
economic growth and preventing the development of a 




"If we are to avoid revolution in South Africa we 
have got to have economic progress." (83) 
Motivating the PFP's economic policy a few years later, Van 
Zyl Slabbert argued that provisions for social welfare and 
the free organisation of labour were necessary. It was 
strategically important in the scheme of warding off of a 
socialist revolution that free enterprise not be permitted 
to exist in an unrestrained manner. The government had to 
follow policies to· avoid "certain social conditions 
which will have political consequences profoundly 
detrimental to any free enterprise at all". (84) 
Not all in the Party, or indeed the business community 
identified entirely with the new policy. Many within the 
Party were staunch free marketeers and the adoption of the 
policy of "economic democracy" was perceived as a 
compromise. A former Transvaal leader of the Party 
described this tension: 
"I am a capitalist. I am not a social democrat or 
a socialist. That doesn't mean that I don't 
coexist very happily with other people. We have a 
policy of economic democracy which makes a lot of 
sense but it really is in a sense a compromise and 
there is nothing wrong with that in politics. 
Anybody who thinks that a country which has this 
first world and third world component, that you 
can totally ignore the weak and the poor and those 
unable to help themselves, lives in a dream world. 
Those certainly have to be taken into account. In 
many cases you have got to go in for affirmative 
action in order to try to redress the balances in 
the interest of everybody. You probably can't 
apply the straight, pure principles of capitalism 
which you might be able to do in a mature economy 
such as, for example, the British one. So perhaps 
that mix between free enterprise and social 
democracy is not a bad thing." (85) 
83 Cape Times, 7 October 1981 
84 Slabbert (1985 a), p 73 
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A similar acceptance of the need for a public sector in the 
economy was voiced by the former Party leader and prominent 
businessman, Zach de Beer: 
"My own stance would be that I think it is beyond 
any doubt at all that the free enterprise system 
a) delivers the goods, and b) allows more freedom 
of choice to human beings than any socialist 
system there has ever been. It is a matter of 
principle to me to be a free enterprise man and 
not a socialist. That does not preclude a mixed 
economy." ( 86) 
Not all Party members agreed with the economic policy stance 
adopted by the Party. Some, such as Bobby Godsell, saw the 
need for the Party to identify a clearer class interest in 
its policy: 
"In a normal society I see a great similarity in 
economic interests, in Marxian terms, of a party 
like the Progressive Party (sic) and parties like 
the Free Democratic Party in Germany, to some 
extent the Liberal Party, the VVD in Holland, of 
liberal Republicans. These are people who are 
genuine inheritors of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century liberals. They are concerned about the 
freedom of the individual in society and that 
freedom has a very important economic component. 
"I think that there is an unresolved tension 
within the PFP. There are some glib and utopian 
socialists who I don't think have thought their 
socialism through. Then there is a kind of soggy 
non-racialism where people think, 'Black people 
want socialism and since we want to be nice to 
black people, we can't afford to disagree with a 
socialist analysis' . I say it is soggy non-
racialism because you don't demonstrate your 
respect for the adulthood, citizenship and 
integrity of black South Africans by patronizing 
them. 
"To some extent the PFP's most logical class base 
is that of an upper middle class and 
86 Interview with Zach de Beer, 18 May 1988 
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professionals. Its class basis should be, in a 
way, new Tories, FDP, in some senses Reagani te 
Republicans. This is not all attractive, but if 
you are looking for reliable political alliances, 
you must combine personal and economic interests 
with what you are trying to achieve." (87) 
It was because PFP economic policy was not seeking to serve 
precise class interests, but rather the generalised 
interests of capital accumulation, that it did not appeal to 
many in the business community. Economic policy was a 
balance between various intellectual strains within the 
Party reflecting a range of reformist and liberal responses. 
It was also a function of the diverse class character of the 
party, of which only a small number of members were captains 
of industry. Acc,ording to Slabbert the party was "largely 
made up of members of the middle class intelligentsia. He 
contended somewhat overstatedly that 
"it was a bohemian party. It was an extraordinary 
collection of indi victuals. They were academics, 
professionals, yuppies; certainly not 
capitalists." (88) 
As a consequence, it could not serve only the interest of 
the dominant monopoly sector of capital, despite extensive 
support from individuals within major corporations. While 
the Party did receive support and funds from leading 
individual businessmen, the business community as a whole 
did not fully endorse the Party. This was both because of 
the Party's economic policy, as well as the stress within 
business of directing political energies towards government. 





"Most of the members of the business community are 
to a greater or lesser extent hostile to any 
Interview with Bobby Godsell, 23 May 1988 
Interview with Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, 28 September 
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smack, any hint of social democracy. We could be 
stronger with the business community if we came 
out much more pro-capitalist than we did. I think 
we have got to deal with responsibility and we are 
much more than simply a business party. We are a 
Party who cares about the people who don't even 
have a vote at all." (89) 
Slabbert argued that he never made a special effort to 
endorse business thinking and at times was highly critical 
of the thinking among capitalists, especially as regards the 




contributed to the party not having as 






business, this view· that you could 
the trickle down effect solve the 
inequality. There had to be 
You had to address the problem of 
"I never def ended capitalism as such, al though I 
did defend the principle of free enterprise, or 
the market economy. But the kind of market 
economy which had a strong social democratic 
aspect. If anything I was rather bohemian in 
those circles." (90) 
much 
Said 
In many cases support expressed by business for the PFP was 
matched by similar support for the National Party in order, 





"to keep in with those 
hand, they wanted to 
They probably voted for 
to the National Party." 
in power and on the other 
salve their consciences. 
us even if they gave money 
(91) 
Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 May 1988 
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In a similar vein Brian Goodall said that the PFP had 
"had a long major disadvantage and that is the 
business community actually has to deal with 
political power because that is where the 
patronage lies. I think the business community 
have actually learned that politics really does 
affect how business can operate. To the business 
community government is a fact." (92) 
While a large element of capital was not forthcoming in its 
support for the Party, specific PFP policies coincided with 
the needs of progressive monopoly business interests. 
Throughout the seventies there had been appeals from this 
sector for a stable educated urban-based work force capable 
of extending the base of the market in manufactured goods. 
Government developments, especially the reports of the 
Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions were welcomed in this 
respect. Organised business embarked on its own initiatives 
in the form of the Urban Foundation. 
The PFP made much of issues related to black urbanisation 
and free labour organisation. The need to recognise the 
permanence of Africans in cities and the imperative of 
ending influx control were constants in the speeches and 
statements of Party leaders in the early eighties, 
especially those of Slabbert. A resolution adopted at the 
Party's 1981 Federal Congress called on government to accept 
black urbanisation as an economic and historical fact and 
appealed for forced resettlements to rural areas to be 
stopped. (93) The campaign on urbanisation was not only a 
reflection of the need to respond to the imperatives of a 
modernising economy. It was, in addition, as much the 
natural consequence of a staunchly moral stance on civil 
rights, as it was an attempt to outgun the National Party on 
an issue over which it was vacillating. This was stated by 
92 Interview with Brian Goodall, 23 May 1988 
93 Minutes of Federal Congress, 1981 
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Brian Goodall, who commented on the Party's stress on 
urbanisation issues by saying, 
"That was a deliberate strategy to exploit a 
weakness within the NP and also because it was a 
key issue - the recognition that the future of 
South Africa was going to be determined by how you 
actually dealt with the urban black rather than 
how you dealt with the rural black. He was not a 
problem." ( 94) 
Attempts by the PFP to woo elements of the business 
community were confounded by the government's reform 
initiatives and deliberate bid to draw ·more capitalists, 
especially English speakers, into the realm of its hegemony. 
Historically the PFP had received the support of a small 
section of capital, most notably from leading figures within 
the Anglo American Corporation. (95) According to Slabbert 
the PFP received 
"a fair degree of support from Harry Oppenheimer; 
and because of that from Anglo American. But, 
comparatively the amount of .support we got from 
them was miniscule compared to the kind of money 
they gave for other issues and causes; or the kind 
of money that they could have given if they were 
really concerned about the role of the PFP. 
"If you did a head count at Anglo American right 
throughout my period in the PFP, I would say the 
majority would come out on the National Party 
side. The party of business was the National 
Party. But the image was that because Harry 
Oppenheimer supported us, we were." (96) 
The bulk of English capital had given its support to the 
United Party. ( 97) Since the demise of that party, many 
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were divided in giving their support to the PFP, while at 
the same time "keeping in" with the governing Party. (98) 
From the late seventies with increasing appeals from the 
business community for reform, especially with regard to the 
. mobility of labour and urbanisation issues, government made 
an increasing effort to appeal to business leaders. The 
1979 Carlton Hotel Conference, and the 1981 conference at 
the Good Hope Centre were vital events in this process. 
They came at the same time as the government was unfolding 
its constitutional plans and talking the language of reform. 
Following the 1979 conference Slabbert responded to Botha's 
initiative by giving credit for creating a climate for 
change. He warned, however that government needed to stop 
talking in generalities. ( 99) After the 1981 meeting he 
again welcomed the initiative. 
There was strong support for government's reforms in the 
field of labour mobility and organisation following the 
reports of the Wiehahn, Riekert and De Lange Commissions. 
The movement towards political reform desired by capital 
found expression in the proposed new constitution put 
forward by government in 1983. The business community, in 
general, supported Botha's initiative. Assocom and the FCI 
welcomed the constitution as "a step in the right direction 
and the start of an evolutionary process of constitutional 
reform". (100) 
During the referendum campaign the PFP made a special effort 
to appeal to business leaders. A large group of prominent 
98 Interview with Zach de Beer, 18 May 1988, Interview 
with Brian Goodall, 23 May 1988, Interview with Harry 
Schwarz, 14 May 1990 
99 Hackland (1984), p 425 
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businessmen were invited by Harry Oppenheimer to hear an 
address by Slabbert. (101) According to Slabbert only two 
out of the approximately one hundred businessmen who 
attended the luncheon agreed with his arguments. (102) 
Commenting later, Slabbert said that most people in business 
had supported his argriments against the new cons ti tu ti on, 
yet voted for it. The "yes" vote, therefore, had nothing to 
do with the merits of the new constitution. The NP had 
sold, 
"'reform', 'steps in the right direction', 
goodness', happiness', 'positiveness', every 
emotion and value it could dredge up. The 1983 
referendum showed me that intelligent, successful 
people can collectively abandon reason and common 
sense." (103) 
Among the indi victuals whom · Slabbert cites as having voted 
"no" were Tony Bloom, Gordon Waddell, Clive Mennell and 
Harry Oppenheimer all with historically close links to the 
PFP. (104) Even Oppenheimer announced before the referendum 
that he would be voting "no" reluctantly. 
Summing up the relationship between the PFP and the business 








"never regarded them as a captive constituency or 
a monolithic constituency. Their interests were 
closely tied to government, to power. I never 
experienced business looking upon the PFP as a 
protector of their interests. How could we. We 
had very little power. But they certainly floated 
towards you when there was disillusionment with 
government. It was pendulum stuff." 
(105) 
Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1983, p 17 
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The vacillating nature of business will be explored in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters. The early years of 
the decade saw a close relationship being built between 
large sections of the business cornmuni ty and the National 
Party goverrurient. To that extent the National Party could 
be seen as the "party of business". The PFP, by contrast, 
while advocating a policy platform which sought to advance 
the interests of the existing market economy, did not 
represent anything more than a small group of businessmen. 
THE PFP AND BLACK POLITICS 
The pattern of the PFP extending links to black moderates 
throughout the seventies was. continued into the early 
eighties. (106) This was as much a consequence of radical 
black organisations and trade unions not wishing to have 
contact with the Party as it was of their relative 
inaccessibility and small-scale operation. It was also a 
consequence of the PFP's positioning of itself in antagonism 
to any potentially revolutionary force. Commenting on the 
situation of popular black organisations in relation to the 
Party before the implementation of the tricameral 
constitution, Colin Eglin said that the mobilisation 
associated with the new deal changed the character and 
perception of black organisations from the point of view of 
the PFP. In the early eighties, Eglin contended the focus 
of activity 
"was really keeping in touch with information, a 
factual kind of relationship with other people. 
Once the mass movement started mobilising against 
the tricameral system, you weren't just on a fact-
106 See Chapter One for a discussion of the seventies. 
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finding mission. You actually had to have a 
relationship with people who were also actors on 
the scene. But I would say that in 1981 those 
external actors were relatively passive and you 
then had to deal with a new relationship with the 
external factors, your active external factors. 
" There wasn't a UDF in 1981. There wasn't an MDM 
in 1981. There was a banned ANC. There was no 
mass movement to whom one had to relate. One just 
had to relate to black individuals, civic action 
committees and people like that. Once there was a 
mobilisation around movements and organisations, 
there was a new ball game and each one had to 
respond in a different way. " (107) 
In many cases relationships with radical groups and 
individuals occurred on an ad hoc basis. The support work 
of PFP MPs, especially Helen Suzman, given to political 
prisoners and to squatter communities under threat of 
removal are useful examples of this work. Said Helen Suzman, 
"I had connections and friendships with black 
people which were really not truly political. The 
fact that I went visiting and did what I could for 
political prisoners to try an improve their 
conditions." (108) 
Commenting on her role with respect to forced removals, she 
added 
"Don't forget I was the one who originally started 
the monitoring process by going to the Dimbazas 
and the Lime Hills in the sixties. I was the 
first to raise the forced removals. I was the 
first to go when being called upon whenever there 
was trouble in the townships. Ken Andrew and I 
used to go out at dawn over and over again when 
they were busy burning shacks at KTC and 
Crossroads and so on. That was more my role than 
looking for the leadership of the extra-
parliamentary organisations." (109) 
107 Interview with Colin Eglin, 25 April 1990 
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The overall thrust of Party activity also included the 
engaging of black leadership. Following an extensive 
assessment of the 1981 elections and the state of the white 
community by the Party's Federal Executive, the minutes of 
the meeting note, 
"We must not forget the disenfranchised, and the 
question of a national convention was raised. It 
was suggested that the Party leaders make contact 
with Black leaders. Dr Boraine reported that this 
is happening." (110) 
The character of the contact as has been pointed out was 
restricted primarily to moderate black leadership. At this 
time the Party, especially through statements by the Leader~ 
sharply criticised the radicalisation of black politics. 
Slabbert distanced the Party from radical black leadership. 
He argued that at the root of the radicalisation was the 
apparent fusing of racial oppression and class exploitation 
associated with apartheid. Compounding the problem was the 
long-standing condition of racial polarisation: 
"Because of the particular structure of the free 
enterprise economy, which largely until now, has 
meant whites have been more free to pursue 
enterprise and blacks more prone to experience the 
consequence of apartheid, there has, in terms of 
conventional class analysis, developed a situation 
where white corresponds to management and black to 
labour. 
"This is now becoming a dangerous trend, because 
superimposed on this class division is the process 
of racial polarisation which has far more 
exploitable political and emotive potential than a 
simple class struggle. As long as white is 
associated with entrenched privilege and black 
with structured deprivation, a dimension of 
irrationality becomes part of the conflict which 
does not easily lend itself to peaceful 
resolution." (111) 
110 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 16 May 1981 
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For Slabbert, the task for the PFP was to counter this 
polarisation, a mission confounded by numerous associated 
problems. Slabbert in speeches in late 1981 identified 
these constraints. Firstly, he criticised the fact that 
radical blacks questioned the bona fides of whites, 
something which either caused despondency on the part of 
young whites, or increased white militancy. Secondly, he 
highlighted "revolutionary romanticism" in seeing South 
Africa as being on the brink of revolution. The PFP as 
reformist or evolutionary was seen to be retarding the 
revolutionary process and was consequently nothing more than 
the "icing sugar on the system of oppression". (112) 
Associated with revolutionary romanticism was the 
development of "utopian socialist alternatives" which were 
fuelled by the increasing identification between apartheid 
and free enterprise: 
"I believe that to the extent that private 
enterprise becomes associated in the minds of 
blacks with the system of separate development or 
apartheid, the development of such an utopian 
alternative will become institutionalised in black 
politics." (113) 
In addition to the problem of "revolutionary romanticism", 
Slabbert also brought attention to his concern with "moral 
brinkmanship". This was the situation whereby, 
"The parameters of the system are defined 
according to some moral quandary, and co-operation 
and negotiation are rejected or accepted depending 
on whether one is defined as being 'within' or 
'outside' the 'system'. Thus, it is argued, to be 
a party in Parliament is to be 'part of the 
system' which somehow makes one morally more 
objectionable than living in a group area or 
riding in a segregated bus. It is necessarily 
accepted that one's intentions, however eloquently 
112 ibid 
113 Rand Daily Mail, 2 December 1981 
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stated, cannot be pure because one has become 
'part of the system'." (114) 
The problems identified by Slabbert were considered 
important as they directly affected one of the 
fundamental goals - the deracialisation of conflict. 
crucial that black/white dialogue took place. (115) 
Party's 
It was 
While understanding the "anger, the bitterness, the 
frustration of those who suffer in terms of the status quo" 
the PFP declared its opposition to "those organisations and 
groups which seek to bring about revolutionary, violent or 
subversive change". ( 116) In the face of this it was 
necessary according to Slabbert to protect the country by 
means of a military "shield" behind which evolutionary 
change could take place. ( 11 7 ) The Party had hereby 
declared a vast gulf between itself and the ANC. In this 
context it was the role of the PFP to keep the, 
"voice of reason and rationality alive at a stage 
when polarizing factions increasingly want to 
succumb to siege and irrational politics." (118) 
The stance adopted by Slabbert and consequently most of the 
members of the PFP was informed, in part, by an ignorance of 









"knew very little about the ANC and extra-
parliamentary politics. I did not know people in 
the ANC. I had never met them. I never really 
understood, practically, 'the struggle of the 
people'." ( 119) 
Rand Daily Mail, 30 May 1981 
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It remained that ongoing contact was almost exclusively with 
Inkatha at this time. Inkatha represented a body of opinion 
very close to that of the PFP in many respects. It was a 
conservative organisation, opposed to revolution and 
committed to free enterprise. As such it embodied the ideal 
ally for the Party in its pursuit of moderation and 
evolutionary change.. In the absence of any clear 
alternative the Party set about forging a close relationship 
with Inkatha. This had started in the seventies at a time 
when the Party sought contact with homeland leaders in 
pursuit of black/white contact, and to represent the views 
of blacks in parliament (120) The Party concluded a joint 
declaration with the leaders of Gazankulu, Kwazulu, Lebowa, 
Qwaqwa, the South African indian Council and the Labour 
Party expressing a joint determination to work together for 
peaceful change in South Africa and for a national 
convention. (121) No close permanent relationship emerged 
from this joint agreement with the exception of that with 
Buthelezi and Inkatha. This relationship was built on the 
strong and long standing personal ties already existing 
between Buthelezi and Slabbert, as well as between the 
Inkatha leader and the leader of the PFP in Natal, Ray 
Swart. ( 122) After a number of high level meetings the two 
groups formed a formal liaison committee. The close bond 
between the two organisations developed on the basis of the 
belief that there was sufficient common ground between them 
to negotiate and agree on an alternative constitutional 
framework for the country. 
At the behest of the Inkatha Central Committee the Buthelezi 
Commission was appointed in 1980 to look into alternative 
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and Natal with Denys Schreiner of the University of Natal 
and with close PFP links chairing it. 
PFP representative on the commission. 
Colin Eglin was the 
In September 1981 the PFP and Inkatha formed a joint 
steering committee to investigate closer cooperation. Over 
the following four years the two parties engaged in many 
joint activities, in particular by the two leaders. 
Slabbert and Buthelezi issued a joint declaration following 
the publication of the Buthelezi Commission's findings in 
early 1982. Their declaration stated that a new 
constitution had to be agreed to by all South Africans. 
They called for the peaceful promotion of a new constitution 
which should be based on negotiations between "the 
recognised and accepted leaders from all sections of our 
population". (123) They reaffirmed a commitment to full 
citizenship for all without discrimination; equality of 
opportunity; accountable government. In criticising the 
government's constitutional proposals they rejected any 
constitutional development which excluded any section of the 
population from participating in the new constitution. 
The two leaders said that the process of the Buthelezi 
Commission represented a commendable attempt at negotiation 
and was worth repeating, specially in the light of the 
government's intransigence on negotiation: 
"There is no other way of combatting polarization 
and confrontation than for South Africans of 
different cultures, race and attitude to get 
together and negotiate on the common future 




Colin Eglin was full of praise for the moderation of the 
Inkatha leader following the publication of the report. He 
described the report as the result of a courageous attempt 
"by one of the most important black South African leaders of 
our time . . . to find a way in which we who live in South 
Africa can live in peace." (125) Buthelezi was courageous 
in that he faced attack from blacks who were committed to an 
"all or nothing approach" and who in frustration had turned 
to violence. He had refused to play to the "black gallery" 
and had not accepted a universal franchise in a unitary 
state. The Buthelezi Commission exercise had proved, Eglin 
went on, that negotiations were not simply part of the 
process of finding a solution. They were part of the 
solution. 
Later Slabbert at a joint public meeting of PFP and Inkatha 
at the Durban City Hall attended by 2000 people called for a 
joint meeting of the constitutional committee of the 
President's Council and the Buthelezi Commission. He 
motivated this by saying that such a meeting would represent 
an opportunity to open up the constitutional debate which 
appeared deadlocked; the Buthelezi Commission could pr_ovide 
valuable informations on how to bring about effective 
reform; it would stop the ignorance of President's 
Councillors about "what blacks are like and what they want"; 
it would prevent the President's Council from promoting 
black/white polarisation; and, finally the PC had nothing to 
lose by such a venture. (126) 
The relationship with Inkatha blossomed during 1982 and 
1983. Among many joint activities there was a joint 
PFP/Inkatha seminar in Durban; regular meetings of the joint 
steering committee of the parties; the PFP invited Inkatha 
to sit on the stage at its protest at the death of Neil 
125 Deurbraak, April 1982 
126 Deurbraak, July 1982 
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Aggett in detention; Helen Suzman had contact with the 
Inkatha Women's Brigade; 33 members of the Johannesburg 
North branch of the PFP had met with Buthelezi at Ulundi; 
and the PFP and Inkatha had held joint meetings during the 
referendum campaign. (127) A resolution at the Party's 
1983 Federal congress recognised the contribution of 
Buthelezi to the referendum campaign and "his steadfast 
commitment to peaceful change in South Africa". (128) 
If the PFP believed that it did not need to relate to 
radical black organisations before the introduction of the 
new constitution, this was certainly not the case at the 
conclusion of the referendum campaign. The introduction of 
the government's constitutional proposals had seen the 
consolidation and mobilisation of a considerable body of 
militant opinion in the black community. 
The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in August 
1983 provided a new challenge to the PFP~ 
nearly 600 organisations nationally into 
opposed to the government's new deal. 
The UDF united 
a popular front 
The national 
character of the new movement, ~ts potential strength, as 
well as its mili tance made it an inescapable force within 
the political landscape. It took an uncompromising stance 
in opposition to participation in government created 
structures, rejected the white referendum as racist and did 
not recommend to white voters whether they should not vote 
or not. ( 129) · Shortly before the referendum day, the ANC 
called on white voters to vote "no" in the poll. (130) 
At the same time as the formation of the UDF, the National 
Forum came into existence. It was an alliance of black 
127 ibid; Deurbraak July 1983; and Survey of Race Relations 
in South Africa, 1983 
128 Minutes and Resolutions of PFP Federal Congress, 1983 
129 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1983, p 82 
130 ibid, p 47 
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consciousness organisations and left wing groups outside of 
the ANC-linked non-racial Charterist tradition and it too 
sought to mobilise opposition to the government's proposals. 
One of the leading organisations in the forum, Azanian 
Peoples' Organisation (Azapo), also did not advise a no vote 
as this was deemed to be a futile exercise. (131) 
The overall impact of this growing mobilisation and 
organisation within the black political community forced the 
PFP to reassess its limited contact with black political 
organisations. In this context the Party's 1983 Congress 
resolved to encourage the Party's leadership to expand 
contact with black leaders. In addition it called for 
continued co-operation and links "with all groups which are 
working for realistic and peaceful change in the country". 
( 132) While the PFP was clearly not departing from its 
approach of seeking alliances with moderate black groups, it 
was being forced by a changing environment to break new 
paths into previously unchartered territory. 
131 ibid, p 83 
132 Minutes and Resolutions of PFP Federal Congress, 1983 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FAILURE OF 'THE POLITICS OF POWER': 1984 - 1986 
CONTEXT AND INTRODUCTION 
The period between mid-1984 and early 1986 proved to be a 
turning point in South Africa's history. It entailed 
severe economic crisis, massive popular opposition, and a 
significant weakening in the power of the state to reform 
itself. While there was increased unity amongst the 
dominated classes, the dominating classes experienced a 
successive diminution of their cohesion. 
A key factor contributing to the heightening of crisis was 
the faltering of the South African economy. The debt crisis 
of late 1985, the closing of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, and the outflow of foreign capital marked the peak 
of this process. The conditions for the crisis had been 
established much earlier. (1) Foreign debt as a percentage 
of gross domestic product increased from 20,3% in 1980 to 
50,0% in 1985. (2) 1984 saw a R 1 billion deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments; the value of the 
rand declining to its lowest ever level of $ 0,33; inflation 
reaching 13,25%; and, the prime lending rate also reaching 
its highest ever level of 25%. (3) Associated with these 
dramatic conditions which continued into 1985 were rising 
insolvencies and unemployment. Bethlehem estimated that 





See Hirsch (1988) for a comprehensive discussion of the 
1985 crisis. 
ibid, p 20 
Survey of Race Relations, 1984, p xix 
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27% in 1980. ( 4) Meanwhile the rate of insolvencies had 
increased by 500% between 1980 and 1985. (5) 
The rise of popular opposition and near insurrectionary 
conditions severely affected business confidence in 1985. A 
combination of factors during the year contributed to the 
August/September crisis. Sanctions played a role as the US 
introduced new sanctions. In July Chase Manhattan Bank 
announced that it was cutting its line of credit to the 
country leading to other foreign banks calling in their 
short-term loans. This was followed by the State President 
PW Botha putting a further damper on business confidence 
with his August "Rubicon" speech. The value of the Rand 
dropped still further reaching an all-time low of US 34c. 
Trading on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was suspended for 
three days in August, while the government announced a 
unilateral four-month freeze on debt repayments from 
September, as well as the reintroduction of the financial 
rand. 1985 saw the South Africa economy at its lowest ebb 
with average growth declining by 1%, inflation reaching 
16,2% and a net outflow on the capital account of R 10,46 
billion. ( 6) 
The dominated classes experienced a heightened moment of 
resistance and mobilisation. 1984 saw widespread schools 
boycotts, a successful boycott of the coloured and Indian 
elections for the new tricameral Parliament which severely 
restricted the legitimacy of these structures, and rent 
boycotts in Transvaal townships which not only served to 
further impair the authority of the newly established Black 
Local Authorities, but also saw the SADF troops deployed in 
townships for the first time as part of a massive wave of 
repression. The repression, however, served to provide a 
4 Bethlehem (1988), p 118 
5 Cassim (1986), p 7 
6 Survey of Race Relations, 1985, p xxviii 
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new rallying point for the popular classes as there were 
three highly successful worker stayaways in September and 
October 1984. 
The conditions of resistance were maintained throughout 
1985. As well as ongoing school and rents boycotts, there 
was also a rise in ANC insurgency, as well as violence 
between the people and security forces in townships 
throughout the country. Distinctive features of this period 
were the national proportions assumed by popular struggle, 
the increased demands for national liberation, and the 
growing hegemony of the ANC amongst the dominated classes. 
The trade unions also played a crucial role. 1985 saw the 
establishment of trade union unity in the form of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions, and an increase in 
strikes which included strong political currents. 
These economic and political conditions served to cause 
disarray within the dominating classes with many leading 
capitalists expressing strong opposition to government 
policies. This was especially the case following the debt 
standstill in September 1985. Whereas business had in the 
early eighties been broadly supportive of government 
developments, there was now a real and growing fear .that the 
regime's approach. would undermine their long-term survival. 
Capital increasingly engaged in the political terrain. 
Significant developments were direct contacts and 
negotiations between businessmen and the liberation movement 
both at the national and local level. Anglo America's 
Chairman Gavin Relly led a delegation of business leaders in 
discussions with the ANC in September 1985. At the local 
level in Port Elizabeth businessmen negotiated with popular 
leadership in an attempt to end the consumer boycott of 
white enterprises. Business also acted collectively in 
making political statements. A full page advert in the 
Sunday Times endorsed by 91 leading businessmen called for 
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the ending of the state of emergency, an end 
discrimination, full citizenship rights for 
negotiations with acknowledged black leaders. (7) 
to racial 
all, and 
A further development of the oppositional tone in business 
thinking at this time was the direct involvement of business 
in the formulation of alternative constitutional frameworks 
for the country. The Buthelezi Commission in Natal set a 
precedent for these ventures. As Glaser has indicated these 
efforts departed significantly from the efforts of capital 
in the post-1976 period in that for the first time it was 
attempting to provide alternative constitutional models for 
the state. ( 8) Both Assocom and the FCI proposed broad 
frameworks which endorsed the idea of a non-racial future. 
These frameworks combined a rejection of apartheid with a 
commitment to the international monetarist current. As 
Freund put it: 
"If corporate South Africa receives a message from 
overseas about the need to break with racial 
privilege and move towards opportunity for all, 
(the narrowest definition of post-apartheid 
society), it also receives an equally powerful 
message about fiscal controls, deregulation and 
distribution away from the working class." (9) 
The anxiety within the business community was echoed by 
similar developments within the state. The much vaunted 
"total strategy" was all but destroyed. 
included widespread repression and a 
Emergency measures 
short-term State of 
Emergency from June 1985 until early 1986. There was a 
realisation that there was need to move beyond the system of 
apartheid to remedy the malaise. But for most of 1985 state 
policy was guided by attempts to still the rising tide of 
revolutionary passion amongst the dominated classes. 
7 Mann (1988), p 81 
8 Glaser (1986), p 17 
9 Freund (1986), p 10 
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Associated with the impact of 
strategy" also came under 
urbanisation and a restructuring 
economy which policy had not kept 
Padayachee put it, 
economic decline, "total 
pressure from increased 
of the spatial political 
pace with. As Morris and 
"The classic patterns of labour supply and 
reproduction based on the simple migrant/settled 
rural/urban dichotomies were being superseded by 
restructured urban regional economies based around 
the industrialised metropolitan areas which 
encompassed traditional rural-bantustan, rural-
whi te, urban-industrial, and urban-black areas." 
(10) 
' 
Associated with this changing pattern was the emergence of 
large scale squatter resistance and increased calls from the 
business community for the abolition of influx control. 
The state's intention to establish the Black Local 
Authorities on a financially self-sufficient basis proved to 
be a failure as widespread popular resistance mounted 
following the imposition of raised rent and service charges 
by local councillors. This resistance coincided with the 
development of mass opposition to the tricameral system and 
the exclusion of Africans from central state organs. The 
resistance served to delegi timise the regime's efforts at 
reform. Ironically it was the reform process which, as 
Swilling and Phillips put it, 
"by aiming to widen the access points to political 
society, 'total strategy' inadvertently created 
spaces for initiating and deepening popular 
mobilisation and organisation. All these 
manifestations of resistance and opposition short-
circui ted key state strategies and prepared the 
way for new ones." (11) 
10 Morris and Padayachee (1988), p 6 
11 Swilling and Phillips (1989 a), p 141 
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This combination of conjunctural and structural pressures 
led to a new phase of reform as the state attempted to come 
to terms with problems it faced. This new phase occurred in 
the period covered by the next chapter. During the latter 
stages of the period covered by the present chapter , the 
state was unsure as to what course of action it should 
follow. 
Conditions during this period presented the PFP with an 
entirely new context from that within which it had become 
used to operating. Escalating struggle, the failure of 
reform, repression, a deteriorating economy and a degree of 
deracialisation within constitutional politics all played a 
role. The failure of "total strategy" in the face of a 
rising liberation movement undermined the legitimacy of 
Parliament. It was no longer the decisive site of struggle 
with the result that the PFP found itself sidelined from the 
main battles unfolding within South Africa. Liberals within 
the PFP felt alienated from what were perceived as the 
forces of revolution and repression. 
In the face of this scenario the PFP under Slabbert's 
stewardship redirected itself away from its traditional role 
as a white liberal opposition party. This chapter explores 
this shift from a preoccupation with contesting the terrain 
of the white dominating classes to a "power strategy" which 
sought to establish the Party as the leading edge of a non-
racial centrist social movement premised on an antagonism to 
both the state and the liberation movement. The strategy 
embarked on an attempt to forge a new historic bloc which 
would attempt to cut across the fundamental cleavage between 
the white dominating and black dominated classes. The party 
attempted to achieve this through a major campaign to 
recruit black members, as well as establish links with 
black moderate groups. 
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The time chosen for this strategy meant that it was destined 
to fail dismally. So much so that the leader of the Party 
resigned in early 1986 unable to see a clear future role for 
the PFP. This chapter explores the party's "power" strategy 
and the decisive factors which caused it to be undermined. 
Important among this were the opposition that it faced from 
the liberation movement; its inability to successfully 
interface with the black community; the sway that the left 
within the Party held over the PFP due to its being 
strengthened by the conditions of crisis; and most 
importantly the post-Rubicon crisis from August 1985 which 
deepened the country's malaise. 
The broad theme that emerges when looking at the period is 
that of the impact of outside forces on the direction taken 
within the Party: the mainstream shifting from the 
traditional liberal opposition mode, the left enjoying an 
importance beyond their numbers, and a staunchly counter-
revolutionary stance adopted by Party hawks. 
The chapter is structured thematically and considers the 
following issues: debate within the Party on defence policy 
in the wake of rising conflict in the townships; the 
repositioning of the Party in an effort to forge a new non-
racial historic bloc of the centre; the campaign to recruit 
black members to the PFP to back up this shift; the debate 
within Party ranks about participation within the coloured 
and Indian Houses of Parliament which was significantly 
impacted on by the liberation movement and the left wing of 
the PFP; the deepening of the relationship with Inkatha and 
the attempt to forge a centrist alliance in the form of the 
National Convention Movement; and finally the relationship 
with the liberation movement which had an enormous impact on 
the Party and its members. 
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DEBATES ON DEFENCE POLICY 
A significant indicator of the impact of rising resistance 
on the Party was its debates on defence and conscription 
issues. These came to a head in late 1984. 
Following the formation of the End Conscription Campaign in 
1983 increasing pressure came to bear on the Party to call 
for the termination of compulsory military service. Members 
of the youth section of the PFP had become actively involved 
in the activities of the campaign and lobbied for it within 
the Party. This was intensified, when in September 1984, 
troops were first deployed in the townships. Following a 
decision by the Natal, Cape and Transvaal Congresses of the 
Party to endorse a call to end conscription in late 1984, 
the PFP Federal Council formalised this position as Party 
policy. Previously it had been the Party policy to advocate 
the establishment of a professional defence force, and the 
call for an end to conscription was argued to be in keeping 
with this. (12) The decision was not, however, endorsed by 
all within the Party. The Party's defence spokesman Phillip 
Myburgh and deputy spokesman Brian Goodall were opposed to 
it. The Transvaal Party leader Douglas Gibson, and other 
Transvaal members Harry Schwarz, Reuben Sive, Alf Widman and 
Dave Dalling also strongly opposed the stance taken. (13) 
Myburgh, Sive and Widman resigned from the Party defence 
group in protest at the stance taken. When resigning from 
his position as Party defence spokesman, Myburgh said that 
he could no longer be the Party representative on defence 
matters as he did not agree with the policy. He felt that 
ending conscription would 
12 Cape Times, 19 November 1984 
13 ibid, Die Burger, 20 November 1984, Argus, 20 November 
1984, and Rand Daily Mail, 21 November 1984 
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"have the effect of weakening the 
politicizing its role, as well 
country on the issue of defence 
interests of the country as a 
consistently tried to avoid. "o ( 14) 
SADF and further 
as dividing the 
which is in the 
whole, I have 
He felt that it was not the SADF or the system of 
conscription which should be criticised, but rather the 
government. 
The position of those who opposed the Party's new 
conscription policy was informed in the main by a desire to 
take a strong stand against revolutionary organisations, 
especially with respect to revolutionary violence. It was 
the view of Harry Schwarz that "in order to have peaceful, 
negotiated change you actually need a very strong security 
situation". (15) For others, such as Gibson, a strong stand 
on security policy was also informed by the need to 
accommodate the security fears of white voters threatened by 
black domination. These fears extended to 
"personal security in the larger sense, rather 
than just in the thing of whether one is dealing 
with the communists or whatever else. I think it 
goes right down to the basic that people don't 
feel safe and secure in their homes or their 
flats." (16) 
The debate and conflict in the Party over the conscription 
issue was eventually resolved in the parliamentary caucus 
with all agreeing to an interpretation of the new 
conscription policy as given by the leader Slabbert. His 
statement, as accepted by the caucus argued that the country 
needed a strong, efficient and non-racial Defence Force. 
The task of the country's Defence Force was 
14 Cape Times, 21 November 1984 
15 Interview with Harry Schwarz, 14 May 1990 
16 Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 May 1988 
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"not only to protect us all from external 
aggression, and to guard our borders, but also to 
provide the kind of stability without which no 
evolutionary transition can take place." (17) 
In the context of a divided society it was crucial that the 
defence force be above controversy. It was important to end 
conscription for political, economic and military reasons. 
The political reasons advanced .were that conscription 
applied to whites only; extending conscription to blacks at 
that time would be " extremely provocative"; it "introduced 
a racial dimension" into the "sensitive domestic activities" 
of troops in the townships; and it furthered polarisation 
which was destructive to bringing about evolutionary change. 
Economic grounds for ending the call-up included its 
negative impact 
productivity. 
on the shortage of skilled manpower and 
Military reasons offered were that a 
professional army would be more efficient and cost 
effective; the call up, training and follow-up of conscripts 
was cumbersome, costly and time consuming; a professional 
army would be more motivated and effective overcoming 
problems of alienation and low morale; and the regional 
context was argued as being conducive to a reduction in 
troop numbers which would be associated with an end to 
conscription. (18) 
Together with the enlargement of the permanent force on a 
professional and non-racial basis and the promotion of a 
volunteer reserve force, he argued that a start could be 
made to the "phasing out of conscription as part of our 
military organisation until it is no longer necessary". (19) 
It was necessary to deal with organisations who may wish to 
exploit the situation in the country for "revolutionary, 




violent or other disruptive ends" by means of an 
uncontroversial Defence Force. 
Defence Force be 
It was necessary that the 
"above controversy and should be accepted by all 
groups as an impartial guardian of stability and 
order . " ( 2 0 ) 
In calling for an end to conscription, Slabbert argued, the 
PFP was not attempting to 
"undermine the role of the Defence Force or to 
hamper it, but to allow for the possibility that 
it can become an effective and necessary agent of 
reform." (21) 
Slabbert's interpretation was welcomed by those who had been 
so strongly opposed the new Party policy earlier. The 
casting of an end to consc~iption within the context of a 
reformist programme which would ·avert revolution proved to 
be acceptable. 
THE PARTY OF THE "MODERATE CENTRE" 
The period from late 1984 until 1986 saw a dramatic shift in 
the context within which the PFP operated. The rise of the 
liberation movement as a central pole of struggle, as well 
as the gradual deracialisation of politics forced the Party 
to reposition itself in mid-1985. However, initially, in 
the first year after the referendum there was still a degree 
of optimism that the PFP was the major force which could 
dislocate the Nationalists from power and so accelerate 
reforms. Jan van Eck, the editor of the Party newspaper 
Deurbraak, wrote in October 1984 that only a white party 




policy. He argued that, despite the introduction of the 
tricameral Parliament, the PFP was the only party other than 
the government which could obtain a white majority and thus 
it was "therefore in reality an alternative government and 
the official opposition." (22) 
Despite van Eck's optimism, the Party leadership doubted the 
PFP's ability at that time of winning a majority of the 
white vote. Slabbert, addressing the June 1984 meeting of 
the Federal Council acknowledged that the Party had lost the 
short-term initiative to the government's reform programme. 
( 23) This view was echoed in the conclusions of a Party 
Image Committee which reported to the same meeting of the 
Federal Council. The Committee concluded that the Party had 
lost potential support to the National Party and that the 
constraints of its image prevented these voters from 
returning to the PFP fold. The concerns with the Party's 
image problem were confined to the Party's status among 
whites. Four areas were identified by the Committee: 
1 . The PFP was seen by white voters as being more 
concerned with black than with white rights. It was felt 
that whites could not trust the PFP with defending their 
interests, a view reinforced by the Party's stance on the 
referendum. 
2. The PFP was perceived as being a permanent opposition 
and not an alternative government with clear alternative 
policies. 
3. The PFP had a strong image as a "boycott party". 
4. The PFP was viewed as being a party of rich English 
speakers. 
22 Deurbraak, October 1984 
23 Minutes of PFP Federal Council, 16 June 1984 
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The Federal Council responded to the report by recommending 
a number of measures aimed at improving the image of the 
Party among white voters. (24) To a large extent this was a 
continuation of the PFP's existing constitutional 
incrementalist trend. There was, however, growing concern 
that the Party was not meeting the challenge of a changing 
context. 
Not all within the party accepted the restrictive view of 
the committee in defining the Party's problems as resting 
largely with its negative image among white voters. This 
approach was criticised by a PFP researcher as not coming to 
terms with the changing circumstances of politics in South 
Africa. (25) During the Vorster era, he argued, the Party 
had focussed on two distinct "markets": voters who wanted 
reform, and voters who wanted effective opposition. PW 
Botha' s reforms had changed this situation fundamentally. 
Former PFP supporters came to see the NP as the vehicle for 
reform. Opposition to the reforms were seen by these former 
supporters as "petulant and obstructive". (26) The 
emergence of a strong right wing had encouraged other former 
PFP supporters to shift their allegiance to Botha in 
response to the conservative threat. Consequently, neither 
of the two unique "markets" existed any longer for the 
Party. 
He went on to state that outside the confines of white 
politics I the introduction of the new constitution had 
significantly challenged the PFP's previous presumption that 
it had "an unchallenged right to speak on behalf of all the 
disenfranchised". (27) The decision of the Party to 
24 ibid 
25 James Selfe, "A comment on the report of the Image 




participate in the new constitution after calling for a "no" 
vote in the referendum had drawn back many supporters who 
had "strayed", but had resulted in "alienating others, 
especially blacks, who felt it was inconsistent with 
opposition to the system". (28) 
The debate about the Party's image and consequent 
positioning was subject to intense pressure over the 
subsequent year as popular protest and extra- and intra-
par liamentary pressures came to force the PFP to 
sophisticate its strategy. The PFP was gradually finding 
itself excluded from the main trajectory of struggle in 
which the main actors were the regime on the one hand, and 
the organisations of the dominated classes on the other. 
The popular resistance was gaining in momentum and authority 
both within the country, and abroad. In particular, it 
came to be seen as the standard bearer of the anti-apartheid 
and non-racial causes - to the exclusion of the PFP. It 
also proved to be a threat to leading elements amongst the 
dominating classes who believed that the UDF and ANC could 
mount a revolutionary assault on the basis of South African 
state, and more particularly the capitalist mode of 
production. 
In an attempt to come to terms with these pressures the 
Party in June 1985 announced a major initiative in order, 
according to Slabbert, to go "flat-out" for what he termed 
"the politics of power". (29) The objective of the strategy 
was to make the Party a political force "among all race 
groups and put it at the centre of negotiation politics in 
South Africa". (30) The initiative to advance the party as 
a centrist force had two key components: 
28 ibid 
29 Leadership, 5 (1) 1986 
30 Sunday Tribune, 9 June 1985 
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1. to position the PFP as a Party which could play a 
mediating role between government and black opposition 
groups. This would require the Party to engage both with 
the government and with resistance organisations to a far 
greater extent than had been the case in the past. Slabbert 
was projected by the party as the pivotal individual who 
could achieve this task. A PFP newspaper argued that 
Slabbert was increasingly seen as 
"the leader who can act as a mediator, as honest 
broker between the two opposing forces of 
Afrikaner Nationalism and black liberation." (31) 
2. to win "effective control" of Parliament by winning 
majorities in the House of Representatives and House of 
Delegates. This aspect.of the strategy was premised on the 
belief that the repeal of the Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act was imminent. The repeal of that 
legislation would open the way for a major recruitment 
effort for the Party within black communities. The Party 
believed that by winning majorities in the coloured and 
Indian Houses of Parliament and by holding the balance of 
power within the House of Assembly in the event of right 
wing growth it could effectively control government. 
The initiative was a response to the growing realisation 
that the Party could no longer operate in the isolation of 
whites-only politics. It was however premised on the 
Party's participation within the existing constitutional 
structures. In motivating why the Party was setting out to 
become the "largest and most broadly based political Party 
in the history of Parliament" (32) Slabbert argued that he 
regarded the strategy as an aspect of "the politics of 
power", as opposed to "the politics of protest". (33) This 
31 Deurbraak, August 1985 
32 Argus, 19 June 1985 
33 Leadership, 5 (1) 1986 
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was a reference to the growing popular resistance movement. 
Slabbert later said that he 
"never denied the validity of a party or group in 
Parliament protesting the injustices of Apartheid. 
But I set myself an objective to see to what 
extent I could get rid of apartheid, not just 
protest against it." (34) 
Slabbert' s refrain of 'repression, revolution or reform ... 
those are the options" became the lodestar of the Party 
strategy. He characterised the government's programme as 
being repressive, while that of the liberation movement was 
revolutionary. Both approaches were considered to be "anti-
democratic, anti-individual and fundamentally irrational". 
(35) 
At the same time as he was seeking for the PFP alliances in 
the extra-parliamentary field he was criticising the 
dominant protest strategy of organisations in this arena. 
He appealed to extra-parliamentary groups to realise the 
limits of protest politics, and described those who confuse 
protest with bringing about change as having 
"the Walls of Jericho approach to change: If 
enough people can be mobilized to walk around and 
trumpet against the citadel of apartheid and 
display intense moral anger the walls may begin to 
crack. I am afraid Jericho was a one-time affair. 
What distinguishes protest action from bargaining 
or negotiation action is institutional leverage. 
that is why protest action without institutional 
leverage will always be vulnerable to counter-
repressive measures." (36) 
The strategic imperative for the PFP came to be to promote a 
"third way" which united Parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary sites of struggle, but which did not depend on 
34 ibid 
35 Slabbert (1985 b), p 59 
36 ibid, p 136 
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protest and which accepted that Parliament was the 
instrument to bring about constitutional reform. The 
initiative was a recognition on the part of the.PFP that it 
could no longer hope for the state to lead the process of 
change form above as its reform initiatives were all but 
undermined by popular resistance. It was also an 
acknowledgement that the Party would have to break with many 
of the traditions of its liberal past. Perceiving the need 
to take the counter-revolutionary initiative, the PFP broke 
with the tradition of white liberal opposition politics. It 
sought now to establish a new non-racial class alliance - a 
new historic bloc - in competition with similar efforts on 
the part of the liberation movement. It, however, pursued a 
social movement which, in contradistinction to the ANC and 
UDF, would be avowedly capitalist, yet non-racial. 
The exact form that the strategy was to take was not clear 
at the time it was unveiled. Over the months that followed 
it became clear that the Party had underestimated the scale 
and contentiousness of its stance. It underestimated the 
precise nature of the moment in the history of South Africa 
in which there was an extreme polarisation between the 
dominated and dominating classes. The reformist programme 
proposed by Slabbert could only succeed on the basis of the 
manipulation of state power and the consent of the 
liberatory organisations. This, of course, was not to be. 
The Party embarked on its course of action being at the same 
time antagonistic to the liberation movement, and also 
ignorant of the power of resistance organisations to limit 
the PFP's efforts. Events from August 1985 also severely 
undercut the initiative. The mid-1985 strategy is best 
understood by exploring the character of the relationship of 
the Party to the black community and black political 
organisations in the period under review. 
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The following sections thematically explore the various 
aspects of this relationship and highlights their confusing 
and contradictory character. 
THE OUTREACH CAMPAIGN AND DEBATE ABOUT PARTICIPATION 
A central aspect of the "power strategy" was a campaign to 
recruit members of the dominated classes into the PFP. 
Although the campaign was only started in"mid-1985 there had 
been earlier moves in this direction. 
The introduction of the tricameral system immediately placed 
before the PFP the reality of working with blacks in the 
Parliamentary context for the first time since the 
introduction of legislation prohibiting mixed parties in 
1968. The issue of participation in the white House of 
Assembly had not caused much of a debate within the Party. 
In addition, this logic was extended to a resolution whereby 
the Party Caucus was requested to consider joint caucusing 
with "like-minded members" of the coloured and Indian 
Houses. ( 37) 
The Party did not actively pursue such a joint caucus at any 
stage although at points there were close working relations 
between it and parties in the House of Representatives and 
the House of Delegates. (38) PFP members adopted an open 
approach to these parties as was demonstrated by an 
editorial in Deurbraak in May-1984. Jan van Eck, the editor 
wrote that the Labour Party was intent on destroying 
apartheid laws. This would lead to a clash between the LP 
and the NP. He also suggested that since the PFP and the LP 
both believed "in the destruction of apartheid" they were 
"bound to become closer allies in the new constitution". 
37 ibid 
38 This is discussed in detail in Chapter Five below. 
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(39) The tone of van Eck's comments was indicative of a 
growing feeling within the Party that the tricameral system 
could provide the constitutional opportunity for the PFP to 
wield the decisive force of state power and thus be in a 
position to bring about reform. 
In the midst of pressures from the Party for the repeal of 
the Prohibition of Political Interference Act key PFP 
structures took decisions in late 1984 to open the Party's 
membership to all races. Party regions had reported that a 
"number" of blacks had joined the PFP in the Transvaal, the 
Cape and Natal. (40) Following resolutions of the Cape and 
Natal provincial congresses calling on the Party to admit 
members o"f all races ( 41) the PFP Federal Council resolved 
similarly.. The resolution read: 
"In the light of the PFP's rejection of compulsory 
race classification and consequently of the Race 
Classification Act, and in the light of the PFP's 
acceptance of voluntary association as necessary 
for political co-operation and stability in South 
Africa, the Federal Council of the PFP wants to 
state unequivocally that when a person applies for 
membership of the PFP, the PFP under no 
circumstances will inquire into, or take into 
account, the colour, race or other ethnic origin 
of that person." (42) 
In motivating this decision Party Chairman Alex Boraine 
said, "There is a deep anxiety within the Party that we 
can't go it alone if we are to solve South Africa's 
problems. We must be in contact with all race groups." (43) 
The only hesitation to the resolution came from the 
Transvaal Congress which was, as always, informed by a 
preponderance of conservative liberals and reformist. It was 
39 Deurbraak, May 1984 
40 Sunday Tribune, 11 November 1984 
41 Sunday Express, 14 October 1984 
42 Minutes of PFP Federal Council, 18 November 1984 
43 Cape Times, 19 November 1984 
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concerned that the decision could be construed as 
encouraging people to break the law. ( 44) The Leader of 
the Party smoothed over the potential conflict by stating 
that while the Party was formally open, prospective members 
would be warned that they could face prosecution. 
The decision to open membership encouraged a sharp rebuke 
from black extra-parliamentary groups. Speaking for the 
UDF, Frank Chikane said, 
"The PFP is at present working within the 
framework of apartheid. Whatever change they can 
impose within their own organisation does not 
have a bearing on our struggle for a just South 
Africa." ( 45) 
The response from the Black Consciousness sector was equally 
damning with the publicity secretary of the Azanian 
Student's Movement Kabelo Lengano suggesting that 
"to say that the PFP has the black people's 
interests at heart, by seemingly deceivingly going 
against the Prevention of Poli ti cal Interference 
Act, would be both flimsy and unconvincing." (46) 
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The repeal of the Act preventing mixed political_parties in 
mid-1985 paved the way for the Party to launch a concerted 
drive to recruit black members. In inaugurating the drive, 
known as the "outreach campaign", Slabbert called for the 
PFP to become the "largest, most broad-based political party 
in the history of the South African Parliament". ( 47) In 
making this appeal and in setting itself on this course of 
action Slabbert and the PFP were setting themselves on a 
collision course with the liberation movement on whose 
terrain they were now actively seeking to operate. The· 
44 Rand Daily Mail, 20 November 1984 
45 Sowetan, 20 November 1984 
46 ibid 
47 Deurbraak, August 1985 
Party put extensive resources into the campaign with the 
chairman Alex Boraine and the National Director Neil Ross 
guiding the recruitment drive. Assisting them was a 
national task force made up of MPs Peter Gastrow, Ken 
Andrew, Andrew Savage, Erroll Moorcroft, Roger Burrouws and 
Peter Soal. Marlene Webber, the OFS leader of the Party 
joined the national team for this campaign. (48) The focus 
of the recruitment campaign was the coloured and Indian 
communities with the possible medium term intention of 
contesting seats in the Houses of Representatives and 
Delegates. PFP leaders at this point stressed, however, 
that the Party had not taken a firm decision yet to' contest 
elections for these two Houses. This was to be the subject 
of debate and strategic assessment within the Party in the 
months to come. 
The decision of the Party to recruit black members was 
treated by the UDF as coming close to a declaration of 
hostilities between the groups. Speaking on behalf of the 
UDF, Gerry Coovadia said that the PFP had 
"no moral right to try to corrupt and erode our 
sense of unity. The PFP must come and ask the 
coloured and Indian communities whether they want 
to participate in the tricameral Parliament. Yet 
82% did not participate in the sham elections last 
year. If the PFP have not learnt that yet, they 
must learn that now, otherwise we will find 
ourselves on different sides of the fence. And we 
don ' t want that" . ( 4 9 ) 
Shortly thereafter, a claim by Boraine that an affiliate of 
the UDF wanted to join the PFP as a group was rejected by a 
UDF spokesman as "difficult to believe" (50) In a hostile 
press debate another spokesperson for the UDF warned the 
Party that if it continued its recruitment drive it could 
48 ibid 
49 Caoe Times, 17 June 1985 
50 Sunday Tribune, 23 June 1985 
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face the sa~e reaction that coloured and Indian parties had 
experienced during the 1983 elections when these had been 
vigorously opposed and effectively isolated from the 
communities they were se.eking to represent. Slabbert' s 
response to this warning was curt and stressed the PFP as an 
independent political force intent on taking the liberation 
movement on: 
"We cannot expect everybody will like the PFP. We 
appreciate there will be possible conflict with 
other groups who do not share our ideals. We are 
not spending our time finding out how many people 
do not like what we are doing. We are rather 
looking at how many people like it." (51) 
Not all in the Party were happy with what was described as a 
"bullish" approach on the part of Slabbert. (52) They 
would have pref erred a more cautious approach in which the 
re-emerging liberation movement was engaged with on a more 
diplomatic basis and not confronted head-on. This 
difference was a reflection of differing emphases within the 
Party as to the meaning of the outreach campaign. For the 
majority it meant a focus on recruitment; whereas, for an 
emerging minority "outreach" was best interpreted as a 
constructive engagement with extra-parliamentary forces. 
(53) The latter interpretation grew as many saw the 
pugnaciousness of the extra-parliamentary left for the first 
time being directed at their own party. For many in the 
Party the recruitment drive was their first interaction with 
black politics. Previously contact had consisted in the 
main of support and civil rights work by Party members. The 
new experience had a major impact. 
Gastrow, UDF opposition to the PFP had 
According to Peter 
"a dampening effect and removed some of the 
romanticism around moving into the black community 
51 ibid 
52 Interview with Colin Eglin, 25 April 1990 
53 ibid 
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and I think it reduced some of the paternalistic 
elements in that approach, where somehow people 
thought that the black community was, politically 
speaking, actually quite keen to be linked to the 
PFP. For many it resulted in a sort of a move 
back into white politics. The resistance seemed 
to be, on the face of it, so strong that people 
thought, 'To hell with it then! I for one am not 
going to try and bash my head against the wall'. " 
(54) 
For others, like Gastrow, the challenge presented by the UDF 
response, forced them to reassess the traditions of white 
liberal constitutional politics. Jan van Eck described the 
impact as follows: 
"You were saying, 'If this isn't working, then the 
people in townships are primarily working through 
extra-parliamentary organisations. Then obviously 
we have to start looking at closer liaison with 
those organisations.' Because, then you are 
involved , although indirectly, with the people in 
the townships." (55) 
There had been great optimism about the prospect of 
recruiting large numbers of black Party members because the 
principles and policies of the Party were deemed to be 
shared by the great majority of South Africans ( 56). The 
campaign, however, failed to draw many black members. It 
became half-hearted and sporadic with Party organisers 
having little expertise in operating within the complicated 
terrain of the popular classes. The culture of .the 
liberation movement was the dominant one in popular politics 
with the consequence that the liberal constitutionalism of 
the PFP was seen as alien. ( 5 7) This came as a shock to 
hopeful PFP recruiters who soon learned that their campaign 
would never get off the ground. 
54 Interview with Peter Gastrow, 28 March 1990 
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The outreach campaign was not only a failure to the extent 
that there was resistance to it, and that recruitment 
numbers were low, but also due to the complications it 
caused for the Party internally. An example of the PFP's 
inexperience in black politics can be seen in its appointing 
of Dinky Pillay, an individual with a very low public esteem 
with the Transvaal Indian community, to its National 
Council. The derision of the Transvaal Indian Congress at 
the appointment of Pillay. (58) forced a number of Transvaal 
PFP branch chairmen to question the wisdom of the 
appointment. (59) The matter was eventually resolved with 
Pillay's resignation from the Federal Council. 
The most significant consequence of the Party opening its 
membership related to the debate this initiated regarding 
participation in all three Houses of the tricameral 
Parliament. At the launch of the outreach campaign in June 
1985, Slabbert indicated that it was the Party's intention 
to win a majority of seats in the Indian and coloured 
Houses of Parliament. A formal decision on participation in 
these structures was seen as complicated and was delayed at 
that point. The response of extra-parliamentary groups to 
the recruitment campaign of the PFP served as a warning that 
it should not venture into participation in all fora of the 
tricameral system too glibly. 
The PFP's participation as a white party in the white House 
had already been questioned by a UDF leader in an article in 
the Rand Daily Mail as early as August 1984. Joanne 
Yawitc:t:i, the leader of Jodac a UDF affiliate comprised of 
white leftists, wrote that the PFP's opposition to the new 
constitution had raised expectations in black communities 
that it would not participate in its structures. The 
58 Sunday Star, 8 September 1985 
59 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, October 1985 
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decision of the PFP to be active in the white House of 
Assembly was seen as a "compromise of principles, and not 
only a tactical compromise. " ( 6 0) In addition to 
criticising the PFP's participation as giving legitimacy to 
the structures, Yawitch also suggested that it obscured "the 
fact that there is a growing movement of democratic whites 
who have entered into the mainstream of opposition to 
apartheid" . ( 61) This, she contended, was an important 
symbolic statement of non-racialism which the PFP's actions 
were obscuring. 
The UDF made an appeal to the PFP on the eve of the Party's 
Federal Congress in August 1985. The UDF cautioned the 
Party against going into the coloured and Indian Houses. 
It said that the PFP would assist the government in 
legitimising its structures through a campaign of 
recruitment and participation in elections for all three 
Houses. Drawing attention to the recently promulgated state 
of emergency, the statement went on to suggest bitterly that 
the PFP had used "the gap the repression of the UDF had 
provided to recruit black members" . ( 6 2) Continuing, the 
statement warned that if the PFP put up candidates for 
elections in the House of Representatives and the House of 
Delegates its candidates would be treated in the same way as 
candidates in the earlier election for these two Houses. It 
suggested that whites should accept that the type of change 
that would satisfy the "majority" could only come through 
the actions of the majority. 
The gauntlet had been thrown down; and it had a considerable 
effect on the debate within the PFP. Expressing sensitivity 
to the warnings of the extra-parliamentary movement, and 
mindful of the need to be cautious in its relations with 
60 Rand Daily Mail, 21 August 1984 
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these groups, Colin Eglin suggested that the PFP needed to 
be "deeply aware" of the skepticism and sensitivity 
regarding participation. He said that in a normal democracy 
the PFP would go all out to gain power, but South Africa was 
not a democracy. The PFP would not rush into the new 
structures without consulting the people affected. (63) A 
stauncher position came from Mark Stein, the vice president 
of the PFP Youth, who warned that he would lead a walkout of 
members from the Party if it was decided to participate in 
all three Houses of Parliament. Stein was suspended from 
the Party for adopting this stance. (64) 
In the debate at the Federal Congress Slabbert took a strong 
pro-participation position. Responding to criticisms of 
participation from extra-parliamentary organisations he 
argued that participation was a matter of strategy and not 
principle. He went on to repeat his contention that 
constitutional change could, by definition, only come about 
through the constitution. In a statement intended to 
distance the Party from the liberation movement and to 
reaffirm its Parliamentary strategy he continued that the 
alternative to constitutional change was to use "violent, 
revolutionary, or military means". (65) He concluded by 
saying that "one cannot demand a perfect constitution before 
one participates to bring about constitutional change". (66) 
The Party eventually agreed in principle to participate in 
all three Houses of Parliament but that the ultimate 
decision to do so would rest with the leadership who would 
have 
"to be sensitive and take into account 
63 Cape Times, 19 July 1985; Deurbraak, August 1985 
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"1. the practical problems 
the PFP' s use of the 
following the repeal of 
Political Interference Act; 
that may result from 
political structures 
the Prohibition of 
"2. the duty of the PFP as a broad-based party to 
play a mediating role in South African politics." 
( 67) 
The resolution was a compromise between those for and 
against participation. At the Federal Congress there was a 
heated and lengthy debate on the motion. Those most 
virulently opposed to the motion were a group of Cape MPCs 
led by Jan van Gend, and including Molly Blackburn and Di 
Bishop. Drawing on their active experience in assisting 
popular organisations in the struggles then reaching a 
zenith in Cape townships they warned that the Party should 
delay participation until it was certain it had "substantial 
support from the communities to be served" by the two 
Houses. · ( 68) Blackburn and Bishop advised that the Party 
would lose credibility in black communities if it were to 
proceed with the strategy. According to Blackburn the Party 
would be committing "political suicide " if it proceeded. 
(69) 
The stance adopted above was informed by the active 
involvement of a small but influential group of Party 
members in popular struggles. Others not directly involved 
were also influenced and attracted to the discourse of 
popular organisations. Their involvement in debates within 
the PFP was guided by this. The influence of the left went 
beyond their numbers. Conditions of exacerbated crisis had 
allowed the left to assume an important role within the 
Party. In searching for a new identity the PFP both sought 
out and was attacked by all sides. It no longer sought to 
only appeal to a limited white constituency. Interaction 
67 Minutes and Resolutions of PFP Federal Congress, 1985 
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with a black constituency came to assume a 
importance. Those that concentrated on this aspect 




unofficial representatives of the liberation movement within 
the PFP. From this platform they could predominate in 
debates, whereas in the past they could not due to the 
lesser strength of the liberation movement. (70) 
The Federal Congress decision was followed by numerous calls 
from the UDF and its affiliates for the PFP not to proceed 
with the strategy. In strong language the TIC said that it 
regarded the PFP Leader Slabbert as "no better than the 
Rajbansies and Hendrickses who, despite massive rejection of 
the tricameral Parliament, entered it." (71) 
With the failure of the recruitment campaign, as well as the 
strong response from popular organisations, the Party, while 
Slabbert was still the leader, backed down from its initial 
enthusiasm to participate in all three Houses of Parliament. 
(72) The Western Cape region of the PFP felt particularly 
strongly about this matter and introduced a motion to the 
December 1985 meeting of the Federal Council calling on the 
Party not to participate in a forthcoming by-election for 
the House of Delegates in their region. After assurances 
from Slabbert that under the current conditions the Party 
would not contest the election, the Western Cape motion was 
withdrawn. ( 7 3 ) 
The PFP's attempts to recruit black members and to 
participate in all three Houses of Parliament, therefore, 
proved to be a failure. In large part the pulling back from 
the decision to participate can be seen to be linked to the 
70 This will be more fully discussed in the section on the 
Party's relationship with the liberation movement below. 
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efforts and opposition of the UDF and its affiliates. Harry 
Schwarz said that there could be " no doubt that the 
attitude of extra-parliamentary organisations played a role 
in regard to participation in the other two chambers". (74) 
The impact of these organisations on Party strategy could be 
likened to a power of veto, he argued, illustrating the 
fragile base on which the PFP stood. 
RELATIONS WITH INKATHA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
CONVENTION MOVEMENT 
Central to the strategy initiative launched in mid-1985 was 
that the PFP should assume the mantle of leading the centre 
of South African politics. Prior experience and changed 
circumstances had shown that it, as a white party, could not 
do this alone. Consequently a two-fold outreach programme 
had been launched both to recruit black members, and to 
consolidate links with black extra-parliamentary 
organisations. 
links with was 
The logical organisation to foster such 
Inkatha. The PFP and Inkatha had long-
standing ties, and held similar moderate policy platforms. 
The historically smooth relationship between the two 
organisations had been blemished earlier in 1985 following 
the shooting of 19 mourners by policemen at Langa outside 
Uitenhage. A delegation of PFP MPs and MPCs led by Errol 
Moorcroft had conducted a study of the event and its 
aftermath and its report had stated that the South African 
government had sent Zulu speaking police to the area in 
order to stir up ethnic rivalries. Buthelezi, the leader of 
Inkatha, took very badly to this assertion suggesting that 
the report was "naked racism" and "filthy Nationalist 
propaganda". (75) When Moorcroft responded that Buthelezi's 
attack had been "intemperate, unjustified and offensive", 
74 Interview with Harry Schwarz, 14 May 1990 
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the Inkatha leader retorted that Moorcroft was contemptible 
and that there was nothing worse than "a racist masquerading 
as a liberal". (76) The Natal leader of the PFP Ray Swart 
immediately intervened by meeting with Buthelezi and 
smoothed over the ruffles that had been created. 
The outreach campaign from June 1985 saw a renewed impetus 
in PFP/Inkatha relations. Slabbert held a number of 
meetings with Buthelezi and met jointly with the Kwazulu 
cabinet. He was also the guest speaker at the opening of 
the its Legislative Assembly in June 1985. (77) At the end 
of June Helen Suzman led a delegation of 11 PFP MPs as 
observers at the Inkatha Congress in Ulundi. They were 
warmly welcomed by Buthelezi who praised the PFP highly. 
(78) 
Not all in the Party welcomed the intensified relationship 
with Inkatha. Party members and leadership figures in the 
Western and Eastern Cape can be identified as being strongly 
opposed to the relationship. ( 7 9) This was in large part 
due to their growing relationship with the UDF which was 
strongly antagonistic to Inkatha. (80) 
Whatever objections there were to Inkatha were insufficient 
to upset the overall course of Party strategy which was to 
elevate the relationship to a primary place in the PFP' s 
extra-parliamentary dealings. This was particularly so with 
respect to the National Convention Movement. While the NCM 
was not a formal initiative of the PFP as much as it was the 
brainchild of Slabbert, it was associated closely with the 
Party and should be seen as the core attempt at creating a 
76 ibid 
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moderate alliance which could present a viable alternative 
to the liberation movement and present a united front of 
establishment opposition to government. 
/ 
Motivating for the establishment of the Convention Alliance 
and for Party support for it, Slabbert said to the PFP' s 
August 1985 Federal Congress that it was unlikely that 
government was going to facilitate political change. It was 
necessary, therefore, to create a new initiative outside of 
government structures to facilitate such change. This was 
an important departure from the Party's earlier stance of 
encouraging the state to bring about reform. Now, freed 
form its earlier constraints of whites-only politics, the 
PFP pursued a non-racial alliance to offset the possibility 
of revolution and to encourage liberal reforms. While 
Slabbert recognised the need for opposition politics - "to 
shout and protest" - he argued for something more: 
"an initiative which can show an alternative 
between the two options that are beginning to 
polarise at an alarming. rate. 
"Repression versus revolution. 






The choice between repression and revolution was a false one 
according to Slabbert. 
"We must show that there is a third option. An 
option in the middle away from violence to change 
the status quo and away from repression to 
maintain it. This is what I have in mind with a 
convention alliance." (82) 
This third option was that of reform which Slabbert argued 
was favoured by the great majority of South Africans. These 
81 Argus, 30 August 1985 
82 ibid 
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people were caught between the poles of repression and 
revolution. The strategy behind the Convention Alliance 
idea was to harness these people into a potent social force 
in order to possibly establish a new historic bloc behind a 
unifying discourse of opposition to revolution and in favour 
of reform. 
The appeal to join the Convention·Alliance was made to all 
including what were deemed to be the revolutionaries - the 
ANC and UDF. Slabbert later said that he set out in the 
belief that the NCM would not work if it excluded key 
elements from the libera~ion movement. He said that he had 
consulted Alan Boesak and Desmond Tutu, believing their 
endorsement of the initiat~ve amounted to the support of the 
UDF. (83) He was, how~ver, severely misguided. 
In his speech to the PFP Federal Council in which he floated 
the idea before taking it to the Party Congress Slabbert 
anticipated the Alliance being a sole force in the political 
terrain being attacked by both the left and right. This was 
despite claims to wanting the involvement of the liberation 
movement. He was minuted as saying that 
"within the foreseeable future , the PFP and the 
Convention Alliance will be the only platforms of 
protest and he said that the Party must be very 
clear on its opposition to violence and its 
commitment to the rule of law. He warned that 
when the Party moves into the middle road with the 
Convention Alliance, it will be attacked from both 
sides, right and left." (84) 
The NCM was, therefore, born consciously at odds with the 
liberation movement. As such, it represented a continuation 
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Party leaders saw the Convention idea as holding the 
possibility for the Party gaining power. It presented the 
opportunity of breaking with a past of limited success, and 
to fabricate a new social movement. Said Colin Eglin at the 
time: 
"We have been caught in the well of white protest 
politics. The accent must not be on protest alone 
but on gaining political power. Our purpose is to 
change the political order." (86) 
The first meeting of the Convention Alliance was convened 
jointly by Slabbert and Buthelezi. A 12 member steering 
committee was elected at this meeting under the chairmanship 
of Advocate Jules Browde. The committee also included 
senior Inkatha member Oscar Dhlomo, Alex Boraine and Colin 
Eglin of the PFP, businessmen Raymond Ackerman and Tony 
Ardington, Prof Denys Schreiner of Natal University, Prof D 
Bosch of UNISA, Rev Stanley Mogoba of the Methodist Church, 
and Joyce Harris of the Black Sash. Ibrahim Bawa of the 
Islamic Council of South Africa was later co-opted into the 
group. (87) The launching meeting was characterised by the 
absence of the UDF, Azapo, the NP and trade unions. A 
significant group of businessmen did attend the meeting 
including Pick n Pay Chairman Raymond Ackerman, Anglo 
American Director and Chairman of a number of major 
companies Zach de Beer, First National Bank's Chris Ball, 
Mike Rosholt of Barlow Rand, Premier Group Chairman Tony 
Bloom, Chris Saunders of Tongaat Sugar and National African 
Chamber of Commerce President Sam Motsuenyane. ( 88) The 
participation of business at this time coincided with an 
increasing unease within the capitalist community regarding 
the failure of government's reform initiatives. Business 
86 Caoe Times, 2 September 1985 
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was increasingly looking elsewhere to implement alternative 
plans. Also attending were Hudson Ntsanwisi, the Chief 
Minister of Gazankulu, and the Cape New Republic Party 
leader Pat Ro"gers. Archbishop Desmond Tutu and South 
African Council of Churches General Secretary Beyers Naude 
sent messages of support to the gathering. (89) 
' 
The initiative was soon on the rocks as the major elements 
of the Liberation Movement refused to come into the 
Alliance. The UDF said that it refused to work with the 
PFP, Inkatha or any other "bantustan leader". The ANC, 
despite the urgings of Slabbert that the Alliance was not 
set up in competition with it, refused to become part of it. 
It argued that a National Convention could only be held once 
apartheid had been dismantled. The PFP and Inkatha were 
forced in October to withdraw from the steering committee of 
the Alliance in order to get the UDF to participate, but 
this effort was a failure leading to the eventual withering 
away of the alliance. Slabbert knew that the Alliance could 
not succeed without the participation of organisations from 
the liberation movement. He said that when the ANC 
announced their opposition to the initiative shortly before 
its official launch 
"the thing died just there. But it was too late 
to stop. it. It must have been one of the most 
embarrassing days of my life in politics. You end 
up at the Sandton Sun and there you have all these 
people, but you don't have any substance." (90) 
Within the PFP there were mixed feelings about the alliance. 
While the Party's Federal Congress endorsed the idea of the 
alliance, it soon became clear to many within the Party that 
the idea would not work. Some claimed that the idea was not 
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as a PFP initiative, it should be seen as being an idea 
pursued by the leader Slabbert. Commenting later Peter 
Gastrow said: 
"It was not canvassed within the Party; it was not 
discussed in great detail by the Party. This was 
one of Slabbert's weaknesses. He suddenly became 
very enthusiastic about the idea and then ran with 
it at such a speed without doing the necessary 
networking. At that stage one wasn't familiar 
with the politics of extra-parliamentary 
groupings." (91) 
The Convention Alliance failure was a hard school for the 
Party. It had been a confused attempt by the leader, with 
most Party members in tow, to build a new hegemonic bloc 
drawing from the dominating and dominated classes. At the 
same time as he was distancing the Party from revolutionary 
politics, Slabbert attempted in a confused manner to draw 
groups such as the ANC and UDF into his initiative. The 
character of the Alliance's politics, with its stress on 
negotiations, was a far cry from the mobilisation of the 
popular classes and calls for ungovernability then dominant 
within the liberation movement. The ·Alliance either failed 
to come to terms with this difference, or deliberately took 
it on. 
The Alliance can be seen as being associated with the 
emergent thrust of opposition to the state emerging at that 
time within the business community. The participation of 
several leading businessmen gives weight to this argument. 
It should not, however, be seen as a deliberate attempt by 
business leaders to establish a new historic bloc under the 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie. While it held this potential 
it should not be cast as having this intention. Rather, 
initiatives such as this, are characteristic of periods of 
severe crisis in which contending forces explore new 
91 Interview with Peter Gastrow, 28 March 1990 
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approaches to redefining and redirecting social conflict. 
Slabbert' s alliance idea was just one adventure in this 
context, just as the various business initiatives of the 
period 1985 to 1987 were as well. The Convention Alliance 
attempt was an idea, not of the making of a dominant social 
class, but born out of an ideology linked to the interests 
of that class. This is not to decry the very real attempt 
that Slabbert was making to· terminate conflict in South 
Africa. It was, nevertheless, an attempt to do so on the 
basis of defending unhindered capital accumulation. 
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The involvement of business, as has been noted, was part of 
an emerging trend away from supporting government. The 
escalating political and economic crisis had unsettled the 
comfortable complacency of this community. The PFP sought 
to capitalise on this not only through the Convention 
Movement idea, but also through a sophisticated fund raising 
campaign under the title of the Van Zyl Slabbert Trust. The 
Trust chaired by Tony Bloom and carrying the endorsement of 
leading industrialists Harry Oppenheimer and Chris Saunders 
sought to raise R 10 million from time of its launch in June 
1985 until Christmas of that year. (92) While it did not 
reach this target, it managed to gather R 7 million by early 
December. The campaign was closely linked to the overall 
PFP strategy, and under the changed circumstances it found a 
degree of success within the business community, managing to 
draw back the support of individuals who had been lost 
through their endorsement of the regime's reforms. A 
notable example in this respect is Chris Saunders. 
92 Cape Times, 20 June 1985; Sunday Times, 13 October 1985 
THE PFP AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT 
As has been shown the liberation movement had a major impact 
on the activities and strategies pursued by the PFP in the 
period under review. Many of Slabbert' s strategic 
initiatives had been opposed by party members significantly 
influenced by resistance politics. Others were virulent in 
their opposition to the liberatory organisations. In this 
context it is necessary to consider several important direct 
contacts between the PFP and liberation movement at this 
time. 
From late 1984 statements at PFP Federal Council meetings 
stressed the need for Party leaders to have greater contact 
with the extra-parliamentary resistance movement. In this 
respect contact with trade union and UDF leaders was 
stressed. (93) As well as providing a means for the Party 
to garner information, it was also seen as a means of 
promoting the "politics of negotiation". The leadership 
were criticised for not moving quickly enough in this field 
and appeals were made for it to take more visible action 
concerning the unrest in the country. (94) 
The first notable involvement of the Party in the emerging 
conflict in the townships was its response to the March 1985 
killing of 19 people by the SAP in Langa, Uitenhage. The 
PFP immediately sent a delegation of six MPs to the area 
amidst a blaze of publicity. Party spokespeople urged 
government to appoint a judicial Commission of Inquiry into 
the shootings, which it eventually did. There was also a 
visible presence of PFP public representatives giving 
assistance to the community following the shootings. 
93 Minutes of PFP Federal Council, 18 November 1984 and 4 
May 1985 
94 Minutes of PFP Federal Council, 18 November 1984 
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Slabbert's response, directed at government, stressed the 
need for a restoration of calm in the townships by a resort 
to conventional policing methods. He also stated that it 
was necessary to redress the root causes of "black 
dissatisfaction" which had given rise to the shooting. 
These were the political and economic frustrations of people 
in the Eastern Cape: 
"To avoid repetition of these tragic events, we 
need now to lay the foundations of healthy long-
term economic development. Such economic 
development cannot be shackled to the demands of 
an obsolete ideology." (95) 
He went on to state that it was necessary for government to 
make a declaration of intent about its political and 
constitutional plans for blacks. He urged government to 
negotiate with black leaders. Further pointing to what he 
perceived as action that government should take, he stressed 
that problems with black education and local authorities 
should be addressed. (96) 
Slabbert's response was a good example of the distance that 
was emerging between the mainstream of the PFP and that of 
the liberation movement. His emphasis was still heavily 
informed by the imperatives of a traditional Official 
Opposition - to point out the mistakes of the government of 
the day and suggest alternative policy approaches for it to 
adopt. The liberation movement was at this stage 
increasingly concerned with popular defence and mobilisation 
- a quite different emphasis. That Slabbert was well aware 
of this at the time was reflected.in his repeated statements 
concerning the differing strategic emphases of the 
respective groups. He was very critical of the approach of 
the township organisations. While understanding the anger 
95 Argus, 23 March 1985 
96 ibid 
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and recognising the legitimacy of resistance strategies, he 
did not conceal his opposition to the language and style of 
popular politics. He said that revolutionary rhetoric 
"creates the illusion of a revolutionary movement 
being in control of the actual violence in the 
townships. People in the townships begin to 
believe they are acting in correspondence with 
some kind of strategy a next stage in the 
revolution, with victory around the corner." (97) 
As has been discussed elsewhere, Slabbert also dissociated 
the party from the liberation movement by his criticism of 
violence as a strategy, and his firm commitment to the 
strategy of participation in the tricameral system. He also 
criticised popular politics for overstressing its opposition 
to apartheid while being little concerned with developing 
alternative policies. In an interview in 1985 he described 
the unity of the ANC and UDF as being built out of a common 
opposition to apartheid, 
"but if you had to ask the UDF what kind of 
constitution they think would work for South 
Africa and they had to move away from the cliches 
of 'power to the people' and 'democratic forces 
unite' and that kind of thing - the result would 
be interesting!" (98) 
This was contrasted with the PFP policy of a universal 
franchise in a non-racial South Africa organised on federal 
lines, with veto rights for minority groups. 
Opposition to liberatory strategies was a common theme among 
many members of the Party, particularly in the southern 
Transvaal. The leader of the Party in that region, Douglas 
Gibson, was vehement in his opposition to the ANC. He said, 
97 Sunday Tribune, 22 September 1985 
98 Leadership, 4 (4) 1985 
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"I am as opposed to them as a Nationalist would be 
opposed to them; and I don't regard them as 
freedom fighters. Some people say that the ANC 
was forced into the violence option. Well, I am 
sorry I don't agree with that. They have adopted 
the violence option for the last fifteen or twenty 
years. It has been no more successful than any 
other strategy that was adopted and I think what 
it is doing is to force the white people into the 
laager and they are likely to put the cause of 
change in South Africa back by another twenty 
years by carrying on blowing everybody up." () 
A major area in which the PFP differed from the liberation 
movement was on the issue of sanctions. As has been shown 
the PFP had always opposed sanctions and disinvestment. 
( 100) Members of the Party including Slabbert, Eglin, 
Suzman, Schwarz, Boraine and Horace van Rensburg had 
travelled abroad to campaign against the international 
economic isolation of the country. Some of these trips had 
been sponsored by the Department of Foreign Affairs. (101) 
The stance against sanctions was in keeping with broadly 
defined class character of the PFP in promoting continued 
capitalist development within South Africa. 
It should be stressed that while many within the Party held 
these views and were strongly opposed to the strategies and 
tactics of the liberation movement, there was universal 
acceptance of the need to legalise resistance politics and 
to allow all to participate in a negotiated political 
process. In the wake of popular calls for the release of 
resistance leaders, PFP public representatives also added 
their voice to the appeals. Notable in this respect were 
the appeals of Boraine and Suzman. 
The growth of popular organisations was welcomed by a small, 
but vocal group within the Party. A number of prominent 
99 Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 May 1988 
100 See Chapter One 
101 Citizen, 10 May 1985 
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individuals such as the Cape MPCs Molly Blackburn, Di Bishop 
and Jan van Eck came to be very closely associated with 
popular organisations, especially with respect to unrest 
monitoring and intervention, negotiation with local police, 
attendance at funerals and rallies, and other support work. 
This activity which increased dramatically during 1985 had a 
major impact on the Party, while also changing perceptions 
within the liberation movement. Jan van Eck, who became 
very involved in such activity, provided a sense of what it 
entailed: 
"I was just another white liberal politician who 
believed that on liberal values, certain things 
should be done to those who haven't got rights. 
But one wasn't involved in the townships. You 
weren't involved with black people. You were so 
insular from them and the whole Progressive Party 
was insular to a large extent. To the extent that 
some of us were either dragged into the townships 
situation, as I was by Molly Blackburn, who I was 
together with on the Provincial Council in the 
Cape - Molly Blackburn and Di Bishop. But if I 
take those two with their massive contacts and 
understanding and the input they made into our 
provincial council caucus, for example, our whole 
provincial council caucus moved about 30-40 
degrees left in the sense. We were exposed by them 
to real leadership, real young comrades and so on. 
My specific situation related to the funeral of 
Mathew Goniwe which Molly sort of dragged me to 
saying, "You can't be in politics unless you know 
what is happening in the townships". And from that 
day onwards, those of us who got involved deeper 
had to pay the price as I call it. 
"And that was that you can't just be a liberal 
politician now with liberal values which are 
narrowly aimed at the white electorate and saying 
to people: "I believe we should have full 
democracy and so on". But that you had to actually 
be an active participant in the broader community. 
Maybe I got too <;ieeply involved. It was never a 
conscious decision. It just happened." (102) 
102 Interview with Jan van Eck, 29 March 1990 
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The Party was encouraged to welcome this activity to the 
extent that it promoted the PFP among blacks in an editorial. 
written by Jan van Eck for Deurbraak in 1985 which read: 
"The way in which PFP public representatives such 
as Molly Blackburn and Di Bishop have been 
accepted by the besieged black communities 
illustrates that it is indeed possible for 'white 
politicians' to be involved in both 'white' and 
'black' politics if one retains one's 
credibility. It is indeed an asset which the PFP 
should cherish." (103) 
It indeed proved to be an asset as it changed the stance of 
a number of UDF leaders who were prepared to draw a 
distinction between the PFP as a party with which it had 
many differences, and individual representatives of it. As 
a result there was, from early 1986, increasing contact 
between UDF and PFP representatives. Motivating this , the 
Publicity Secretary of the UDF Murphy Morobe said at the 
beginning of 1986: 
"On numerous occasions we have sounded our 
rejection of the attempt to move into what we 
consider the black arena. That position is borne 
out of our rejection of organisations which 
operate within the government's structures. 
"We, however, acknowledge individuals' progressive 
challenge of apartheid. Our relationship with the 
PFP is on that basis because as an organisation we 
make distinctions" (104) 
The contact with the liberation movement by Party members 
assumed a distinct regional pattern with the bulk of contact 
happening in the Western and Eastern Cape. 
Suzman and Gastrow the Southern Transvaal 
According to 
Party was 
dominated by a conservative leadership which veered away 
from contact with radical extra-parliamentary organisations. 
Suzman describes this aversion as being a "nervousness" to 
103 Deurbraak, August 1985 
104 Sowetan, 16 January 1986 
be associated with the ANC or any·organisation which could 
be accused of being a front for it. 
the Southern Transvaal leadership 
were, he explained, 
(105) Gastrow described 
as "incestuous" . 
"inward-looking, and dominated very much by a 
network of people who had been there for a very 
long time. They were in close contact with each 
other, and setting the pace." (106) 
They 
The relative lack of extra-parliamentary contact by the 
Southern Transvaal Party at this time can, therefore, be 
attributed in part to the hold that the conservative 
leadership in this region held over the PFP. This 
conservatism can be seen as arising out of a number of 
factors. Important Southern Transvaal leaders such as Harry 
Schwarz and Dave Dalling had joined the Progressive Party 
from the United Party at a much .later stage than the 
original "true blue" Frogs. They brought with them a more 
cautious approach politically. The "true-blue" element in 
the Transvaal were also cautious in matters of contact with 
radical organisations. This can be attributed largely to 
the strong links with the business community held by this 
group. It was not at this stage in business's interests to 
forge close ties with radical groups - indeed it was their 
project to seek a moderate alternative. This factor played 
a role in the Party as well. A further consideration was 
the very real concern that the Southern Transvaal leadership 
felt with the growth of the Conservative Party which they 
feared would drive PFP voters to support the National Party 
in an attempt to ward off a right wing threat. Slabbert 
also pointed out that the Southern Transvaal Party was very 
committed to participation in municipal politics and had 
always been cautious that the PFP not adopt policy positions 
105 Interview with Helen Suzman, 9 April 1990 
106 Interview with Peter Gastrow, 28 March 1990 
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which would lose it votes. (107) There was a concern that 
the PFP should not be seen to be too closely linked to 
radical organisations. 
The more radical stance of the Cape Party can be attributed 
to an absence of many of the above factors. The class 
character of the Party in the Cape was much more firmly 
rooted among the professional middle classes - a group with 
no clear and independent political agenda. The Cape 
tradition of liberalism had a more staunchly non-racial 
flavour. This factor informed the approach of Party 
representatives in the Eastern and Western Cape who sought 
out contact with popular organisations. 
The reemergence and growth of a vibrant liberation movement 
forced the Party at the highest level to reassess its 
approach in the latter part of 1985. The trajectory of 
class and national struggle had considerably reduced the 
importance of conflicts within Parliament. Despite regional 
variation and assertions by the Party leadership that the 
white constitutional domain was the primary site in which 
reform could take place, there was growing understanding 
that the re-emergent liberation movement was a force which 
could not be ignored in the PFP's strategy for the future. 
The rise of the liberation movement and the growth of an 
hegemonic position around the ANC represented a challenge to 
the PFP. The PFP had long since realised the limits of 
solely attempting to gain the support of a majority of white 
voters. The key lesson learned in the NCM experience was 
that to attempt to create a new non-racial bloc would be 
impossible without the support of the leading organisations 
of the liberation movement. But even this task, it was 
being realised, was becoming impossible. The organisations 
of the dominated classes had no interest in subscribing to 
107 Interview with Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, 28 September 
1990 
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the moral and political leadership of a predominantly white 
liberal party. Its interests lay in forging a potentially 
revolutionary alliance built out of the unity of the black 
dominated classes and left-wing whites. In doing so it 
sought to assert its hegemony and programme over the 
process. 
While the Party remained very critical of the strategies of 
the ANC it had come to advocate the view that a solution to 
the conflict was impossible without its active involvement. 
An example of this could be seen when in a report to his 
constituency in August 1985 Alex Boraine had been highly 
critical of the government's attempts to negotiate only with 
bantustan leaders and discredited community councillors. 
Credible negotiations with black leaders, he said, had to 
include the ANC. Nelson Mandela could not be ignored and 
there could not be stability in the country while he and 
other leaders remained imprisoned. He proposed that a 
judicial commission be appointed to determine the process 
whereby blacks could elect their leaders freely and fairly 
in order to participate in negotiations. (108) This stance 
incorporated a realisation of the essential need for the 
liberation movement to participate in negotiations. It was 
also informed by an attachment to the liberal notion of an 
independent judiciary for which, he implied, black consent 
existed. It was an attempt to come to terms with the 
emergent power and authority of the ANC. The call for 
unconditional negotiations then being made by Boraine and 
other PFP members was not endorsed by the ANC and the 
liberation movement more generally, while the call for a 
judicial commission to facilitate such talks was even 
further from the mind of liberatory strategy. To this 
extent Boraine's attempt to come to terms with the hegemony 
of the liberation movement betrayed the distance that 
108 Argus, 22 August 1985 
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existed between the PFP and the organisations of the 
dominated classes. At the same time, it was a display of 
the impact of these organisations on the work of the PFP. 
The events of 1985 had a profound effect on key PFP leaders, 
not least on Slabbert. According to Peter Gastrow: 
"1985 was the year of unbelievable turmoil. 
Slabbert was starting to make his first real 
contact. My impression was that he was 
experiencing for the first time the turmoil the 
agony, but also the potential within black power. 
He had been to townships in the past. There's a 
photo of van Zyl and Alex Boraine amongst the 
squatter children of Crossroads. I call that Red 
Cross stuff. It's important, but it's not politics. 
In that year (1985) he went to Uitenhage during the 
Kannemeyer Commission. He saw what was going on 
there. He spoke to political activists. He went 
to numerous hot places. The whole turmoil sucked 
him in and I think really broadened his whole 
perspective about what was happening in black 
politics." (109) 
This was true for Slabbert as it was for other significant 
Party leaders. While they were not attempting to embrace 
the liberation movement, they were attempting to engage with 
it on a new basis. The attempt at forming the Convention 
Alliance was one such attempt. 
The meeting with the ANC by four of the Party's leaders -
Slabbert, Boraine, Eglin and Gastrow in October 1985 was 
another. According to Jan van Eck the meeting was an attempt 
to respond to the pressure as the Party was very sensitive 
that it may be becoming irrelevant." (110) The meeting was 
also in keeping with the stance the Party had adopted of 
attempting to mediate between the conflicting parties. 
109 Interview with Peter Gastrow, 28 March 1990 
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The meeting with the ANC was not deliberately sought by the 
Party leadership but arose out of a chance meeting between 
Peter Gastrow and ANC members in Zimbabwe. A meeting was 
proposed which Slabbert and the Party leadership decided to 
run with. They did not seek the consent of the Party as a 
whole due to the contentious nature of such meetings at the 
time, but they were confident, however, that there would not 
be a substantial opposition to it in the PFP. (111) After 
the meeting Slabbert rationalised it in terms of the PFP's 
stated goal of talking to anybody or any organisation in 
order to "decrease violent confJ;ontation and promote the 
politics of negotiation". (112) 
At the meeting the two organisations agreed that apartheid 
lay at the root of the conflict in South Africa. There was 
common statement that in order for negotiations to take 
place it was necessary that certain preconditions such as 
the release of leaders and the removal of apartheid had to 
be met. This acknowledgment by the PFP leaders was a 
decisive departure for the Party which had been calling for 
unconditional negotiations. 
There were important points of difference. The PFP tried to 
sell its idea of the Convention Alliance. But this was 
rejected by the ANC on the grounds that the time was not 
right for such an initiative, and also because of the 
participation of Buthelezi and Inkatha in the initiative. 
The PFP delegates responded that their participation was 
essential. The ANC, the PFP leaders were happy to report, 
did not rule out any future negotiations or National 
Convention. The conditions for such developments had, 
however, to be appropriate. 
111 Interview with Tiaan van der Merwe, 6 March 1990, 
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The PFP also expressed opposition to the strategy of armed 
struggle. Despite this they accepted the rationale that the 
ANC gave for the armed struggle and both Slabbert and 
Boraine promoted this on their return to South Africa. In 
an article in the Financial Mail, Boraine wrote, 
"It is our view that it is futile to expect the 
ANC to abandon the armed struggle if the 
conditions which led to the armed struggle 
persist. For them the continuation of apartheid 
and the armed struggle are inextricably linked. 
Therein lies the tragedy and potential violence of 
the future." (113) 
The burden did not lie with the ANC to end the armed 
struggle. For Slabbert the issue was 
"how far the Government is prepared to go to get 
rid of apartheid and to seek a peaceful resolution 
of our problems. This would determine how many 
lives are lost in the final analysis. This is 
where one's first loyalty must lie - to all the 
young people of South Africa." (114) 
This was a major departure in the outlook of Slabbert who 
had earlier gone to great lengths to decry and condemn all 
political violence in general, and t_he strategy of armed 
struggle in particular. It was a sudden departure and 
difficult to explain as being related specifically to the 
meeting with the ANC. That meeting may well have been the 
catalyst for this shift, al though the reasons should be 
found in the overall change in the conditions within which 
the PFP was 
strategies. 
confines of 
operating and the successive failures of its 
Slabbert was effectively shifting out of the 
white politics and attempting to adopt an 
holistic approach. His stance came to be increasingly at 
odds with the main stream of Party thinking. 
113 Financial Mail, 18 October 1985 
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While there was no overt opposition to the meeting from 
within the Party since it accorded with the broad strategic 
drive of the Party, there was concern that the Party should 
not be seen to be too closely linked to the ANC and 
revolutionary politics. This would not only conflict with 
the Party principle of opposition to revolutionary 
ideologies, but also be detrimental to the Party's electoral 
chances in a conservative white electorate. Many in the 
Party held, that while there should be talks with 
revolutionary groups, it was crucial that the Party strongly 
oppose their strategies and advocate a firm security 
strategy in response to them. This was a view which had 
manifested itself in the debate on the Party's defence and 
conscription policy in 1985. 
SLABBERT RESIGNS 
At the end of the Parliamentary debate of no confidence in 
the government in February 1986, Slabbert shocked his party 
by announcing that he was both resigning as its leader and 
as a member of Parliament. The resignation came after what 
Slabbert viewed as a year of failures in 1985. As well as 
being based in a personal aversion to carrying on in his 
role as the leader of a political party, it was also built 
out of a growing realisation of the limits of Parliamentary 
politics. It was a statement of no-confidence in the 
politics of a white liberal opposition party in the context 
of a dramatically changing environment. 
On resigning Slabbert explained his move as being based in 
what he believed to be the limited context of Parliament: 
"The circumstances in our country are simply too 
serious to bluff ourselves in the clubby 
atmosphere of Parliament, no matter how 
desperately a way out is needed." (115) 
He contended that his decision to resign was 
"not an act of desperation. It is actually an act 
of affirmation affirming that the future of 
South Africa does not lie with that Parliament 
alone." (116) 
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The experience of failure after failure in the initiatives 
of 1985, as well as the new understanding he had developed 
through his increasing contact with popular organisation had 
encouraged Slabbert to review his role. In an interview 
after his resignation he described how in 1985 he had 
attempted to steer the PPP away from being a perennial 
opposition party. He attempted to drive the Party flat out 
on the path of what he described as the "politics of power". 
He wished to change the role of the PPP: 
"I have never denied the validity of a party or 
group in Parliament protesting the injustices of 
apartheid. But I set myself an objective to see 
to what extent I could get rid of apartheid, not 
just protest against it." (117) 
To this end he identified three strategic goals for the 
Party. The first of these was to engage the government in 
negotiations about constitutional reform. To this end he 
had 5 meetings with President Botha as well as other 
meetings with individual cabinet ministers. In addition he 
agreed to serve on the specially extended cabinet committee 
on constitutional matters. It was his assessment that very 
little came of these engagements. He had come to the 
conclusion that the security forces were increasingly 
playing a role in government in which context traditional 
115 Argus, 8 February 1986 
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parliamentary opposition was ineffective. (118) The 
failure of the government's "total strategy" reform 
programme had reduced the prospects of success for a 
strategy of encouraging a state-led process of incremental 
change. 
His second goal was to get representation for the PFP in the 
coloured and Indian Houses of Parliament following the 
lifting of the restrictions on racially mixed parties. It 
was his goal to recruit black members to the Party and 
consequently gain control of the House of Representatives 
and the House of Delegates, while attempting to hold the 
balance of power in the white House. This configuration 
would provide the Party with the leverage to make a 
distinctive impression on the exercise of state power. This 
project also failed. The final strategic goal was to forge 
a coalition of anti-apartheid groups in the form of the 
Convention Alliance. This objective also ended in 
disappointment. 
The "politics of power" proved to be an illusive objective. 
The lessons of 1985 for Slabbert were ultimately that the 
white Parliamentary opposition could 
the process of change by means of 
said later that the PFP had become 
do little to facilitate 
negotiation. Slabbert 
"increasingly sidelined in the conflict between 
extra-parliamentary government and extra-
parliamentary opposition. And a growing awareness 
on my part that the debate wasn't here; it wasn't 
even touching it." (119) 
At the end of 1985 Slabbert assessed this situation in the 
midst of what many of his colleagues described as a growing 
despondency and disenchantment with the organisational 




responsibilities of leading a political party. At the start 
of 1986 he convened a group of close colleagues to discuss 
an appropriate way forward. At this meeting he presented a 
paper which outlined a radical new strategy initiative for 
the Party. (120) He also consulted other leading members of 
the party individually. (121) In the paper he argued that 
the government had become intransigent and that earlier 
approaches of the PFP were not being effective. He proposed 
.that he could not continue as in the past: 
"According t~ my light and wisdom I have done 
whatever can be done with the available 
opportunities and to continue as before I would be 
bluffing myself and others that I was making any 
significant contribution to the politics of 
negotiation." (122) 
He proposed that PFP MPs resign their seats in a statement 
of rejection of the tricameral system. In the event of by-
elections being called the MPs would once again stand for 
their seats seeking a mandate: 
" not to return to Parliament until the Government 
clearly commits itself to restoring freedom of 
choice by dismantling Apartheid completely". (123) 
If the government committed itself to such change the 
elected MPs would 
"support and assist it in bringing about 
constitutional and non-violent change towards a 
non-racial democratic alternative". (124) 
He argued that if the PFP caucus pursued such a course of 













could have a galvanising effect on the whole tri-cameral 
system". ( 125) 
He presented this paper to a select group of colleagues who 
collectively discussed and agreed to reject it. In a 
memorandum they suggested that if Slabbert resigned it would 
have a seriously detrimental effect on Party finances and 
morale. Most significantly their responding memorandum 
suggested that the PFP would lose the purported centrist 
positioning it had attained: 
"We contend that the PFP are the real 
conservatives and occupy the middle ground. In 
one stroke we will sink the middle ground and 
polarise the situation between Nat and ANC". (126) 
Those MPs who resigned along with Slabbert, it argued, would 
be applauded by blacks "and forgotten no voice, 
constituency, clout". (127) Those who remained in 
Parliament would be isolated from the black community. 
They proposed that rather than resign, Slabbert and other 
MPs should be relieved of many of their Parliamentary duties 
in order to concentrate on extra-parliamentary activities. 
This would 
"move the centre of gravity of PFP effort away 
from .Parliament. There would be nothing against 
increasing the Parliamentary load of certain 
members who prefer or who are more suited to 
conventional Parliamentary functions. Central 
funds could be used to augment the salaries of 
members whose extra-parliamentary duties cut back 
their attendances in the House." (128) 
125 ibid 




It was proposed that Slabbert address Parliament at the end 
of the no confidence debate and say 
"a. That PW Botha had systematically diminished 
the status of Parliament and increased the role of 
the executive to a degree where the official 
opposition has had to re-appraise its role. 
"b. The PFP is consequently no longer prepared to 
waste its time on Parliamentary procedures 
designed to create a democratic facade behind 
which authoritarian government can operate. 
"c. He therefore intends to downgrade the 
Parliamentary obligations of members and increase 
their non-parliamentary role so that they are 
better able to serve all South Africans." (129) 
Slabbert did · not agree to this and proceeded to resign. 
Shortly after his resignation the National Chairman of the 
Party Alex Boraine also resigned for similar reasons to 
Slabbert's but only, it has been alledged, after assessing 
first whether he would run for the leadership of the Party. 
( 130) A former leader of the Border region of the Party, 
Donald Card, also resigned in support of Slabbert. 
The departure of Slabbert was a severe setback for the PFP. 
He had been a very popular leader of the Party and had led 
it to a very strong public position. He had stamped his 
personal style on the Party and had been very dominant in 
determining the strategic direction of the Party. (131) Of 
greatest significance was his ability to hold the different 
factions of the Party together. The wedding of the 
different sides in the emerging debate about the Party's 
role in Parll.ament and outside of it came apart on his 
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Jan van Eck, 29 March 1990 
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found its elf dumped in the stormy seas of an existential 
crisis. The turmoil experienced by Slabbert about the role, 
direction and potential of the Party was now in the court of 
the Party as a ·whole - and without a strong leader who could 
see them through. At root the challenge posed by Slabbert's 
departure lay in his reducing . the legitimacy of the 
tradition within which the PFP operated. The very 
foundation of the Party's liberal opposition and 




THE PARTY IN DECLINE: 1986 - 1988 
CONTEXT AND INTRODUCTION 
South Africa entered the period covered by this chapter 
immersed in the most acute crisis of its history. A 
faltering economy, escalating popular struggles, divisions 
within the dominating classes, and a succession of failures 
in government policy all added up to what amounted to a 
situation which begged dramatic moves from the regime. 
The state in early 1986 tried to respond to the mounting 
internal and international pressures in an attempt to roll 
back the impact of isolation from the world economy, and 
also to bolster the existing structure of capitalist 
production and white domination. The key aspects of this 
new phase was a move away from Grand Apartheid, while still 
retaining race as a central social determinant; and, there 
was an attempt to depoliticise the provision of the means of 
social reproduction. When many aspects of this reform phase 
broke down, the state once again resorted to naked coercion 
following a renewed declaration of a State of Emergency in 
July 1986. 
By 1985 there was realisation within the state that the 
pattern of spatial separation of the political economy 
associated with Grand Apartheid was a failure. It was 
necessary now to pursue a course which acknowledged the 
interconnected and interdependent nature of the political 
economy. The policy of "regional development" received 
extensive promotion, which together with the approach of 
"orderly urbanisation" became the cornerstone of state 
policy. Nine development regions cutting across bantustan 
boundaries established earlier were actively promoted. It 
was the intention that these would allow for 
"the planning of economic development within 
coherent regions free of the constraints imposed 
by political borders." (1) 
With the coordination of development programmes between 
South Africa and the "independent" homelands, the 
establishment of Regional Development Advisory Committees, 
and with a central role accorded to the Development Bank of 
South Africa an effort was made to overcome the structural 
maladies of apartheid. 
Of greatest significance was the realisation that black 
urbanisation was no longer simply a reality, but a necessity 
given the projected growth imperatives of the country. 
Consequently the policy of "orderly urbanisation" was 
promoted which ended the system of influx control, pass 
laws, forced removals and decentralisation based on the 
bantustans. In effect it was a tacit acknowledgement that 
apartheid had failed. In addition, through the abolition of 
pass laws, the state hoped to remove an important point of 
popular political antagonism and mobilisation. It marked 
the end of the Riekert reforms' distinction between urban 
and rural Africans. By permitting orderly squatting and 
informal business, the state was, in effect, withdrawing to 
a large extent from the provision of housing and services to 
urban African communities, hoping that the cost of these 
would be carried by both the working classes and the 
aspirant middle classes, as well as by the private sector. 
A central aspect of the regionalisation programme was an 
attempt by the central state to decentralise administrative 
and planning functions to metropolitan and regional 
authorities, i.e. the Regional Services Councils, provincial 
1 Cobbett, et al (1988), p 9 
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executives, and regionai liaison committees. It was an 
attempt to depoliticise the role of the central state in the 
allocation of regional and local resources. Later, a 
crucial development was the incorporation of Africans into 
local and regional levels of the state through the RSCs and 
provincial executives. This was an attempt to address the 
political crisis associated with mass resistance to the form 
of the central state. 
A third strand of this phase of reform was the promotion of 
privatisation and deregulation policies. This also 
illustrated the state's attempts to depoliticise the 
provision of goods and services. It was also based in the 
realisation that it could not "deliver goods to its black 
subjects on the scale necessary to coopt them". ( 2) This 
had especially become the case with acceptance of African 
urbanisation and the consequent need to downgrade the supply 
of social welfare provisions. An example of this 
development was the privatisation of housing and the use of 
site and service schemes as opposed to state-provided 
housing. In addition, an effort was made to promote 
informal business activity through the dropping of various 
constraining regulations. The rationale behind this 
development was partly due to the desire to build a black 
middle class supportive of capitalism; and also to ease 
unemployment. (3) 
The tide of popular resistance spilled over into 1986 
serving to diminish the impact of these reforms. Continued 
rent, consumer and schools boycotts, as well as continued 
insurgency and violent resistance limited the ability of the 
state to pursue this course of direction. Furthermore, the 
state could not respond coherently as it was internally 
divided over the direction it should follow. The division 
2 Glaser (1987), p 384 
3 Innes (1987), p 560 
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could be reduced to that between the Department of 
Constitutional Development and Planning under Chris Heunis 
on the one hand, and the security establishment on the 
other. (4) Heunis's department sought to establish 
legitimacy for the state through the provision of goods and 
services to black communities through political structures. 
This path was blocked by a combination of popular 
resistance, and the Byzantine network 
structures established by his department. 
of political 
Ultimately his 
department could not ensure that · sufficient distribution 
could take place. The security establishment also sought 
the same objective - legitimacy for the state through the 
provision of goods and services. It believed, however, that 
firm security action was required to do away with mass 
resistance; and, that strong executive measures were 
required to implement policy. This approach was presented 
as a "counter-revolutionary warfare" strategy and ultimately 
won the day in what has been termed a "shift towards 
executive rule". (5) From mid-1986 this approach became 
dominant within the state with the introduction of a 
massively repressive national state of emergency, and the 
activation of the National Security Management System. 
This shift in policy which marked the final departure from 
"total strategy" should be seen as 
"quite clearly a' political initiative sidestepping 
whatever representative structures exist at all 
levels in the society in order to ensure a 
coordinated security and redistributive 
intervention." (6) 
The strategy marked a shift from what Swilling and Phillips 
have described as "grand visions of reform from above to 
4 See Morris and Padayachee (1988), pp 17 - 18; and 
Swilling and Phillips (1989 a), p 141 
5 Morris and Padayachee (1988), p 14 
6 ibid, p 16 
building up new foundations from below". (7) The state now 
sought through a combination of repressive action and 
welfare provisions to remove all vestiges of popular 
resistance, while at the same time attempting to "recaste 
civil society" through a combination of infrastructural 
upgrading, housing development, and local government reform. 
( 8 ) 
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Despite the wide implementation of this strategy, and the 
severe repression of the liberation movement, continued 
international opposition and the resilience of the popular 
classes meant that it ultimately failed. At the same time 
as its implementation, there was ongoing debate within the 
National Party and Broederbond as to the future direction of 
policy. There was considerable internal division within the 
NP in the period from 1986. In 1987 important members of 
the NP such as Wynand Malan, Dennis Worrall, Wimpie de Klerk 
and a number of Stellenbosch academics broke away in pursuit 
of a more reformist programme than that being implemented by 
the regime. These breakaways would eventually coalesce into 
the "independent movement" which fielded candidates in the 
1987 General Election in which Malan won his seat in 
Randburg, while Worrall narrowly missed' defeating Chris 
Heunis in the Helderberg constituency. 
Coinciding with this challenge to the regime from its left 
flank was the increasing success of the Conservative Party. 
In the May· 1987 elections it increased its Parliamentary 
representation from 18 to 23 seats, and replaced the PFP as 
the official opposition in the House of Assembly. In 
Decembe.r 1987 it increased its representation by winning a 
by-election in Sasolburg. 
7 Swilling and Phillips (1989 a), p 144 
8 ibid, p 144 and p 146 
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The business community's behaviour during the period covered 
by this chapter can be divided into two clear periods. In 
the first which coincided with months leading up to the 
declaration of the state of emergency in July 1986 there was 
a continuation of the near panic response which followed the 
September 1985 debt standstill. As well as turning against 
the regime, business leaders became increasingly involved in 
alternative political initiatives. Notable amongst these 
were the involvement of business in constitutional policy 
formulation. Notable amongst these was the FCI Charter of 
January 1986. (9) Another initiative which took off in 1986 
and 1987 was the Kwa Zulu Natal Indaba which was heavily 
sponsored by business. At the first meeting in April 1986 
the Indaba brought together the KwaZulu administration and 
the NRP-led Natal Provincial Administration, as well as 
other major establishment political and business groups. 
The Indaba adopted a liberal Bill of Rights in July of that 
year, and followed this with a non-racial constitution for 
Natal in November. Following Cobbet, et al we should see 
this initiative as an attempt by the dominating classes to 
resolve the crisis by forging a federal constitutional 
solution for the country which would incorporate Africans 
while retaining capitalism~ Federalism presented a way to 
extend political rights without the threats inherent in a 
unitary majoritarian state. (10) 
The declaration of the state of emergency as well as the 
rescheduling of South Africa's foreign debt was broadly 
welcomed by the business community. The stabilisation of 
the economy, which after growing by only 1% in 1986 
recovered with a GDP growth of 2,5% in 1987, eased business 
confidence. (11) 1986 saw the value of the Rand dropping 
9 See Introduction to Chapter Three. 
10 Cobbet, et al (1988), p 18 
11 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (1986), p LVi 
to an all-time low of US 19c, inflation climbing to 18, 6% 
(against 16,2% in 1985), and 48 US companies disinvesting. 
The initial success with which the state implemented its 
programmes after July 1986 provided a measure of relief to 
leading capitalists. Associated with this trend was a 
retreat by business leaders from overt involvement in 
political issues, as well as a backlash against 
outspokenness in their community. This was illustrated in 
the 1987 dismissal of the author of the FCI Charter from his 
chief executive position within that organisation, as well 
as the election of a conservative leadership to replace the 
more liberal incumbents. (12) 
For liberals the period from 1986 to 1988 was a trying time 
as they battled to come to terms with the dramatic changes 
occurring within South Africa. Extensive debate and 
publication was associated with this soul searching. ( 13) 
The concern of liberals revel ved around their perception 
that liberalism was both under attack and being marginalised 
in the bigger scheme of the South African struggle. As they 
had done historically liberals saw themselves as distinct 
from the two main warring bodies of the state and the mass 
popular opposition. Particular developments such as the 
entrenchment of authoritarian and illiberal rule on the one 
hand, and what was perceived to be revolutionary intolerance 
and the threat of socialism on the other combined to 
threaten the small predominantly white liberal community. 
12 Morris and Padayachee (1988), p 19; See also Welsh 
(1988) for a discussion on the coincidence of economic 
recovery and business conservatism. 
13 In this respect there were two important conferences 
held in 1986 on the future of liberalism in South Africa. 
For a collection of the proceedings see Butler, Elphick and 
Welsh (1987), and South African Institute of Race Relations 
(1986 a). Other key documents of the period are the series 
of lectures by Simkins (1985); Berger and Godsell (1988) as 
well as articles by Slabbert (1988), Owen (1987), Schlemmer 
(1988) and Gerson (1987). 
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At a moment of revolutionary polarisation liberals found it 
difficult to have their voices heard. As in the past, 
however, liberals were divided in their responses. A 
significant number of them had drifted into a position of 
alliance with the mainstream of the liberation movement. In 
this respect members of, e.g. the Black Sash, the churches, 
the End Conscription Campaign, and indeed the PFP had come 
to identify closely with the UDF and ANC in the anti-
apartheid struggle. This development was in keeping both 
with the tradition of liberalism in South Africa, but also 
the history of the tradition internationally. This group 
was motivated on the basis of the non-class determinants of 
the liberal discourse. 
Main stream liberals, by contrast, were more firmly 
committed to a class-conscious path and saw in the 
liberation movement the threat of revolution and the 
possible demise of capitalism in South Africa. Their stance 
was, however, a contradic.tory one in that the non-class 
elements of their discourse compelled them to recognise the 
right of the liberation movement to operate freely. It 
furthermore established a common ground between mainstream 
liberals and the liberation movement to the extent that both 
were committed to eradicating South Africa of apartheid. 
The mainstream, especially that located around the South 
African Institute of Race Relations and the liberal elements 
of big business, drew together on the issue of the nature of 
the relationship that liberals should have with the 
liberation movement. They opposed what Jill Wentzel of the 
SAIRR called a "slide away" by many liberals from condemning 
tyranny and violence on all sides. (14) She argued that a 
combination of group pressure, fear and guilt had led many 
liberals to support what was described as illiberal policies 
and strategies promoted by the liberatory organisations. In 
14 Wentzel (1986), p 47 
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contrast she and others who held her view called for a 
steely determination in advocating their understanding of 
the liberal tradition - a centrist, incremental tradition 
occupying the middle ground between the opposing forces of 
revolution and repression. 
Within this latter framework a strategic programme was 
proposed which would at the same time as it sought to 
enhance and promote extant liberal institutions such as the 
courts and the market mechanism, also pursue a course 
encouraging gradual incrementalist change. In this respect 
there was return to the view that a promotion of free market 
forces - the unshackling of the economy from dirigism and 
racial regulation - would unleash forces able to advance the 
cause of a bourgeois liberal democracy. A staunch and vocal 
proponent of this view was Ken Owen, the editor of Business 
Day, a daily newspaper primarily serving the capitalist 
community. He advocated the argument that only a stalemate 
situation between the contending forces of the state and the 
liberation movement would allow for a break in the cycle of 
struggle. Until that point was reached it was the role of 
liberals to 
"try to present, not too dogmatically, the 
alternatives that lie in rapid economic growth, in 
free markets, in the rule of law and in the 
piecemeal improvement in the law itself. 
"There is no escape from moral dilemmas, no 
pristine position to take. Liberals can urge and 
support limited reforms in the hopes that reform 
leads to reform. It often does." (15) 
This incremental stance was increasingly advocated over the 
period from 1986/1987. (16) The incrementalist liberalism 
was wrapped in a class-conscious pursuit to avert revolution 
at all costs. Revolution was presented as being associated 
15 Owen (1986), p 30 
16 Berger and Godsell (1988); Schlemmer (1988) 
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with armed struggle. There was an appeal to liberals not 
only to reject the oppression of the state, but also the 
tyranny of the left. (17) But, as Anglo American's Bobby 
Godsell and Ann Bernstein of the Urban Foundation, both 
senior members of the PFP, pointed out, 
incremental path of ten did not have 
objectives: 
those pursuing an 
clear strategic 
"If revolution is rejected, then it is important 
to define other avenues for change. 
Incrementalist acto'rs need to couple their twin 
rejection of the status quo and of armed struggle 
with vocal and thoughtful answers as to what other 
means of political change are available to both 
black and white actors." (18) 
A debate developed amongst incremental liberals who 
presented various strategic analyses of the best means of 
encouraging incremental change within the state. 
Significant contributors to this were Schlemmer, Godsell and 
Berger. ( 19) 
There were however strong critics of the incrementalist 
/~~id~ e ground view. Most notable amongst these was Va~ -
: lap~ who had quickly developed away from his e~ 
views to a stance that endorsed the need for 
li erals to become "critical allies" of the liberation 
movement. (20) His premise appeared to be that for 
liberalism to succeed in South Africa it was no good for it 
to be espoused by a group isolated from the main contending 
forces in society. Rather, efforts should be made to 
articulate it to the the discourse of one of the two primary 
antagonists. The logical target of this strategy at that 
time was the liberation movement, which while perceived to 
17 See Gerson (1987), p 250 
18 Godsell and Bernstein (1988), p 186 
19 See Schlemmer (1988); and, Berger and Godsell (1988) 
20 Slabbert (1988), p 112 
be illiberal in certain respects, was nevertheless imbued 
with a significant democratic and liberal content. 
The debate amongst liberals was never concluded, but it 
served to harden and focus positions which had been emerging 
somewhat confusedly over the previous years of escalating 
struggle and polarisation. 
For the PFP the period saw an initial continuation of the 
earlier incoherence as it attempted to come to terms with 
the many new pressures acting on it. Chief amongst these 
was the growing illegitimacy of Parliament and the shifting 
of the key site of struggle to a terrain far removed from 
its confines. Slabbert's resignation brought these issues 
to a head within the Party. A further point that the Party 
was attempting to respond to was the evident weakening of 
the NP and the state in the first half of 1986. Trying to 
respond to both of these outside points of reference proved 
to be a difficult task. The PFP attempted to do both 
through its "hinge assumption" which placed emphasis both 
through attempting to forge ties in the black community, and 
also through trying to develop its support among white 
voters. 
This approach only served to show up the divisions between 
the Party's left which placed a primacy on the non-class 
element of its liberal ideology, most notably on non-
racialism; and, the moderate, centrist group who sought to 
stress a class-conscious advocacy of capitalism. The left 
assumed a power beyond its numbers as it had done in the 
immediately preceding period. 
Dramatic setbacks at the elections as well as the growth of 
a backlash to the liberation movement within the dominant 
classes generally, and amongst liberals more specifically, 
saw the rise to ascendance of the centrist trend within the 
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Party. This coincided with the broader retreat of the 
liberation movement in the face of an assault of state 
repression. The left continued to operate within the Party 
but many of its leading members left after the visit of a 
group of Afrikaners to the ANC in Dakar in mid-1987. This 
allowed for the complete conso.lidation of the centrist trend 
and the advocacy of a more class-conscious discourse by the 
PFP. Its approach came to be founded on an opposition to 
the liberation movement, a reassertion of constitutional 
incrementalism, and the increasing influence·of the Southern 





these issues in the following 
the new leadership elected after 
Slabbert's departure and its incoherent centrist attempt to 
deal with the new situation facing the Party; extra-
Parliamentary work which saw a growth on the left of the 
Party; the major setback at the 1987 General Elections in 
which the polarisation of the Party was evident, despite its 
stated centrist election platform; the post election 
malaise; the isolation of the left; and the consolidation of 
centrism in the form of a new 'mission statement'. 
A NEW LEADER/ V-'~ 
departure of .Slabbert and Boraine left the PFP with a 
evere leadership vacuum. Th two who had left had filled 
the crucial positions of Leacler and Chairman in which both, 
nd especially Slabbert, he{d a firm grip over the Party. 
A a meeting of the Part /~ Federal Council in mid-February 
nanimously elected the Leader, Peter 
<B!ib!S"-~ .. e National Chairman, .Ken Andrew was voted 
in as the Chairman of the Federal Council with Douglas 
Gibson as his deputy. In addition, a new position of 
Secretary General was created which was filled by Robin 
Carlisle. 
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Bravely, Eglin pronounced that the leadership was "young, 
aggressive and politically ambitious". (21) Carlisle said 
that the Party was, adopting a "new, more aggressive" 
management style. He said that in future there would be 
"a greater degree of planning, strategy 
development and professional management style in 
the way the Party operates." (22) 
While this was the intention, Eglin's leadership proved to 
be ineffective in reaching this objective. While attempting 
to guide the Party towards a consolidation of a centrist 
stance, he failed to limit the rise of the PFP left. The 
effect was that over the period until mid-1987 the Party 
presented an incoherent front balancing its various 
tendencies with no clear direction. 
The departures also had the pronounced effect of forcing the 
Party to reevaluate its positioning and strategy. There had 
been a growing pressure within the Party over the previous 
year for greater contact with extra-Parliamentary groups and 
struggles. These pressures had been very carefully directed 
by Slabbert into his strategic plan. His departure had, 
however, increased the level of doubt in the Party's 
Parliamentary base. The doubt raised by Slabbert in the 
legitimacy of the institution of Parliament was compounded 
by the broader rejection of the tricameral · system by the 
popular classes. Those on the left of the Party made their 
voice known and were agitating for more emphasis on the 
struggle outside Parliament. The Western Cape region of the 
Young Progressives committed themselves to this work and 
stated that 
21 Cape Times, 17 February 1986 
22 Cape Times, 3 March 1986 
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"in view of the desperate situation in which South 
Africa finds itself, we call on the leadership of 
the PFP to respond to the crisis by acknowledging 
the limited role of Parliament as a means of 
bringing about an end to apartheid rule." (23) 
The Party leadership responded to the pressures by 
attempting to bring about a clearer definition of the role 
of the PFP in Parliament and in the extra-Parliamentary 
terrain. According to Eglin, Slabbert's departure had 
"forced the Party and caused me to consider more 
seriously than one might have done the relevance 
of the Party and one came to the conclusion that 
one was only relevant if one had a twin track 
strategy, and that you couldn't only go the 
Parliamentary route." (24) 
Eglin quickly developed an interpretation of the situation 
which represented a consensus of the differing trends within 
the Party. The point of departure in his analysis was that 
the nature of South African politics had changed 
dramatically such that the view that whites were the "main 
political actors and Parliament the main site of political 
activity" no longer applied. (25) Political activity in the 
future was 
"going to take place in a much larger political 
arena; the political actors are going to be black 
as much as white". (26) 
Despite his gesture to the extra-Parliamentary field, 
Eglin' s stress fell on the traditional Party domain. In 
this respect Parliament was still unique as it was deemed to 
be the only place where laws could be made or repealed. It 
was here too where Government could be called to account and 
face to face debate with it could take place. 
23 Caoe Times, 14 February 1986 
24 Interview with Colin Eglin, 25 April 1990 





considered it folly to leave Parliament and leave the 
government unquestioned and unchallenged. The PFP, he 
concluded, had "to utilise to the utmost of its ability its 
position in Parliament". (27) This was a retreat away from 
the position developed under Slabbert which had played down 
the traditional opposition role of the PFP. It was a return 
to the safety and comfort of what the Party had historically 
grown used to. 
At the same time as maximising its position within the 
confines of the tricameral Parliament it was also necessary 
to be "relevant to the wider South African political arena. 
It is not an either/or situation". (28) From this 
Parliamentary base he called on the PFP to 
"reach out to the people of our South African 
nation. We must deal in a practical way with the 
issues that affect their daily lives. We must 
build bridges." (29) 
Building "bridges" would require closer ties and contacts 
with popular organisations. A special "task force· for 
negotiation" under the leadership of Peter Gastrow and 
National Director Neil Ross was established to forge closer 
links with popular resistance groups. (30) 
The existing programme to recruit black members had been a 
failure and had not met the Party's need to establish a 
bridgehead within the dominated classes. Addressing the 
February meeting of the PFP Federal Council, Colin Eglin 
said that while the campaign had been well intentioned, it 
was not well managed or conceived. It needed to be 




30 Sunday Times, 23 March 1986 
The programme eventually 
31 Minutes of PFP Federal Council, 15 February 1986 
withered away to become a minor part of Party strategy as 
little energy was put into it by any of the PPP regions. 
As well as a realisation that it needed to be relevant to 
the total political environment, and not only the white one, 
the notion that the Party could forge a centrist hegemony 
capable of uniting core black and white constituencies and 
potentially sweep into a position of power was again growing 
in the Party. The rudiments of this emergent strategic goal 
could be seen in the "There is a way to save South Africa" 
campaign conducted in May 1986. In this project extensive 
resources went into publicity material and full page 
newspaper advertisements. The objective of the Party drive 
was to appeal to disillusioned NP supporters, as well as to 
win credibility within the black community. The emerging 
signs of disenchantment within the National Party were 
welcomed by the PPP leadership as a new opportunity to once 
again attempt to seize the controlling interest within the 
white political arena. It realized that earlier strategies 
which ignored the black community could no longer be 
pursued. As well as a means of presenting the Party's 
policies to the public, the PPP saw this campaign as an 
opportunity to present itself as the Party of the centre 
capable of fighting what it perceived as the extremism of 
right and left. ( 32) Eglin emphasised the focus on the 
National Party which, he contended, had 
"to break to enable a new realignment of groups in 
the centre. We will assist in this process and we 
will have an important position in that power 
structure". (33) 
The rationale behind the belief that the Party could unite a 
non-racial centrist grouping was based on what was known 
within the PPP as the Hinge, or Andrew Assumption, after its 
32 Die Burger, 21 May 1986 
33 Sunday Star, 25 May 1986 
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deviser Ken Andrew. The Secretary General Robin Carlisle 
explained this concept: 
"The key to the Party's future is to increase 
black and white membership. Once whites realise 
that the PFP has substantial support in the black 
community, more will support us. Once blacks see 
that a large number of whites support us, more of 
them will see us as a party with a prospect." (34) 
The publicity material for the campaign focussed on the 
PFP's stress on individual rights as well as the appeal for 
negotiations. In this aspect the campaign engaged directly 
with the then current tone of government which was based on 
its notion of negotiations. The PFP questioned this notion 
and suggested its own. In focussing on negotiations, the 
PFP was both challenging government and the liberation 
movement which, while not rejecting the concept of 
negotiations, had at that point not seen it as strategically 
appropriate and was insisting on certain preconditions being 
met before it would consider that course of action. The 
tone of the pamphlets and adverts captured this dual thrust: 
"The PFP' s concept of negotiations is very 
different from the way the government is trying to 
do it. 
"It has to do with the spirit 6f the thing. With 
gaining trust, without which nothing will be 
achieved. 
"You have to show intent by scrapping apartheid 
and unbanning political parties and leaders so 
that people are free to negotiate." (35) 
The campaign made the bold appeal that the PFP was the 
single organisation capable of taking the lead in this task: 
34 Argus, 24 March 1986 
35 Sowetan,. 20 May 1986 
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"The PFP is the only Party with the resources, the 
people and the credibility to take the centre 
stage and form an alternative government. Support 
for the PFP has been growing at a rate that has 
surprised our critics, warmed the hearts of our 
friends and hastened the day when the PFP can 
actually form an alternative government." (36) 
The ideas incorporated into the "Save South Africa" campaign 
were incorporated into a far larger strategy project 
culminating in a major programmatic document finalised in 
September 1986. It came two months after the massive 
crackdown on the liberation movement associated with the 
declaration of a national State of Emergency in July 1986. 
The document authored by Robin Carlisle proposed a major 
initiative whereby the PFP would consolidate itself as a 
leading centrist party with significant black and white 
support and which could hold the balance of power within the 
constitutional system. The strategy was in many respects 
similar to that unveiled by Slabbert the previous year. It 
differed in its appeal to technocratic political techniques, 
as well as in incorporating a more sensitive approach to the 
black community. and popular organisations. While the 
document represented the overall drift towards a centrist 
stance, the document accommodated the views and objectives 
of the Party's left. It was, consequently, another 
incoherent attempt at a non-racial centrism. 
The belief that the PFP could once more aspire to being a 
leading party came as a result of extensive opinion survey 
analysis conducted by the Party. According to the principal 
PFP pollster Jannie Hofmeyr, voter support for the Party at 
that time stood at between 16% to 18%. This compared with 
as many as 30% to 45% of the voting public agreeing with the 
PFP' s policies. ( 37) The Party believed that the latter 
group needed to be targeted in order to become PFP voters. 
36 ibid 
37 Star, 2 October 1986 
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Hofmeyr contended that the situation of conflict and 
violence in the country had encouraged a mood of despair and 
apathy. The PFP was perceived as being unable to guarantee 
stability. The major target for the PFP was a large section 
of NP supporters who, while voting for the National Party, 
no longer supported its policies: According to Hofmeyr the 
PFP was in a position to convince these people that the 
government was unable to "deliver reform fast enough". (38) 
He contended that the message that would convince most 
voters was that the PFP was the party more likely to 
establish "a realistic partnership with significant black 
leadership". ( 39) It was his belief that the task at hand 
for the PFP was a marketing one: 
"This is not a question of changing people's basic 
attitudes and values. People have already made up 
their minds on all the important issues such as 
open schooling and integrated residential areas. 
We must isolate the obstacles which prevent them 
from voting for us. The fundamental barrier is 
that we are not trusted with the transition. 
People think we are going to give the country 
away. People do not think we are able to handle 
the dynamic which transition will set in motion 
because we are soft on security." (40) 
The Party believed that it would gather support by 
projecting an image which showed the PFP as being more 
likely to be able to share power with "significant" black 
leaders who could be trusted and who would be prepared to 
come to some kind of settlement. In turn, the NP would be 
exposed as being incapable of negotiating a peaceful 
resolution of conflict. 







"The government is making a mess by any yardstick 
and we have a marvellous chance of picking up 
disenchanted voters who supported the NP before. 
We don't have to change people's attitudes. We 
merely have to get people who share our attitudes 
to support us. For the first time in ten years 
the PFP has a strategy and knows where it is 
going. " ( 41 ) 
The emergent strategy set the Party clear Parliamentary and 
extra-Parliamentary objectives. The Parliamentary 
objectives were based on four assumptions. These were that 
there would be sufficient stability to ensure the integrity 
of electoral politics; that it could gain two-thirds of the 
NRP vote; that it would hold onto voters who might support 
the NP through fear of the right wing; and, that it could 
achieve the same swing as the Party had gained between 1977 
and 1981. Given these assumptions it believed that it was 
capable of winning 52 seats in Parliament. A position of 
this kind would allow the Party to either hold power 
outright, or the balance of it. in the event of a hung 
Parliament in the House of Assembly. (42) 
The extra-Parliamentary thrust sought to make the Party a 
"relevant factor" in the "total political market place" and 
"power equation" through establishing and gaining the 
"trust, credibility and endorsement of leaders and 
organisations of all races". ( 43) This was crucial to the 
fulfillment of the "hinge assumption" which presupposed that 
the more that whites believed that blacks accepted the PFP 
plan, the more they would be prepared to do so, and vice 
versa. 
The plan called for a three year programme of developing 
support in the Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary 
terrains. In the Parliamentary field the strategic plan was 
41 Sunday Star, 7 September 1986 




called "turbocharge" which called for sophisticated 
recruitment and canvassing techniques which the Party would 
deploy in pivotal Parliamentary constituencies. It would 
make use of direct marketing techniques which had been used 
in politics in the USA, Canada, France and Austria. The 
extra-Parliamentary thrust called for a professionalisation 
of the Party's monitoring and mediating work in the black 
community. A network of "outreach" officers were to be 
appointed whose tasks were to implement the six stated 
objectives of the "national outreach programme" which were: 
"To become truly relevant in the current political 
situation; 
"To mobilise and conscientise our supporters and 
members; 
"To become a rallying point for the middle ground 
and for liberal values; 
"To develop a comprehensive battery of contacts 
and establish a data bank of black communities; 
"To be recognised as the authoritative force in 
the peace-making process; 
"To grow white and black support for our 
principles and policies by practically 
demonstrating their effectiveness in real life 
situations, and thereby grow our membership in all 
areas." ( 44) 
With this programme the PFP set about an 
of becoming the central force in South 
This ambition was, however, soon dashed. 
both too ambitious, 
circumstances in its 




The programme was 
was precluded by 
will be discussed 
below, the grand plans laid down in the programme were never 
fulfilled. While the Party became very ext~nsively involved 
in the extra-Parliamentary field it never succeeded in 
becoming a force among the dominated classes. The plan was 
44 Robin Carlisle, "National Outreach", May 1986 
an imprecise attempt to engage with the liberation movement 
on the one hand, while at the same time attempting to gather 
increased white support. This was to prove to be a 
collision course for the Party, especially since there was 
no attempt to integrate the two objectives. This reflected 
the rift between a dominant centrist liberal group within 
the Party, and a small but effective left wing. This 
condition was a recipe for an incoherent and dis jointed 
attempt at forging a new national hegemony. Rather than 
achieving this, the plan allowed for further polarisation 
within the PFP, and little success outside of it. 
Within the Party, while there was no overt opposition to the 
plan, not all members saw it as a priority and continued 
with the traditional mode of liberal opposition politics. 
Said Helen Suzman, 
"I never saw us as a power party. There were 
others who did and were constantly talking power, 
but I must say, perhaps I was more realistic or 
maybe I was just so used to being in opposition 
the idea of being in power never occurred to me. 
But it didn't mean in any way that I thought that 
diminished the role the Party had to play." (45) 
It was also the calling of a General Election in January 
1987, just four months after the announcement of the 
strategic plan, that confounded the three year plan of the 
Party. 
45 Interview with Helen Suzman, 9 April 1990 
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THE OUTREACH PROGRAMME 
1986 saw extensive activity by the PFP in reaching out to 
the black community and to a lesser degree to popular 
organisations. The exercise in recruiting black members, 
started the previous year, was continued, although on a much 
decreased scale. Emphasis fell in the main on monitoring, 
support and back-up work in townships then in the grips of 
conflict and repression. 
The announcement of the national state of emergency in June 
1986 saw a vigorous response from the PFP. As well as 
running a series of public protest meetings, the Party also 
established a "missing person's bureau". This name was 
given to what was effectively a detainees support project as 
a means of circumventing the curb on reporting Emergency 
detainees. By October the Party reported that it had a list 
of 6000 detainees on its books and was co-operating with 
popular organisations in detainee support work. (46) 
By the end of 1986 well over 100 PFP members had been 
involved in over 70 townships. Activities included 
mediating between residents' organisations and police in 
conflict situations; being present at meetings and funerals 
as a deterrent to police action; negotiating between 
"comrades" and vigilantes; mediating between Inkatha and the 
UDF; negotiating with the authorities to lift restrictions 
on meetings and funerals; putting pressure on government to 
lift bans on popular leaders; assisting detainees families 
materially; assisting victims of violence in bringing legal 
actions. The National Director of the Party was put in 
charge of these activities with many MPs and Party members 
participating. In the Western Cape two people were 
46 Newsline, October 1986 
appointed to full-time positions to assist in outreach work. 
(47) 
The Party leadership valued these activities highly as they 
promoted the image and credibility of the PFP in the black 
community. Said Colin Eglin, 
"Operation Outreach, whatever it was intended, was 
converted to something quite valuable. It led to 
the development of widespread monitoring 
activities which was a way of gaining access to 
the extra-Parliamentaries in the community without 
being seen to be in competition with them." (48) 
The Party also felt that these activities could potentially 
have a moderating influence on popular resistance politics. 
In the words of Robin Carlisle outreach work served to open 
"lines of communication not normally available to 
blacks and therefore facilitating negotiations 
rather than confrontation". (49) 
There were 1 however, serious concerns that while the. Party 
was interacting closely with affected communities, it was 
not succeeding in forging links with popular leadership. 
This was repeatedly pointed out by Colin Eglin in his 
presentations to meetings of the Party's Federal Executive 
in the latter part of 1986. He was concerned that although 
the PFP's 
"monitoring at grassroots was having an effect ... 
very little was being done at leadership level to 
forge contacts and increase understanding for our 
position." (SO) 
47 PFP, Strategy for a New South Africa, September 1986; 
Newsline, November 1986. 
48 Interview with Colin Eglin, 25 April 1990 
49 PFP, Strategy for a New South Africa, September 1986 
SO Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 22 October 1986 
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Despite this, the extra-Parliamentary activities had a 
significant educative effect on those Party members who were 
involved in them. It served to reinforce the left within 
the Party through encouraging both a greater understanding 
of, and sympathy for, the liberation movement by those who 
got involved. 
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While the Party was not making contact with the leadership 
of the liberation movement, it was closely involved in the 
KwaNatal Indaba in which moderate black groups were actively 
involved. The Indaba represented very closely the interests 
of key sectors of the dominant classes who were seeking a 
means to overcome the impasse that had arisen as a result of 
the inability of the state to resolve the structural crisis. 
The eight-month long project was highly regarded by Party 
members as a triumph for negotiation. ( 51) The proposals 
developed by the Indaba included a bill of individual rights 
and a constitutional framework for the region based both on 
a one-person one vote system, and a scheme to ensure group 
participation. "Groups" represented within the 
constitutional framework would have a right of veto · over 
legislation affecting their language, religion or cultural 
rights. (52) The Party was represented at the negotiations 
by its Natal leader Ray Swart and Durban MP Peter Gastrow. 
The identification of the Party with the agreement reached 
in the Indaba process brought it into conflict with the 
liberation movement. The Indaba was strongly criticised by 
the UDF as being an inadequate regional approach to the 
national question in South Africa. It called on PFP 
supporters ·to rethink the Party's support for the Indaba 
proposals. It argued that 
51 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, p 171 
52 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, p 103 
"the Indaba was flawed from the start, built on 
ethnic politics and going ahead without the 
support or mandate of the people. · The Muzorewa 
experience should have taught white South Africans 
not to build castles in the air." (53) 
A significant consequence of the impact of radical extra-
Parliamentary politics on the PFP and an important band of 
its members was the reassessment it forced of the Party's 
policy of including a veto right in its constitutional 
framework. The policy stated that the size of the minority 
veto would be determined by the National Convention in 
drawing up a new constitution. This would mean that in the 
legislature 
"any group of say 10% - 15% will be able to veto 
legislation which is against its vital interests. 
In the executive the minority veto will work by 
requiring broad policy decisions to be taken by 
consensus." (54) 
Many critics of the Party had argued that this veto right 
could lead to a white (or any other) minority placing a 
block on decisive changes and thus reserving power in the 
hands of a minority. At the 1986 Federal Congress a vote 
was taken to scrap the veto clause in the Party policy. A 
total of 110 votes went in favour of scrapping the veto, 
while 90 backed its retention. As a two-thirds majority 
was required to change the Party's constitutional policy, 
the veto was retained although a committee was appointed to 
investigate this aspect of the Party platform. (55) 
The division over the veto debate reflected the delicate 
balance the Party 
and black support. 
was attempting to achieve between white 
Speaking in favour of scrapping the veto 
53 UDF, "United Democratic Front Position on Whites-Only 
Elections", 19 March 1987 
54 PFP,. "What it stands for. Your questions answered",· 
1987 
55 Argus, 22 November 1986 
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Jan van Gend argued that it placed a block on "general 
democracy". He went on to say that if the Party was truly 
in favour of democracy it would not place stress on the 
minority veto. The majority should be allowed to rule, 
while the minority could be defended by a Bill of Rights. 
( 56) Van Gend' s comments were endorsed by many, who were 
also impressed by the appeal of a guest speaker to the 
Congress Nthato Motlana, a leader of the UDF. 
Those who supported the retention of the veto argued that 
this was necessary in order to win white support. Said the 
Party's Director of Research Prof Nie Olivier, 
"While it is important to increase our credibility 
among blacks, we will never achieve anything as a 
Party unless we can get more support from white 
voters . " ( 5 7 ) 
The veto debate was left unresolved, reflecting the 
unresolved nature of the Party's ongoing direction. 
THE 1987 GENERAL ELECTION 
In January 1987 PW. Botha called an election for the white 
House of Assembly. This announcement caught the PFP off 
guard as they were anticipating an election only in 1989. 
The Party had to move fast to adapt its recently unveiled 
strategy to the constraints of a General Election at short 
notice. 
The calling of an early election by PW Botha had bedeviled 
the PFP's three year programme to gain power. (58) 
Nevertheless, the Party took the· essential elements of the 
strategy and incorporated it into its approach to the 
56 Rapport, 23 November 1986 
57 Citizen, 24 November 1986 
58 In terms of the new constitution the next elections 
were due to be held within 180 days of 1 September 1989. 
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elections. In lieu of the Party trying to win as many seats 
under its own flag as possible it chose rather to adopt a 
strategy of forging an "alliance of moderates". This 
implied a series of electoral alliances and partnerships 
which avoided opposing other centrist parties and movements. 
In particular, the NRP and the newly emergent "independents" 
- exiles from the left wing of the National Party - were 
identified for special treatment. 
This stance adopted by the Party reflected its attempt to 
constructively deal with a real shift in attitudes within 
the white community. The rise in black urbanisation and 
increased participation in the urban economy was reflected 
by this shift in attitudes. On the "soft" issue of racial 
integration in theatres whereas 40% of whites endorsed this 
view in 1978, the figure rose to 74% in 1986. Hofmeyr shows 
that it was particularly during the period of heightened 
resistance between 1984 and 1986 that there was significant 
easing in attitudes. (59) On the "harder" issue of 
integrated group areas, there was also a gradual, although 
lesser, drift towards liberalisation. Support for 
integration of this kind rose from 17% in 1982 to 29% in 
1986. Hofmeyr' s research shows that by the mid-eighties 
there was "a substantial majority of whites" who were 
"prepared to accept a loosening.of the Act as long as it did 
not impact on them directly". (60) Politically these trends 
were reflected both in internal division within the NP, as 
well as significant breaks from that Party. 
59 Hofmeyr (1990), p 39 
60 ibid 
34 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 25 January 1997 
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however, that it wished to retain its own identity within 
the alliance. Wh" e m ~ of the regional formations of the 
NRP agreed to the\ al{iance, the Albany branch of that party 
actively opposed t~ ment. Less than two weeks before 
the polling day the branch placed an advert in a local 
Grahamstown newspaper saying that there was "no alliance in 
Albany". ( 62) 
While the PFP did agreements with 
the newly emergen "independent m vement" - the independents 
sought to distance from the Party fearing that 
too close a link would be detrimental to their chances - it 
did stand back from contesting seats where Wynand Malan, 
Dennis Worrall and Esther Lategan were standing. According 
to Federal Council chairman Ken Andrew this was a 
manifestation of the PFP' s approach to "realignment 
politics". (63) The Party saw this approa_c~--"'~ being in 
keeping with its goal. of cementing a c~rist P. litical 
movement within South Africa. Electio · emphasised 
this objective extensively. 
part, 
An election advert read, in 
"I am going to vote PFP because they have had the 
courage to put aside party politics to form an 
alliance of moderates. 
"I am going to vote PFP because they are bringing 
talented people together to build a new South 
Africa. 
"I'm going to vote PFP because I agree with them 
and Wynand Malan that there must be real 
negotiation. 
"I'm going to vote PFP because they agree with 
Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi' s efforts in the 
KwaNatal Indaba. 
62 Die Burger, 23 April 1987 
63 Citizen, 20 February 1987 
"I'm going to vote PFP because I agree with them 
and Dennis Worrall that there should be real power 
sharing. 
"I'm going to vote PFP because they agree with 
Wimpie de Klerk about National Party intolerance 
of uninhibited political reporting. 
"I'm going to vote PFP because they agree with the 
Stellenbosch professors that the Group Areas Act 
must go." (64) -~-~ 
As well as accommodating the cependents within its 
electoral plans, the PFP also stoed_ba.e· from opposing 
individuals still within the National Party who were known 
to be very critical of government policy. Those not opposed 
included Albert Nothnagel, Leon Wessels and Sam de Beer. 
(65) This approach was informed by the belief that if the 
PFP /NRP alliance and the independent candidates held the 
prospect of forming an alternative government more than 
thirty Nationalist MPs would join up with it. (66) 
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After the bluster of its election campaign, PFP members were 
shocked at how badly the Party performed. Not only did it 
not gain any new_seftts, but it lost MPs and its position as 
t:hBOf f icia/Ic:c;-po-s~ in the House of Assembly to the 
~=:servative Party_,~fter putting up 77 candidates in the 
~,--t~P won only nineteen seats (plus one 
nominated MP), down from the 26 it held going into the 
election. Two PFP candidates were unopposed. The Party 
lost eight seats to the National Party, while gaining one 
from that party. ( 67) The PFP' s election ally, the NRP 
64 Argus, 8 April 1987. The Stellenbosch professors 
ref erred to were a large group of academics at the 
University of Stellenbosch who in 1987 distanced themselves 
from the National Party. Wimpie de Klerk was the former 
editor of the government supporting Rapport newspaper who 
had also distanced himself from the direction of government 
policy. 
65 Citizen, 20 February 1987 and 3 March 1987 
66 Welsh (1987), p 94 
67 ibid 
lost four of the five seats it held - all to the NP. Among 
the independents, only Wynand Malan won a seat, while Dennis 
Worrall came within 39 votes of defeating the Minister of 
Constitutional Development Chris Heunis in the Helderberg 
constituency. The PFP won only 14,11% of the total votes 
cast and the NRP won 1,92%. Against this the National Party 
won 52,45% and the Conservative Party received 26,37% of the 
vote. ( 68) 
Compared to the Party's performance during the 1981 
elections, the 1987 results illustrated a dramatic decline 
in support for the PFP. Various factors contributed to the 
PFP's failure. Among the factors identified by the Party's 
Federal Council were the ef feet of government control of 
television; an absence of youth involvement in the campaign; 
the fact that the Party had disbelieved opinion surveys in 
the run up to the election; complacent and ineffective 
organisation; an unfocussed message; the "election alliance" 
only served to lose the Party support; not addressing the 
crucial issue of security which the NP concentrate on; the 
Party had an elitist image. 
At root, however, the Party's poor performance was a 
function of its location as a liberal Party in the context 
of a far broader strugglr:~tween primary antagonists, 
neither of which was the , P~v Three issues served to 
illustrate this during the :tections: the contest around 
"security", the impact of the liberation movement on the 
election campaign, and the close identification by the PFP 
with a "third force" - the KwaNatal Indaba. 
The elections came in the midst of an intensive State of 
Emergency in which the state was attempting to destroy or 
paralyse the liberation movement. The reform of the 
68 Citizen, 8 May 1987 
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political state which had characterised government action 
until 1986 had all but come to a stop. In its place 
government efforts went into an extensive low-intensity 
campaign to reformulate civil society in the absence of an 
effective resistance movement. A two-fold approach of 
socio-economic reform and high-profile repression were 
pursued by the regime in an effort to ensure continued 
accumulation, while simultaneously attempting to defend the 
interests of a variety of white class forces. This state 
programme was closely associated with the work of the State 
Security Council and the National Security Management 
System. ( 69) The root of this programme was the conflict 
between the state on the one hand, and an alliance of 
dominated black class forces led by a liberation movement 
directed in the main by the ANC, the UDF and Cosatu on the 
other. The election for the white House of Parliament was 
not, therefore, central to the primary conflict. It was, 
though, an attempt by the National Party, to consolidate its 
position in the context of a growing right wing and 
splinters within its own ranks. 
The main thrust of the National Party election campaign fell 
on its efforts to oppose the liberation movement. With 
little by the way of new policy initiatives it resorted to 
stressing the "threat" to the country posed by the ANC and 
Communist Party and its allies. The NP had a two-stream 
election manifesto which on the one hand referred to the 
vague notion of "broadening the democratic base of the 
government", but placed greater stress on security by 
"fighting and neutralising the revolutionary offensive". 
(70) 
69 See Swilling and Phillips (1989 a and b) 




In order to reinforce the government's appeal to "security" 
the Foreign Minister twice called meetings of foreign 
representatives to inform them of an "ANC plan to dis;rupt 
the elections". (71) A highly orchestrated campaign by the 
National Party sought to exploit the links leading PFP 
members had with the liberation movement. In doing so the 
National Party was both exploiting and furthering the trend 
of opposition to the ANC within the white community. 
Hofmeyr shows that whereas 72% of whites in January 1986(', 
' 
supported the idea of negotiations with the ANC on condition 
that it renounced violence, only 40% supported similar talks 
in 1986, and 36% in 1988. (72) The NP placed adverts in, 
newspapers publishing photographs and statements attempting 
to link the Party to the ANC and SACP. Nationalist speakers 
referred extensively to the various contacts that the PFP 
and its members had had with resistance organisations. NP 
candidate and a former senior security policeman Craig 
Williamson questioned the PFP on its security policy and its 
views on the ANC. ( 7 3) Minister of Defence Magnus Malan 
argued that PFP delegates to a meeting with the ANC had 
spoken highly of SACP General Secretary Joe Slovo, the 
( / implication intended that the Party found the Communist 
0Party acceptable. (74) Adding to the fray Pik Botha asked 
why the PFP did not speak out against the ANC. Instead, he 
said, it had been "soft" on the ANC while being "hard" on 
the SAP. (75) He went on to warn that the ANC would use the 
PFP as a "Trojan horse" in its struggle. (76) 
In response to these claims by the government, the PFP at 
first restated its policy which was that all parties should 
be permitted to operate freely, unless their stated goal was 
71 ibid, p 745 
72 Hofmeyr (1990), p 40 
73 Citizen, 24 April 1987 
74 Cape Times, 25 April 1987 
75 Die Burger, 28 April 1987 
76 Argus, 28 April 1987 
to pursue the violent overthrow of constitutional 
government. (77) Elsewhere a spokesman was quoted as saying 
hat the PFP viewed the ANC as an enemy because it pursued a 
olicy of violence. He went on to say that no party should 
e invited to participate in negotiations if it supported a 
policy of violence. (78) The Party did not, however, stress 
its security policy during the elections and the ongoing 
badgering of the NP took its toll. In the face of what 
becoming evident as a poor performance in the elections, the 
Party Leader Colin Eglin assumed a pugnacious tone and 
contended that if the PFP came to power it would "eat the 
communists for breakfast". (79) 
The response of the Party on the ANC and security issues 
was, according to a leading Party member David Welsh a 
result of a classic dilemma 
"confronting liberal parties in polarising multi-
ethnic societies. True to its liberal principles, 
it could never condone the violations of civil 
rights and the strong-arm methods used by the 
State in combatting unrest." (80) 
a result the Party appeared only to condemn the actions 
the state. But, the Party was in similar dilemma 
respect of the ANC and SACP issue. According to Welsh, 
"The polarisation of South African politics 
demands ideological specificity. The crudeness 
and raw emotion generated by racial politics in an 
atmosphere of heightened insecurity consequently 
offers little scope for nuanced or subtle 
positions on highly controversial issues. Given 
the logic of its principles and the first-hand 
knowledge of PFP members about the ANC's strength, 
the PFP could do little else other than what it 
did: express its opposition to the ANC's violence 
77 Citizen, 19 March 1987 
78 Die Burger, 9 April 1987 
79 Cape Times, 12 April 1987 
80 Welsh (1987a), p 97 
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and its communist members, but also recognise that 
its influence could not be wished away." (81) 
The "middle position" on the ANC proved to have no place in 
the context of the 1987 elections. Not only did the Party 
come under attack from the National Party to its right, but 
extra-Parliamentary groups, especially the UDF came out 
strongly against the elections and the PFP' s stance. The 
Party's approach reflected its polarised response to the 
increasing illegitimacy of Parliament, as well as to the 
hardening of opposition to the liberation movement within 
the white community. 
In a position paper released before the elections, the UDF 
declared that its "theme" in response to the elections was 
to be "Down with apartheid elections: Votes for all in a 
united South Africa!" (82) It considered the elections to 
be a "farce" as they perpetuated minority rule, they were 
not free or democratic, and the poll would take place in the 
context of a State of Emergency, repression, censorship 
ignorance on the part of white voters. 
The UDF then went on to make a direct appeal to the PFP. It 
reiterated its criticism of the PFP's participation in the 
tricameral system, but was aware that the . Party was not 
about to leave Parliament and its supporters would be voting 







81 ibid, p 98 
from the racists, look toward the 
Abandon the myth of change through 
And when the Nats come to power on 6 
deep and hard about the political 
82 UDF, "United Democratic Front Position on Whites-Only 
Elections", 19 March 1987 
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"For the fact of the matter is that PFP supporters 
will have to recognise that their children's 
future lies neither in a futile bid for a few 
extra seats in a moribund Parliament, or in 
leaving South Africa get in touch with the 
thinking of the majority. Investigate the harsh 
world behind government imposed censorship and 
misinformation, and then be in a position to make 
informed judgements." (83) 
The UDF then went on to oppose participation in Parliament. 
It argued that 
"the real engine for change lies outside 
Parliament. It is based in the democratic . and 
mass based organisations of our people." (84) 
The Party was well aware of the artificial nature of the 
election in the context of widespread repression and 
resistance. Addressing the January meeting of the PFP 
Federal Executive Colin Eglin was quoted as saying that the 
"election was set against a very unnatural 
background where the focus would be on White 
politics in a White political arena, and whilst 
this would be on the forefront of everybody's 
minds and the news, it did not reflect the 
realities of this country." (85) 
Responding to the UDF appeal Helen Suzman reiterated the 
view in a leader page article in the Sunday Times that "for 
the foreseeable future" only Parliament could make or break 
laws which would bring apartheid to an end. ( 86) She 
rejected the notion that the election was a "sideshow" to 
the main struggle between the state and the popular 
opposition. She questioned how the liberatory organisations 
could get rid of the Government short of through an 
83 ibid 
84 ibid 
85 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 25 January 1987 
86 Sunday Times, 
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election. The PFP was not simply trying to win a "few more 
seats", rather 
"the aim is to form a powerful alliance of like-
minded people in Parliament who are determined to 
get rid of apartheid and thus create a climate for 
negotiation." (87) 
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While the UDF, Cosatu and Nactu did not call for a boycott 
of the elections their opposition to them was intensified by 
the stayaway call for 5 and 6 May which focussed among other 
issues on the whites-only poll. In a statement Cosatu said 
that the election 
"capitalises on and deepens racism, fear and 
ignorance among the white electorate, and ... aims 
to entrench power more firmly in the hands of a 
minority. The white elections have not remotely 
touched on the real issues dominating the lives of 
millions of the oppressed and exploited." (88) 
The stayaway proved to be very successful with the Labour 
Monitoring Group estimating that more than a million workers 
stayed away. Cosatu claimed that 1,5 million workers joined 
the action, with one million students also staying away. 
(89) 
Certain members of the PFP claimed that the call to action 
by the organisations of the liberation movement had the 
ef feet of discouraging left-wing white voters, especially 
students, from voting. Party spokesmen argued that the 
Party had lost the Wynberg, Albany, Edenvale and Hillbrow 
seats because of this factor. They also contended that 
there had been a close call in Green Point due to this 
reason and also that it had not been possible to gain 
87 ibid 





Said Douglas Gibson reflecting on the 
"The people who did most of the damage were the 
white adherents of those black political movements 
like, for example, the UDF. There is no doubt 
about it that the UDF put a question mark over the 
whole Parliamentary election and almost went out 
of their way to persuade people that if they 
voted, they were sort-of being untrue to the cause 
and we think that more than anything else put the 
CP in as the official opposition in South Africa." 
(91) 
He argued further that if the PFP had won three of the 
marginal seats that it had lost, it could have retained its 
position as the Official Opposition. Whether this would 
have been the· case or not is open to conjecture, but the 
interpretation offered by Gibson was a prominent one within 
the Party, and served to alienate the more conservative 
elements within the Party, especially those in the Southern 
Transvaal further from organisations of the dominated 
classes. 
The PFP also faced criticism during the election campaign 
from both the National Party and the UDF regarding its 
endorsement for the KwaNatal Indaba. The PFP/NRP alliance 
fought the election in Natal largely in support of the 
Indaba proposals. The NP attacked the proposals arguing 
that support for them would be tantamount to giving approval 
for "black domination". Chief Buthelezi joined the PFP/NRP 
election campaign by speaking at an election meeting in 
Westville on the eve of the voting day. (92) 
The National Party won convincingly in Natal. They lost 
only one seat to the PFP while gaining three previously held 
90 Welsh (1987), p 96; Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 
May 1988 
91 Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 May 1988 
92 Natal Mercury, 5 May 1987 
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by the Party in Natal. In addition they won three NRP 
seats. It is most likely that previous NRP voters had given 
their votes to the NP in the face of the black domination 
and security threat fears of the National Party. The NRP in 
Natal, as was the case with Natal United Party, was a 
conservative formation more inclined to the authoritarian 
and racist stances of the National Party than the PFP' s 
liberalism. 
The 1987 elections proved to be a severe setback for the 
Party from which it would never recover. It deepened the 
rift within the PFP over future direction in the context of 
popular resistance on the one hand and government policy on 
the other. 
THE POST-ELECTION MALAISE: 
The year after the 1987 elections was one of the most 
difficult ih the Party's history. Pressures which had been 
building over the course of the preceding decade came to a 
head with an intense debate in the Party as to its future 
direction, and ultimately the resignations of a number of 
important members. The Party emerged from the period 
retreating from its previous desire to engage with the 
liberation movement. It assumed a position which stressed 
its centrism and there was a return to an emphasis on the 
Party's "liberal values". In essence this was an assertion 
of a more overtly class-conscious liberalism. 
The grand plans that the Party had of becoming a power 
broker within South African politics lay tattered at the 
backdoor of the May election in 1987. PFP sympathetic 
newspapers in their response to the poor showing of the 
Party at the polls stressed the need for it to return to a 
more traditional mode of operation. Stating that the 
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192 
Party's election strategy had been a "spectacular failure", 
the Cape Times went on to suggest that 
"to revert to a Suzman-style function as a voice 
for civil liberties is well within the PFP's range 
and can be effectively sustained by the Party's 
traditional and impregnable constituency in upper-
income areas. As it seems to be a futile endeavor 
to broaden the Party's base of support among 
whites in current circumstances, the road ahead is 
plain enough as a civil rights lobby. At the same 
time existing contacts in the black community 
should be further developed and fostered" (93) 
In its attempts to contain the damage suffered during the 
elections the Party stressed its Parliamentary role. The 
Federal Council resolved to consolidate its work in the 
House of Assembly, while Eglin emphasised the Party's role 
in eliciting information and highlighting abuses of human 
and civil rights. ( 94) The fact that the Party was no 
longer the Official Opposition meant, as· well, that it had 
to work that much harder at being heard within Parliament. 
The rise of the Conservative Party also led to the PFP 
needing, according to Eglin, to "counter the negative impact 
of the CP, opposing them at every turn". (95) For Eglin it 
was like a "bad dream" that the Official Opposition was now 
to the right of government. (96) 
The emphasis on the Party's role in Parliament was in large 
measure a knee jerk reaction to mounting criticisms by the 
liberation movement. Long standing pressures from the 
extra-Parliamentary movement once more weighed on the Party 
after the elections. The UDF made an appeal to the PFP to 
withdraw from participation in Parliament. () A UDF 
National Conference resolution also called for the 
dissolution of the House of Representatives and that of 
93 Cape Times, 18 May 1987 
94 Argus, 20 June 1987, and 15 June 1987 
95 ibid 
96 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1987/8, p 763 
97 Cape Times, 4 June 1987 
Delegates. Archbishop Desmond Tutu also urged the Party "to 
get out of Parliament" since its participation in the 
tricameral system gave "the world the impression that we 
have a multi-party democracy when it is now quite clear we 
have a total charade." () The more moderate leader of the 
National African Chamber of Commerce Sam Motsuenyane also 
added his voice to the criticisms of the PFP. 
with accurate foresight that 
He warned 
"more and more the PFP will become redundant. I 
think the PFP will persist in their weakened 
·position until they are finally liquidated by 
history. The credibility of the PFP among blacks 
is going to diminish, although, in fairness, the 
Party has articulated some black aspirations very 
strongly." (99) 
The election defeat, together with criticisms from black 
leaders both encouraged and coincided with an existential 




there was a deep soul searching within 
more generally. (100) Many staunchly 
liberal members of the Party were increasing viewing their 
position as being under attack by the repressive nature of 
the state in which the tradition of white democracy had been 
sacrificed to the machinations of the National Security 
Management System; while to the left there was the 
perception that while there was the shared perspective of 
opposition to apartheid, common ground ended there. The 
intensification of armed struggle, and in particular the 
bombing of soft targets, led to a view which perceived the 
prospect of tyranny arising from the left in future. The 
conclusion that many liberals were drawing was that the 
Party needed to reflect their opposition, not only to 
apartheid, but also to ideologies of the left which were 
98 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1987/8, p 763 
9.9 Argus, 20 June 1987 
100 See the chapter introduction for a discussion on the 
debate among liberals in the 1980s. 
viewed as holding the seeds of tyranny. They wanted a 
firmer statement of the Party's commitment to liberal values 
and ideals. In particular, there was a stress on the 
economic aspects of free enterprise and private property. 
This amounted to a class-conscious centrist liberalism. 
This would require a distancing not only from the apartheid 
state, but also from the liberation movement to the extent 
that these forces departed from the values of the Party. 
ISOLATION OF THE LEFT 
Individuals to the left of the Party did not welc.ome the 
retreat to a centrist liberalism. They had been drawn into 
a new mode of politics by their increasing contact and 
participation in the activities of the liberation movement. 
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The emerging conflict came to a head when, in July 1987_, V 
three leading left wingers within the Party joined anf }pA:s~ \,/" 
sponsored meeting with the ANC in Dakkar, Senegal. ~ 
three - Party Chairman ~Peter Gas trow, Greytown MP :Pierre 
Cronje, and President's Councillor 'Pieter Schoem1n - were 
subsequently subjected to intensive criticism by most 
leading PFP members for their participation in the trip 
which had been led by the former leader of the Party Van Zyl 
Slabbert. 
The Dakar meeting was a very high profile event and had 
elicited a storm of condemnation from the government. The 
participation of PFP members in the trip had, therefore, 
given further ammunition to the Party's conservative 
opponents. The response from within the Party had as much 
to do with the damage such an identification would have on 
the Party, as with the fact that the three had participated 
without Party permission. The bulk of the criticism 
levelled at Gastrow, Cronje and Schoeman relateq to the 
latter procedural matter. The behavior of the three was 
considered unacceptable by · the Federal Executive which 
agreed that 
"no public representative or senior office bearer 
of the Party should accept politically sensitive 
invitations without timeous prior consultation 
with the leader who will determine what acceptance 
procedures may be appropriate in each case." (101) 
In addition the three were forced to apologise 
actions and expressed regret at not discussing 





caucus furthermore issued a hard-hitting statement which 
clearly distanced itself from the ANC. The caucus resolved 
that 
"while the PFP is opposed to apartheid and will 
continue to strive for its abolition, and wishes 
to bring about a democratic government in South 
Africa with constitutional, social and economic 
concepts which accord with recognised Western 
liberal principles, its policies differ 
fundamentally in many respects from those of the 
ANC and, even more importantly, also differ in 
regard to the means to be used to achieve change." 
(103) 
The fqrmal Party response to the Dakar visit, therefore, 
amounted to a slapping down of the left in the Party. Not 
only did the Party reiterate its distance from the ANC while 
stressing its commitment to liberal values, but it also 
instituted a procedural mechanism which could limit-....the 
contact of Party members with the liberation movement. Some 
members, such as Harry Schwarz felt more strongly about 
needing to express opposition to the ANC. He called on 
those who had had talks--wi th the ANC to justify why they had 
done so, since in his opinion the ANC was a 
101 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 27 July 1987 
102 Argus, 6 August 1987 
103 Citizen, 7 August 1987 
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machine". ( 104) He said that he was not "prepared to 
negotiate with someone who has an AK47 on the table". (105) 
Colin Eglin was more moderate in his response, although he 
distanced the Party very clearly from the ANC. He said that 
the PFP would talk to anyone in a "blunt, direct manner" but 
that this did not mean that it would seek a cosy arrangement 
with people who espoused terrorism, "whether they called it 
an armed struggle or anything else." (106) 
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The response to the Dakar visit related in the main to the 
retreat from the previous pattern of seeking out extended 
contact with the liberation movement1~- It was -part"-of the ---"\ 
withdrawal to being a party of ce'rrerlst~ liberal ideals ) 
~-==----=-~--,- -"-,_: --,,.·-~ -o-_~.....,_ __ ~ -------··------~..,..~- .. 
distancing itself from both the left and the right. This 
was a consequence of the growth of the liberation movement 
and the threat it posed of unq~_rmining continued capital 
~"'·---- • .,____,.- ~ "• - _,- • 0-- - • _ __, ~-=- • -.-O-"~ _,.--.---. • -=""""= -=·~---=- .,,....-_.,_.- _,___ - -- • - "='=-.~---- ·-~.-,-~---- --.•""~ ~~T ·=~--==--'~-· -=---.....,,.._-=---· --~ 
accfunulation;-- It was also a result of the declining support' 
,/-
\among white voters for the PFP due to its increased contact_-, -
=~oi ::: b~i::::'.:~-':::a:;';~::;:io:s. £_a~;·r=;;~;::=;1~r 
well~tlr~th of new centrist ideologies within the 
capitalist community aimed both at preserving the interests 
of capitalism, and at limiting the militance of the popular 
opposition. Theories of economic growth as facilitator for 
political change reminiscent of the liberal modernisation 
approach of earlier years came to the fore. This 
deveiopment coincided with the upswing in the economy during 
1987 and the consequent business silence on political 
reform. It reflected the broader balance of forces in which 
the liberation movement was on the retreat. Business could 
consequently afford not to engage with popular organisations 
to the degree that it had in the past. 







The left within CPFP was increasingly isolated as the 
centrist liberali~k of the PFP dame to be hegemonic within 
the Party. Over th~--Q~g~our months the Party lost a 
number of its significant left wing members unable to 
reconcile their views with continued membership of the PFP. 
(
. The _first key member to resign was the Claremont MP CJ a~ van 
;Eck: Van Eck argued that he was committed to the overall 
goals of PFP policy, but found that its strategic 
orientation was increasingly at variance with the politics 
of the black community. He said that the Party had becoming 
increasingly loath to shape its vision . of the future 
"through active involvement in the total community" as it 
was afraid to lose the support of conservative white voters. 
(107) He contended that the Party was remaining aloof from 
the struggles and concerns of ordinary black people: 
"It's that aloofness that drove one around the0' 
bend because the belief that you can sit in a 
library, go through all the newspapers, magazines 
and books that are others, write a very nice, 
beautiful analytical liberal speech on liberal 
values, on how they should be preserved; but you 
do not dirty your hands at the bottom." (108) 
Other members of the Party left the Party in sympathy with 
Van Eck's included members in 
Pietermaritzburg, Sj:._e.llenboscll and the youth wing of _ 1:.he 
Party in the~-~~~~ ( 109) Shortly before (v~n.·~-i~k' s 
resignation, the Party's Western Cape regional dire'cl:or left 




members who went to Dakar were about r.:· ··~ ·''/ .....,._'-
time as \Van Eck, \but decided to 
on heari~--ni~ resignation. 
Cape Times, 17 August 1987 
Interview with Jan van Eck, 29 March 1990 
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Gastrow_, ~~~d-S~1loema~~~ed from the Party to join 
the €.Q!lal De~r-~ Move~n~formed by Wynand Malan. 
( 111) This party had similar policy goals to the PFP 
al though it was not as rooted in the tradition of South 
African liberalism. It laid a greater emphasis on pursuing 
contact with black South Africans, while trying to forge a 
base of support among Afrikaners and disaffected NP 
supporters. Reflecting on his departure from the Party, 
Gastrow said that he was 
"strongly influenced by the events in South Africa 
in 1985 and 1986. For the first time, really, I 
had started to get a feel for what was going on in 
black politics . It wasn't only the Kannemeyer 
Commission. It was also involvement in Natal 
townships. It was the contact I was starting to 
make with political activists and political 
leaders. That whole turmoil which people were 
going through in black politics and which South 
Africa was going through was somehow not being 
experienced within the Party. The Party carried 
on as though nothing was happening while the rest 
of South Africa was shifting and moving and 
clashing and fighting and debating and arguing and 
feeling the crisis situation. That created 
tremendous tensions as far as I am concerned as an 
individual. Somehow it became unreal, but at the 
same time after Slabbert's departure, I was unable 
to put a crisp alternative strategy for the Party. 
I was digesting all these influences. I was 
trying to formulate an alternative in my own 
mind . " ( 112 ) 
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The response of the Party to the Dakar visit, together with, ';./ 
the establishment of the NDM by Malan proved to be the~ 
catalyst which· saw Gastrow and his two colJreagues leave the \ 
Party. It was another tremendous blow to the Party. Not 
only had the PFP lost three public representatives, but also 1 
the Party chairman. Eglin responded by admitting that their \ 
~artur~~·sown confusion in reformist ranks". (113) ~ 
111 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1987/8 p 765 
112 Interview with Peter Gastrow, 28 March 1990 
113 Progress, October 1987 
called their resignation a "self indulgence" which only the 
National Party would benefit from. He further stated that 
they could achieve in the PFP what they aimed for in the 
NDM. (114) This view put by Eglin was, however, unlikely 
given the dominant mood within the Party. There was a 
hardening of positions around a centrist liberal platform. 
This positioning had been formalised in a Party "mission 
statement" completed in August following a round of 
workshops in all regions of the PFP. 
THE "MISSION STATEMENT" 
The mission statement was interesting in that it 
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consolidated the trend of centrist liberalism which had been 
somewhat unclear over the preceding period. The centrism of 
this period differed from that under Slabbert in that it did 
not tolerate "soppy" non-racialism. It would not seek non-~ 
racial contact to satisfy emotional compulsions. Rather i~ 
adopted a harder edged approach which sought to promot.e 
clearer class interests. Non-racial contact and strategies 
would be selectively determined on the basis of this 
objective. 
Under Slabbert the strong assertion of centrism had been 
undermined by various pressures acting on the Party. The 
growth of the left within the Party had had a crucial 
\ 
impact. The departure of the main left-wingers during 198v 
had cleared the way for an unbridled hegemony by ~s_,_l 
With the core of the PFP weakened and in retreat the 
"mission statement" set out to make a strong statement of 
the liberal philosophy of individualism. The statement said 
that at the heart of the PFP's existence was 
114 ibid 
"the simple yet basic philosophy, i.e. that it is 
not the group, or the section, or the class, or 
the system, but the individual human being that is 
the touchstone of value in society" (115) 
As a corollary of this belief the document then restated the 
Party's commitment to a non-racial democracy "where 
Government and society respected the fundamental human 
rights and dignity of the individual citizen". (116) The 
statement went on to argue that this philo8-ophy and 
commitment positioned the Party as a centrist body in the 
scheme of South African political society, consciously 
distancing itself from other fundamental groups: 
"The PFP is positioned firmly at the centre of the 
broad spectrum of South African politics. From 
there it will lead while rejecting the racists, 
the Marxists and other extremists at both ends of 
the political spectrum." (117) 
Elsewhere in the document a similar statement of a 
"centrist" positioning is made which sought to distance the 
Party from the "violence" of "revolution" and "repression". 
The Party believed that the majority of the country's people 
supported this view: 
"The PFP refuses to believe that the only options 
facing South Africans are to join the forces of 
repression and the forces of revolution. 
"These options the 'laager' option and the 
'showdown' option - may reflect the despair of 
many South African. But they do not reflect the 
hopes, the aspirations or the desires of the vast 
majority of our people. 
"Millions of ordinary South Africans of 
languages and creeds desperately want 
violence. They are prepared to share. 
to live in peace. 
all races, 
an end to 
They want 
115 Eglin, Colin 
Option'", PFP, 22 
116 ibid 




"The PFP has a duty to show to this divided nation 
that there is another way. It has to persuade the 
people of this country that the third option -
'negotiation option' - is the one that offers real 
hope for the future." (118) 
A consequence of its rejection of violence and commitment to 
a negotiated resolution of the country' conflict was both to 
strengthen the 
"middle ground in South African politics where 
millions of South Africans share the PFP's basic 
philosophy and its vision for the future" 
and engage 
"those on both sides of our rapidly polarising 
political society who do not share the PFP' s 
philosophy or vision in order to promote that 
philosophy and vision and to persuade people that 
negotiation is the alternative to violence." (119) 
--JI In a speech to the 1987 Cape Provincial Party congress, Cape 
~ leader Roger Hulley described this positioning. He said 
that in the face of violent polarisation within the country 
which presented two options - repression or revolution - it 
was the PFP' s duty to strive for a "third option of a 
negotiated non-racial democracy". ( 120) This meant that 
the Party had to talk to anyone in the interests of peace, 
while also condemning all violence "for or against the 
oppressed". To deny this "third option" was tantamount to 
promoting polarisation and a civil war. (121) 
The theme of opposition to violence proved to be a central 
aspect. In announcing the mission statement Party Chairman 
Ken Andrew said, 
118 ibid 
119 ibid 
120 Progress, December 1987 
121 ibid 
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"Whatever may be said about the need for security 
in the short term, surely no-one wishes to see 
rule by military force in perpetuity. At the same 
time we see activities aimed at the overthrow of 
the state by violence. These must be rejected 
likewise, for both moral and practical reasons." 
(122) 
Leading Party members also asserted that the centrist 
position of the Party needed to be strongly stated. Said 
the leader of the Party in the Johannesburg City Council 
Tony Leon, 
"The middle ground is not going to be preserved by 
mere occupation. The hard edges of the centre 
need to be defined. The guiding philosophy of the 
Party is very simple: to allow each individual the 
maximum amount of freedom, drawing a line where 
such freedom conflicts with the rights of others." 
(123) 
The strong assertion of liberal values which accompanied the 
release of the Mission Statement was linked to the Party's 
contention that it occupied the centre of South African 
politics. Leading Party members argued that a centrist view 
was the dominant one in society and coincided with a liberal 
democratic outlook. Said David Welsh in a keynote address 
to the Cape PFP Congress in 1987: 
"You will find that middle-grounders span the 
political spectrum from elements inside the NP to 
the ANC. They don't agree on every aspect of 
future policy, but they are united by a common 
fear of the abyss of racial war, and a belief that 
reasonable people arbitrate their differences 
through democratic Parliamentary institutions. 11 
(124) 
Significant to the context of these developments was the 
Party's increased comfort with an explicitly class-based 
122 Argus, 22 August 1987 
123 Sundav Times, 17 April 1988 
124 Progress, December 1987 
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politics. In the late seventies and early eighties an 
avowed identification to a bourgeois class project could be 
perceived as racist on account of the very small black 
bourgeoisie and aspirant bourgeoisie. This was no I:onger 
the case given the rise of black middle and entrepreneurial 
classes in the eighties, a process encouraged by the state 
and big capital. Consequently, a class-politics could no 
longer be decried as racist. 
This theme of a common cornrni tment to liberal values was 
essential in the thinking around the "mission statement". 
According to Ken Andrew the first task for the Party was to 
win support for the PFP's "essential values". In the longer 
term this could be developed into a "broad-based South 
African movement which can restore peace and build 
prosperity". (125) In a similar vein the Natal Party leader 
Ray Swart believ·ed that 
"the role of the PFP must be emphasised in 
Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary politics 
because it is primarily the role of a bearer of 
standards and it is vital that these standards are 
kept aloft in South Africa at the present time." 
(126) 
The fact that liberalism and liberal ideals were perceived 
to be under attack at the time pr.oved to be a spur 
motivating the PFP. According to Eglin the attack on 
liberal values did not make them 
"any less important. In fact, it makes it even 
more important for people to stand up for these 
values so that, when apartheid is gone, they will 
still be there to help build a new South Africa on 
the basis of equal rights , individual freedom and 
the rule of law." (127) 
125 Argus, 22 August 1987 
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The assertion of liberalism coincided with the left being 
ousted from the increasing influence it had been having on 
the Party. The primary commitment to liberalism allowed the 
Party to maintain its independence of both the left and the 
right. In effect it marked the start of a consolidation by 
centrist elements within the party. The pattern of not 
criticising the liberation movement for fear of losing vital 
contacts was also diminished. It also allowed the Party to 
be rid of what Tony Leon termed "fellow-travellers" in the 
sense that they were not "committed to any form of liberal 
democracy". For this group, argued Leon, the Party 
"was just a vehicle, a cover for their own anguish 
against the government and they really had no 
role. They really never had a pro-active belief 
in a liberal party. They were there simply 
because it was an attack on the government." (128) 
The effect of this stance was that the Party took a harder 
line than previously in respect to its relationship with the 
liberation movement. Harry Schwarz put this view most 
strongly when he said: 
"There is no instant solutions and quick fixes. 
Nor is strength to be obtained by alliances with 
those whose methods and objectives differ from 
those of the PFP. 
"Common opposition to apartheid cannot be allowed 
to put the Party into bed with revolutionaries who 
seek violent methods to overthrow the state. 
"The choice of political processes is 
negotiation, revolution or reaction. The end 
results of such processes are Western-style 
democracy, one-party leftist tyranny or permanent 
conflict. 
"Those who believe in a peaceful process leading 
to a Western-style democratic government not only 
can, but should be together. 
128 Interview with Tony Leon, 27 March 1990 
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"All the rest the reactionaries, the 
revolutionaries and those who reject Western 
political and economic systems - are the PFP' s 
political opponents." (129) 
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The view adopted by Schwarz was the strongest held within 
the Party. The dominant approach in the Southern Transvaal, 
fast becoming the political centre of the Party, was similar 
however. The regional leader of the PFP Douglas Gibson said· 
that 
"the people in the PFP don; t have such a burning 
desire to have the approval or the good wishes of 
the UDF as they used to." (130) 
While this was the main current in PFP thinking there was at 
the same time the objective of engaging with the liberation 
movement in the hope of getting it to shift to a more 
moderate positioning. This involved repairing diplomatic 
damage from the past, a task seriously undertaken by the 
Southern Transvaal Party, especially with white radical 
groups. (131) Differences with the UDF were seen to rest in 
the style of politics it pursued - characterised as protest 
politics and it strategic opposition to participation 
within the tricameral system and to negotiations at that 
time. Colin Eglin argued that if the tactical issue of 
participation ceased to be a point of disagreement "there 
could be greater areas of agreement". ( 132) Similarly 
Gibson argued that the Party had to "make sure they (the UDF 
- DS) operate within the mainstream" and "try to do whatever 
one can to force the various parties in the direction of 
negotiation with each other". (133) 
129 Sunday Times, 31 January 1988 
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The "mission statement" defined the Party's role in the 
"wider political arena" as being rooted in its role in 
Parliament. It acknowledged that 
"Parliament is not the only site in 
South African arena where political 
influence are expressed." (134) 
the wider 
power and 
It followed, said the statement, that if the Party were to 
use its base in Parliament effectively it would have to be 
relevant to all South Africans. The document then set out 
five extra-Parliamentary tasks for the Party. These were to 
"(1) be involved, wherever it can, with 
communities and in particular expand and improve 
its negotiating, mediating , monitoring and 
awareness ~ctivities; 
" ( 2) build bridges of mutual trust across the 
racial divide; 
"(3) identify with the plight of those South 
Africans who are denied fundamental rights; 
"(4) co-operate with the individuals and 
organisations that share our philosophy, our 
vision and our commitment to non-violent change; 
"(5) engage and interact with others in order to 
reduce the level of violence and raise the 
prospect of negotiation." (135) 
At the time of the adoption of the "mission statement" the 
Party had learnt the hard lessons of its earlier outreach 
campaign. The Party was not about to set out to compete 
with organisations operating within the extra-Parliamentary 
terrain. Colin Eglin said in the pages of the Party 
newspaper Progress, that the PFP could not simply go out and 
recruit black members as this would lead to it running into 
conflict with other organisations "who see you as a 
134 Eglin, Colin "Mission Statement: 'The Negotiation 
Option'", PFP, 22 August 1987 
135 ibid 
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competitor". ( 136) It was therefore more important to 
establish trust and credibility at the grassroots and 
leadership levels within black communities. He further 
stressed that it was necessary to do this at the level of 
individual communities since this was the way in which the 
extra-Parliamentary groups worked. The primary means for 
this was through the Party's monitoring and support work 
through the UMACs. Through these committees it was the aim 
for the Party to not just be 
"a third party watching others scrapping it out. 
It is actual involvement to try to avert the 
conflict." (137) 
The Party's federal executive took a decision to upgrade the 
work of the UMACs and mandated the Party's National Director 
Neil Ross · to travel around the country improving the 
organisation of the committees. (138) 
Despite the intentions of the Party in the extra-
Parliamentary sphere, the weak organisational condition of 
the Party as well as an emphasis on its work in the white 
community meant that there was not a great spurt in work in 
black communities. Said Brian Goodall in May 1988, 
"We are systematically trying to improve 
relationships with the black community. I think 
at the present moment it is a low priority for the 
very simple reason that the first priority is in 
fact to try and re-establish a power base within 
the white community; because if you have no 
credibility within the white community, you are 
going to have no credibility within the 'black 
community as· a political force. There I think you 
have got a slower process." (139) 
136 Progress, October 1987 
137 ibid 
138 Sunday Times, 23 August 1987 
139 Interview with Brian Goodall, 23 May 1988 
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In effect the party toned down its extra-Parliamentar 
to concentrate on the Parliamentary context. 
interview Czach de Beer denied that the party ·,- -
- -----~,.-~ 
"retreating" from 1t:s eX:tra-Parli'anfen~tny role, 
acknowledged that there had 
"been a considerable diminution of such activity. 
Of course, personalities count in this thing. We 
must find all the time, energy and money that we 
can devote in the extra-Parliamentary area·. But 
what the PFP has been doing for the last year is 
fighting for its life. It has only been able to 
handle that which was its immediate priority, and 
that was in the electoral area." (140) 
As has been stated, leading Party members were also more 
outspoken in their opposition to the liberation movement, a 
course of action not favourable to an improvement of 
relationships if this in fact was what was desired. Dave 
Dalling criticised the UDF for having "little to show" for 
all its struggles. He said that it was time for it to get 
involved in the tricameral system: 
"While the UDF elects to stay politically pure and 
aloof, others will dictate the future. The 
message to the UDF is that it must get involved." 
(141) 
The UDF rejected Dalling's statement saying that the PFP was 
"preoccupied with criticising the democratic movement." 
(142) 
Just as the Party adopted a harder edged approach to the 
liberation movement while seeking to engage with it, it also 
took a vacillating approach to the ruling National Party. 
The Party remained uncompromisingly opposed to apartheid as 
well as to the state's militarism and cooptive approach to 
140 Leadership, 7 (3) 1988 
141 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1987/8, p 766 
142 ibid 
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negotiations. The PFP expressed strong opposi tion ___ J:o the 
existence and operation of the National Security Mana~~ 
System. It also opposed the National Council Bill, ~ 
government's proposed forum for negotiations as not 
providing for all. The Party would not simply support any 
·approach to negotiation. Eglin contended that if the 
government proceeded 
"to set up negotiating machinery that is not fully 
representative, not only will its efforts fail, 
but the process of negotiation will be set back 
still further." (143) 
Yet, while the Party continued to oppose government policy, 
it considered that it may need to come to the NP's 
assistance if the regime were threatened by the Conservative 
Party. The PFP centrism and opposition to the left and 
right, therefore, accepted that it may need to vote with the 
government in Parliament. (144) 
In terms of the Party's ·approach to its participation in 
Parliament the "mission statement" stressed that it should 
be a custodian of liberal values. It was also to play the 
role of preparing white voters for change. This aspect of 
.the policy was stressed by Robin Carlisle in a speech to the 
Five Freedoms Forum conference in Johannesburg in September 
1987. He argued that the decisive group who could 
facilitate change were white South Africans, and that 
"the central obstacle to a non-racial future lies 
not with blacks but with the whites of South 
Africa." (145) 
He rejected the possibility of a revolutionary overthrow of 
the government or that the government could be pressurised 
143 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1987/8 p 765 
144 Business Day, 18 April 1988 
145 Five Freedoms Forum (1988), p 32 
into bringing about change. The only viable strategy was to 
bring about a change in government through resort to the 
Parliamentary process, particularly through the House of 
Assembly. It followed that 
"the principal role of the PFP in Parliament as. a 
force for change lies squarely in bringing about 
changes in white attitudes and the change of 
· government that must inevitably follow if this 
change in attitude was successful. Every white 
who is persuaded to believe in non-racialism 
lowers the obstacle we face." (146) 
In addition to the above, the Party also set itself the task 
of strengthening its support base and winning back seats it 
had lost in the 1987 elections. 
The PFP was more concerned with forging unity among the 
divided opposition within Parliament than establishing 
contacts with the liberation movement. In answering a 
question about the PFP' s extra-Parliamentary role at the 
time, Colin Eglin acknowledged the need for work in this 
broader context, but contended that the Party's 
"basic platform is a Parliamentary one and within 
this it has to reach out to others who share its 
values and objectives. Greater cohesion is needed 
among these Parliamentary groups for them to have 
greater impact." (147) 
The backlash against engagement with the liberation movement 
was almost complete. Over the next year - the final one in 
the history of the Party - all efforts went into forging 
unity within the Parliamentary context to the exclusion of 
forging a broader role. 
146 ibid 




1987 - 1989 
INTRODUCTION 
The period covered by this chapter saw the ultimate 
dissolution of the PFP as it became part of a new and bigger 
reformist formation the Democratic Party. This 
development represented the eventual outcome of the 
overwhelming drift within the Party towards an assertive 
class-conscious liberalism. It represented, as well, a 
resurgence of reformist thinking within the dominated 
classes generally, and in the business community more 
specifically. This development came in the wake of the 
conjuncture manifesting conditions of deepening crisis 
illustrated by economic decline, the further failure of 
state reform initiatives, and liberation movement 
resilience. 
In early 1988 the economy experienced a "mini boom" which 
had the effect of stimulating imports. This gave rise to 
new balance of payments crisis, with a deficit being posted 
for the first time since 1986. Associated with a decline in 
the gold. price and the rising ef feet of sanctions urgent 
measures were called for. An indication of the impact of 
sanctions could be seen in a US government report which 
stated that statutory economic isolation had cost South 
Africa R850 million in exports to the USA alone, as well as 
the sale of RSO million in South African stocks by American 
interests. The report also indicated a decline in exports 
to South Africa's other trading partners. (1) 
1 Niddrie (1988), p 53 
In an effort to still the balance of payments turmoil 
government was f creed to draw on crucial foreign exchange 
and gold reserves. These stood at $2,17 billion in August 
1988, a decline of 35% on the figure for August of the 
previous year. (2) This deteriorating position was a major 
cause for concern for the state and business community since 
there had been a massive slow down in the flow of capital 
into the country meaning that current account deficits could 
not be financed through the capital account. New import 
surcharges were announced in September 1988 in an attempt to 
limit the flow of funds from the country. 
Increasing emphasis came to be placed on generating growth 
through domestic consumption. Much discussion went into the 
development of the informal business sector, with increased 
attention being focussed on deregulation measures. The 
prospects for a rising black middle class to emerge out of 
the ranks of taxi owners, hawkers and skilled artisans, and 
other entrepreneurs was constantly promoted. Privatisation 
was also placed higher on the government agenda in an effort 
to raise windfalls for the depleted fiscus. 
A further important development during 1988 was the 
relocation off shore of significant interests held by such 
leading South African companies as Anglo American, Liberty 
Life, and Rembrandt. This was an important sign of a lack 
of confidence in the future of the country by leading 
elements within the business community. This disease was 
also manifested in a discomfort by businessmen with the 
continued inability of the regime to successfully implement 
political reform. In August 1988 the country's two elder 
statesmen of the business community, Harry Oppenheimer and 
Anton Rupert, issued a joint statement on behalf of the 
Urban Foundation decrying the fact that government did not 




scrap the Group Areas Act, rather than simply reforming an 
aspect of it as it was at that time attempting to do. (3) 
The FCI, in September 1988, called for urgent deregulation 
of the economy to remove racial restrictions. (4) 
An important political development in the business community 
was the formation in 1988 of the Consultative Business 
Movement following a meeting in August 1988 between business 
leaders and representatives of the liberation movement. (5) 
The meeting was a significant shift away from the 
conservative tone which had dominated business political 
thinking since the implementation of the July 1986 state of 
emergency. While many major businessmen were not at first 
represented in the CBM, its formation was a significant 
marker of a shift in business political thinking. It 
illustrated the rising tide of discomfort with the state's 
efforts, and the need to look elsewhere for solutions to the 
country's problems. 
An important contributor to this shift towards a greater 
reformism within the business community was the progressive 
failure of government's cooptive reform initiatives, and the 
effective breaking down of apartheid. From the time of the 
declaration of the state of emergency government had 
followed a three part programme which attempted: firstly to 
destroy the liberation movement through extensive 
repression; secondly 
resources to black 
to redistribute essential social 
communities through "upgrading" 
programmes in an effort to remove points of popular 
antagonism and to raise the credibility of the Black Local 
Authorities; and, thirdly in order of priority, the state 
sought ways of extending political rights to Africans. 
3 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1988/9, p 590 
4 ibid, p 591 
5 See Du Preez, Evans and Grealy (1988) for a detailed 
report and discussion of this conference. 
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many other popular 
organisations in February. Cosatu was restricted from 
engaging in political activities . Detentions increased in 
the run up to the October elections, there was an increase 
in political trials, and also the development bf "informal" 
repression in the form of vigilantism. 
The state, in an effort to take the initiative in much 
called for negotiations, set about establishing an National 
Statutory Council which would be a forum for talks with 
representatives of state structures in the bantustans and in 
the townships. As this initiative would exclude major black 
political groups it was rejected by most moderate and 
radical black political groups. The state had hoped that 
the· Black Local Authority election of October 1988 would 
increase the legitimacy of these structures, as well as 
provide a source for negotiating partners. Extensive 
resources went into promoting these elections. However, 
despite repression, the liberation movement managed to. 
mobilise the popular classes to reject these structures by 
boycotting the elections. Only 10% of eligible African 
voters took part in the poll. As a result the state's 
attempts at political reform stood in tatters by late 1988. 
In addition, the limitations placed by the country's poor 
economic performance provided an inadequate fiscal basis for 
township upgrading schemes. The state was also further 
placed on the defensive by the effective breaking down of 
apartheid. A trend which became particularly evident during 
1988 was the development of de facto racially mixed areas. 
The state was forced to acknowledge these through allowing 
for "free settlement areas". While this was not a complete 
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move away from a cornerstone of apartheid, it represented a 
major chink in its armour. 
The war in Angola proved to be militarily undermining and 
financially draining on the state. The combined impact of 
Angolan government and Cuban forces stopped the SADF's 
advances in that country. The South African government was 
forced to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the war and to 
commit itself from withdrawing from both Angola and Namibia. 
The combined impact of these pressures and failures led to 
increased divisions and conflicts in the ranks of the state 
and the ruling National Party. Adding to the pressure was a 
threat from the right illustrated by the successes of the 
Conservative Party in two Transvaal by-election victories in 
March 1988 and in the October municipal elections in which 
it won control of more than two-thirds of the municipalities 
in the Transvaal. 
massive growth, 
( 6 ) 
as 
The Conservative Party also claimed 
did the neo-f ascist Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging. This growth was a manifestation of the 
fears among the Afrikaans lower middle and working classes 
that apartheid, which had provided for their development, 
was faltering and that they would lose their position of 
racial privilege. 
The divisions within the ruling group manifested itself in a 
number of ways. The Broederbond, historically a key policy 
development forum for the National Party, had been moving 
away from the notion of racial segregation since 1986. The 
activation of the emergency state, the shift to executive 
rule and the increased authority of the repressive 
apparatuses of the state had limited the impact of these 
policy shifts. The incumbents within the state were at odds 
with this more enlightened thinking. The collapse of 
6 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1988/9, p 656 
apartheid, the success of negotiations in Angola, and a 
rising wave of reformism within the busi.ness community 
caused many within the state to reassess the direction being 
followed. Throughout the period covered by this chapter 
there was growth in this debate without any clear 
resolution. 
The apparent inability of the NP to deal with the crisis led 
to many reformists within the dominating classes looking 
elsewhere for a solution. The growth of the Independent 
Party was evidence of this. The IP advocated a strong 
reformist programme of change from above, as well as a 
commitment to free market ideologies. It sought close ties 
with other centrist groups, most notably Inkatha. The IP 
was formed after the 'independent movement" of exiles from 
the National Party could not agree· on a common approach. 
The other main group was the National Democratic Movement 
which sought broader non-racial contact than the IP, and 
pursued social democratic economic policies. 
For the PFP this period was characterised by a determined 
effort to forge centrist unity. In the context of a 
weakened and divided National Party, a weakening of the 
liberation movement in the face of repression, and a 
resurgence of reformist thinking within the dominating 
classes, the Party sought to advance a brand of class-
conscious liberalism. This chapter explores these attempts, 
most notably efforts to cooperate with coloured and Indian 
parties in Parliament, as well as with the white opposition 
parties. The latter development led ultimately to the 
dissolution of the PFP and the formation of the Democratic 
Party. 
Another theme explored is that of the Party not being 
entirely homogeneous. A residual left wing - especially 
within the youth wing of the PFP and in the Western Cape -
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remained. It made its presence felt especially in debates 
on defence policy. 
The most important development within this period, however, 
was the eventual consolidation of the centrist trend within 
the Party. This was manifested in a shift of the centre of 
Party power to the Southern Transvaal, the resignation of 
Colin Eglin as leader, and his replacement by a major 
industrialist, Zach de Beer. The change in leadership paved 
the way to unity between the PFP, IP and NDM. The formation 
of the DP was the culmination of this process, although 
there were fears from within the PFP that the new party 
would be less committed to liberalism than the PFP. This 
illustrated a tension within the centrist discourse of the 
PFP between a commitment to a class-conscious programme 
which would ensure unity of the major reformist groupings; 
and, a residual attachment to the non-class aspects of the 
liberal discourse, e.g. civil rights, which it was feared 
would be·waylayed by the new Party. 
The chapter explores these issues in the following sections: 
an examination of Colin Eglin's attempts to cooperate with 
coloured and Indian parties, the decision to participate in 
the House of Representatives and House of Delegates, as well 
as his inability to forge unity with the white . groups; 
debate on security policy; the rise of the Southern 
Transvaal Party and its campaign to take over power in the 
Johannesburg City Council; and, the ascendance of Zach de 
Beer to the leadership and the ultimate dissolution of the 
PFP and the formation of the Democratic Party. 
In the midst of a desperate weakness in its popular support 
and organisational ability the Party set about the task of 
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attempting to forge broad centrist unity in accordance with 
the objectives set under Colin Eglin's leadership. It 
sought to unite the disparate white political parties to the 
left of government. It also attempted to investigate 
possibilities for co-operation with parties in the coloured 
and Indian Houses of Parliament. 
The Party's Federal Council in November 1987 agreed that the 
leadership should seek ways of building opposition unity. 
The resolution called for the formation of a group which 
would have the task of 
"investigating what common values, principles and 
areas of concern may exist between opposition 
groups in order to make recommendations furthering 
these values. " ( 7) 
Over the year that followed PFP leaders conducted extensive 
talks with the parties in Parliament. They did so despite 
the Party's previous hesitance in engaging in the politics 
of the coloured and Indian Houses of Parliament. These new 
developments represented a consolidation of the anti-left 
centrist trend in the PFP. After initiating contact with 
the Labour Party, Progressive Reform Party and Solidarity on 
the possibility of greater co-operation, Eglin informed the 
Party's Federal Executive that it would in the PFP's 
interests to align with members of the other Houses. He 
warned, however, that this would be a "tricky" exercise, but 
was given a mandate to deal with the situation as it 
developed. (8) 
In February 1988 the Party decided that the time was 
appropriate for the PFP to participate in the other two 
Houses. The stated purpose of this departure was to 
7 Minutes of PFP Federal Council, 21/22 November 1987 
8 Minutes of PFP ·Federal Executive, 31 January 1988 
"fight apartheid and 





and · non-racial 
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a comprehensive centrist political 
PFP members saw as potentially 
incorporating a range of incrementalist organisations which 
included the PFP, the NDM and "independents" from the white 
arena, the Labour Party, Progressive Reform Party and 
Solidarity from the other Houses, Inkatha and other moderate 
African groups, as well as less militant elements from the 
liberation movement. This was set against the background of 
a weakened liberation movement and divided National Party. 
Said Zach de Beer in May 1988: 
"If you take the hypothetical centre of the white 
community and the hypothetical centre of the black 
community, the gap between them is very wide; the 
art of compromise between them very narrow. If 
you take that portion of the white community which 
is most liberal, and that portion of the black 
community which is most conservative, then there 
is very little gap in ideological thinking ... so, 
take this twenty percent of the whites and this 
twenty or thirty percent of the blacks, then the 
task is not so difficult." (10) 
This objective was later developed in a Federal Executive 
resolution as the 
"development of a broadly-based 'middle-ground' 
democratic movement or alliance, including both 
Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary groupings." 
( 11) 
Here we see the consolidation of what was perceived as an 
increasingly legitimate class politics which changed 
conditions had facilitated. These developments played 
9 Minutes of PFP Federal Council, 20/21 February 1988 
10 · Interview with Zach de Beer, 18 May 1988 
11 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 18 November 1988 
themselves out against a rising conservatism within the 
business c~mmunity. In effect the Party put all its 
energies into forging unity among the Parliamentary groups. 
Part of the process of reaching this objective was the 
forging of co-operative relationships with, in particular, 
the Labour Party and in the House of Representatives, and 
the Progressive Reform Party in the House of Delegates. 
In March 1988 after several meetings Eglin and the LP Leader 
Alan Hendrickse agreed that their parties would co-operate 
practically "on issues of common interest". ( 12) This 
implied co-operating in opposing the government's apartheid 
policies in joint committees and elsewhere in Parliament. 
The co-operation with the Labour Party was possible because 
of a number of factors. These included the increased 
profile and staunch opposition of the LP to government 
initiative over the previous year. This included walking 
out of Parliament in protest at the government's National 
Council Bill; an act of civil disobedience when Hendrickse 
and other Party members swam at a whites-only beach in 
protest at petty apartheid, and the consequent dressing down 
of Hendrickse by State President Botha which led to the LP 
leader leaving the cabinet. At the end of 1987 Hendrickse's 
high profile in the business community was rewarded by him 
being made the Financial Mail's "man of the year". (13) 
In the context of a liberation movement struggling to regain 
its feet after suffering severe blows inflicted by the state 
of emergency, Hendrickse' s actions were seen as a 
sufficiently militant alternative for a PFP seeking to win 
support in the black community. The PFP, as well, was no 
longer seeking to be on close terms with the liberation 
12 Beeld, 4 March 1988 
13 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1987/8 
p 738-742 
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movement which was vehemently opposed to the Labour Party. 
The latter was perceived by the liberation movement to be 
giving legitimacy to the government's reform initiatives. 
The LP's prominent opposition to government policies while 
still participating in the "system" accorded with the 
emerging dominant view within the PFP which pursued full 
participation in the constitutional process, while at the 
same time forging a centrist unity in opposition both to the 
regime and to the liberation movement. Said Zach de Beer: 
"Until Hendrickse left the cabinet, the general 
feeling in the PFP was that we wouldn't touch the 
coloured elections with a barge pole. Now people 
are inclined to say we would." (14) 
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Despite ongoing statements of the intention to engage with 
organisations in the liberation movement, there was 
generally a slowing down in this activity at the time. (15) 
The bulk of the PFP' s energies went into forging a united 
front in Parliament. It was the stated goal of the PFP to 
try and alter the strategic direction of the liberation 
movement, or alternatively to isolate it, which served to 
distance it from resistance organisations. This distance 
was reinforced by the view that an alliance with a popular 
organisation would only be useful if it was based on the 
PFP's liberal philosophies. Commenting at the time on the 
possibility of an alliance with the liberation movement, 
Douglas Gibson argued that it depended very much on what the 
approach of the particular liberatory organisation in 
question was: 
"If they.are radical in the sense of believing in 
blowing up shopping centres and bridges; and, that 
what you have to do is make South Africa 
ungovernable, then there is no possibility 
whatsoever of links and alliances. If it is on 
the basis of political rights and the rule of law,· 
14 Interview with Zach de Beer, 18 May 1988 
15 Interview with Brian Goodall, 23 May 1988 
and the freedom of the individual, and freedom of 
the press, and freedom religion and those things, 
well then with out any doubt at all, there is a 
possibility of an alliance. Any further than 
that, the people who have chosen the violence 
option - I am as opposed to them as a Nationalist 
would be opposed to them - and I don't regard them 
as freedom fighters." (16) 
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Within the Party there was soon the realisation that the 
most that could be gained out of the engagement with the LP 
was a relationship of co-operation. Seeking to forge a 
single party would pose too many difficulties. Among the 
problems identified by Douglas Gibson were language 
differences, differences in economic policy, and the fact 
that the many LP members were probably closer to the 
National Party than the PFP in their political orientation. 
( 1 7 ) Despite these problems the Party maintained ongoing 
co-operation with the LP throughout 1988 even when progress 
in forging unity with the IP and NDM were advanced. (18) 
The situation in relation to the Indian Progressive Reform 
Party (19) was quite different. This Party led by Pat 
Poovalingham and with three MPs in the House of Delegates 
was formed in January 1987 after a breakaway from 
Solidarity. The breakaway had occurred because of the close 
co-operation between Solidarity and Rajbansi's National 
People's Party which was perceived to be too closely linked 
to the government and the system of apartheid. (20) The PRP 
policy platform was very similar to that of the PFP. 
Following discussions between Eglin and the PRP's 
Poovalingham and Mohammed Rajah, both of whom the PFP leader 
found "very impressive", it was decided that the PRP would 
16 Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 May 1988 
17 Ibid, 20 May 1988 
18 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 15 October 1988 
19 Not to be confused with the forerunner of the PFP 
20 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1987/8 p 752-
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disband and its members could apply to join the PFP. ( 21) 
In March 1988 this was done and the three PRP MPs soon 
became PFP members. The Party was now represented in both 
the House of Assembly and the House of Delegates. Ken 
Andrew saw the development as holding enormous potential for 
the PFP: 
"It is an historical occasion, and I am confident 
it is the beginning of a truly non-racial 
Parliamentary-based Party whose impact will be 
considerable on the South African political 
scene." (22) 
Colin Eglin rejected a criticism of the move by Farouk Meer 
of the Natal Indian Congress who argued that the House of 
Delegates had been "totally discredited". ( 23) The PFP 
leader responded by contending that the three Indian MPs 
were "true South Africans" and that the legitimacy of 
participation did not depend on the system, but on how 
individuals behaved within it. 
The PFP also conducted talks with JN Reddy of Solidarity at 
various times, although little came of these. It refused to 
have any contact with the National Peoples' Party. 
While the above efforts were underway the bulk of the 
Party's energy was going into forging unity between the 
white anti-apartheid opposition groups operating within the 
Parliamentary context. Colin Eglin and Zach de Beer took 
primary responsibility for forging contacts with these 
groups starting in September 1987. As well as the stated 
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aim of forging unity in the 
also seeking to stem the 
"middle-ground" , the PFP was · 
flow of its members to the 
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There was also a popular retreat by PFP voters away from 
support for the Party. By mid 1988 the Independent Party -
which was formally launched in March of that year - overtook 
the PFP's level of voter support. Whereas Rapport 
newspaper's poll gave the PFP support among a mere 8,8% of 
the white electorate, the IP received 10, 7% and the NDM 
3, 5%. By comparison the National Party was supported by 
44,4% of whites and the Conservative Party by 18,5%. (24) 
In this context the enormously weakened PFP could ill afford 
to compete with the other white anti-apartheid parties. 
This was described by Tony Leon as an "image problem" that 
he "did not think was actually salvageable". (25) In March 
1988 the Federal Executive concluded that there was no room 
for competing opposition parties. Colin Eglin also 
expressed the fear that if the situation were not "sorted 
out rapidly" the parties would "end up fighting each other". 
( 26) The Party attempted to engage with both the NDM and 
the IP but did not have much success in forging unity until 
late 1988. 
There was a distinction in the approaches to the two 
parties. The NDM was formed in October 1987 amidst the 
resignations of key PFP members who were founders of the 
Party. There was much bitterness and resentment within the 
PFP about this and Colin Eglin had to work hard to ensure 
that leading PFP members did not "engage in guerilla war 
against the NDM". (27) He advised the PFP's Federal 
Executive that the Party should not be seen to be in 
conflict with groups like the NDM which shared the same 
principles as the PFP. 
24 Citizen, 20 June 1988 
25 Interview with Tony Leon, 27 March 1990 
26 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 29 March 1988 
27 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 18 October 1987 
Efforts to forge unity with the NDM initially failed as 
Wynand Malan's group did not wish to be associated with the 
PFP. ( 28) The NDM sought to extend contacts with leading 
members of the black community and especially with the 
liberation movement. It did not wish to be associated with 
the PFP's conscious distancing from the mainstream of 
popular resistance politics. 
Relations with the fledgling Independent Party both before 
and after its formal launch in March 1988 were better. The 
PFP took greater care in creating links on this front. 
Worrall was deemed to be a force to be "reckoned with" and 
so worth engaging with. (29) The IP, however, while broadly 
interested in conducting talks about unity decided in June 
1988 that its interests were better served by having a 
separate identity to that of the PFP. In particular it 
believed that it had the prospect of winning the support of 
former NP voters, something very unlikely for the PFP. (30) 
By mid-1988 then, the PFP' s efforts at forging centrist 
unity had made very limited progress. In one of his final 
appeals to the Party before resigning as leader at the end 
of June 1988, Eglin stated that the PFP would continue to 
seek unity with the other groups. He made an appeal to the 
Party leadership for the PFP not to be seen to be attacking 
the IP and NDM despite the floundering of the unity 
initiatives. (31) 
There was much pressure within the Party for success in 
creating a unified party. Middle-level Party leadership 
felt this objective was not being actively enough striven 
for. ( 32) There was also a growing feeling that the PFI> 
28 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 25 January 1988 
29 ibid 
30 Argus, 20 June 1988 
31 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 18 July 1988 
32 Sunday Times, 24 January 1988 
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would be better served by a new leader in the pursuit of 
this task. In the run-up to the October 1988 municipal 
elections in Johannesburg the Business Day reported that 
many of the PFP candidates for city government there were 
running for election on condition that Party stalwart Zach 
de Beer would take over as leader. (33) 
Eglin' s leadership had been in question since late 1987. 
Before the October 1987 meeting of the Party's Federal 
Executive Committee, there had been some lobbying for de 
Beer to take over as the leader, a step which he explained 
to the meeting he would not be availing himself of. Eglin 
in a speech to the meeting accepted responsibility for the 
weak state that the Party was in. He argued that if Party 
members did not support the "mission statement" which he had 
drawn up, he could not continue to be the leader. Drawing 
attention to the sense of chaos in the Party and amongst its 
supporters, he went on to say that an immediate change in 
the leadership would add to the problems faced by the PFP. 
He would notify the Party at a later stage of the steps to 
be taken. A decision was taken that the Party hold a 
Federal Congress in August 1988 at which the issue of the 
leadership be settled. (34) 
There was further pressure on Eglin' s leadership when it 
became known that a group of Party members under the 
leadership of the former Secretary General Robin Carlisle 
who were wishing to push faster for "middle-ground" unity, 
were planning a "think-tank" to which Eglin was not invited. 
Carlisle stated that the proposed meeting, which eventually 
did not take place, was called by a group of Party members 
concerned about the future of liberalism and disunity on the 
"left". He said that there was 
33 Business Day, 13 June 1988 ···· .. 
34 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 18 October 1987 
" a sense that liberal values still have a race to 
run in South Africa. There is tremendous concern 
about what will happen to the tradition of 
liberalism, which has lit the sombre light of 
public life in South Africa. We want to discuss 
how it can be strengthened and maintained." (35) 
Eventually a month before the Party's Federal Congress Eglin 
announced that he would not be standing for reelection as 
leader. ( 36) This opened the way for Zach de Beer to 
become the leader and so consolidate the hegemony of the 
centrist liberal element within the Party. It also 
facilitated the way for a speedy process of unity with the 
IP and NDM and the eventual dissolution of the PFP. 
DEBATE ON SECURITY POLICY 
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The ascendant centrists within the PFP were convinced that a 
decisive factor in the Party's poor performance in the 1987 
elections was its liberal stance on security issues. In the 
context where the white voting public was rallying behind PW 
Botha's strong-arm security approach the PFP found that its 
policies fell on deaf ears. Views on security issues within 
the white public were hardening in the face of increased 
crime and revolutionary violence. ( 37) The context for 
this was an intensification in armed insurgency and an 
escalation in the war in Namibia and Angola. Continued 
activism by the End Conscription Campaign and conscientious 
objectors added a crucial oppositional component to the 
conjuncture. 
The departure from the Party of a number of important left-
wing members had allowed a more conservative discourse to 
predominate. The Party was not, however, completely drained 
35 Star, 23 January 1988 
36 Argus, 1 July 1987 
37 See Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1987/8, 
p 509; and, Hofmeyer (1990). 
of its more radical members. Within the Party's youth wing, 
especially, there was a vocal group of members who adopted 
many positions at variance with the bulk of the rest of the 
Party. With respect to security policy many youth members 
were informed by their active involvement in the radical End 
Conscription Campaign. This campaign was single-issue 
alliance of leftists, radicals and liberals closely linked 
to the liberation movement. Other elements within the Party 
remained very strong adherents of civil rights and found 
themselves at variance with more conservative members. The 
debate on security issues at the 1988 Federal Congress in 
Cape Town witnessed this conflict. 
The Party debated its entire security policy at this 
Congress in the wake of a report by its Security Commission. 
This group chaired by Helen Suzman, and including Roger 
Burrows, Brian Goodall, Tiaan van der Merwe and James Selfe 
had been appointed to investigate the Party's security 
policies in the midst of the concerns identified above. The 
Security Commission report proposed broad principles which 
would guide PFP policy, and also presented detailed 
guidelines on approaches to the SAP, internal security, the 
SADF, and armaments production. 
The principles guiding policy reflected a commitment to the 
Party's liberal democratic tradition. It argued firstly for 
a government based on the popular will, a Bill of Rights, 
and an independent judiciary which would define the 
parameters in which "adequate, effective and well-
disciplined police and defence forces" could protect the 
rights of individuals. (38) It went on to reject all forms 
of violence regardless of its source. The rule of law was 
identified as the means whereby the rights of individuals 
could further be protected. The report then went on to 
38 PFP, Security Commission Report, August 1988 
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claim that "revolutionary activity" in South Africa was in 
part due to "the current political, social and economic 
injustices which characterize South Africa". (39) Real and 
lasting security would only be reached 
"when new political and social structures are 
brought about by negotiation and consent amongst 
South Africa's accepted leaders." (40) 
The doc::ument concluded its section on broad principles by 
expressing concern at the increased militarisation of South 
African society and of the state. 
attention to 
It especially drew 
"the lack of accountability by the security organs 
of the government to Parliament and the people of 
South Africa." (41) 
In order to deal with the escalating rate of crime within 
the country the Commission recommended 
"a strong Police Force which is well disciplined, 
well trained, well equipped, well paid, well 
managed, adequately staffed, and accountable for 
its actions." (42) 
In addition it was recommended that municipalities optimise 
their resources to ensure the 
"safety of residents and to provide for security 
in the suburbs, in homes, on the streets and in 
recreational areas." (43) 
To this end it was proposed that municipal police forces be 
created and neighbourhood watch systems be encouraged. The 








Transvaal delegates who were about to embark on a municipal 
election campaign in which one central plank was the 
ensuring of effective policing by city government. It was 
particularly in the Southern Transvaal where pressure for 
the Party not to look "soft on security" was strongest. (44) 
There was also opposition in this region to the generalised 
attacks on the SAP following the committing of excesses by 
members of this force. This view was illustrated by Douglas 
Gibson when he said that he thought it was 
"terrible to characterise everybody in the Police 
Force being some sort of fascist bully, because it 
is simply not true." (45) 
With regard to policy on internal security the commissioners 
restated the Party's opposition to the existing security 
laws and the State of Emergency. They also condemned the 
National Security Management System which was considered to 
"have a distinctive internal political agenda 
which goes beyond what is generally accepted in 
Western Societies as legitimate. The structures 
are non-elected, are not accountable to anyone for 
their actions to anyone except the Executive, and 
are secretive in their operation. While the Party 
obviously supports the essential socioeconomic 
uplif tment for which these bodies have been 
responsible, it questions whether the NSMS is the 
appropriate institution to initiate such 
programmes, more particularly as the NSMS seek 
thereby, apparently deliberately, to undermine 
broadly-based community organisations." (46) 
This commitment to civil rights was repeated in the 
statement that the Party believed in lifting the bans on all 
banned organisations and individuals. In an effort, once 
again, not to be adopting too soft a line on security the 
commission expressed the belief that 
44 Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 May 1988, Sunday Star 
7 August 1988 
45 Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 May 1988 
46 PFP, Security Commission Report, August 1988 
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"no organisation or individual should be permitted 
to engage in, foment or advocate violence, 
terrorism., insurrection or revolution. Such 
organisations or individuals ought to be dealt 
with firmly and expeditiously through the courts 
and in terms of the ordinary law of the land. " 
(47) 
Qualifying this gesture to the right, the report went on to 
state that a solution to the conflict in the country would 
only be possible if political prisoners and detainees were 
released, apartheid was eradicated and negotiations with 
recognised leaders for a new consensual cons ti tu ti on were 
begun. 
Despite the qualification left wing members of the Party led 
by Groote Schuur MP Jan van Gend expressed concern that the 
policy would alienate the PFP from the liberation movement. 
On the other hand conservative centrists wanted the Party 
to be more explicit in its opposition to the organisations 
of the liberation movement. This group led by Harry 
Schwarz should be seen as fitting in the with dominant 
thrust of the Party. They differed with the mainstream in 
advocating a hawkish harder· line opposition to the 
liberation movement, while being strongly supportive of the 
security establishment. A motion from the Natal Inland 
Region called on the Party to point out to the ANC that it 
should refrain from violence as this served to aggravate 
polarisation and did not advance the cause of a "prosperous 
non-racial society". ( 48) It also called for the PFP to 
commit itself to "exposing the Communist Party and its 
ideals as totally irreconcilable with the ideal of an open 
free society." (49) A similar motion was introduced by the 
Pietermaritzburg South branch. (50) 
47 ibid 
48 Citizen, 23 July 1988 
49 ibid 
50 ibid 
The debate was inconclusively resolved when the Congress 
accepted Helen Suzman's interpretation in which she stated 
that the policy on freedom of association and bannings would 
allow due process and the rule of law. This was a neutral 
liberal stance, rather than one which would cause the Party 
to side with the liberation movement. By implication it 
served to further distance the Party from popular 
organisations. 
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With respect to SADF policy the report restated the Party's 
view that conscription should be phased out and replaced by 
a professional standing force with a volunteer reserve. It 
called for the defence force to be free of Party politics 
and that it should be politically neutral and accountable. 
When this aspect of the proposed policy was debated at the 
Congress numerous speakers condemned the SADF for being 
partisan and working in the interests of apartheid. Harry 
Schwarz was heckled when he rejected the notion that the 
SADF was an instrument of apartheid. Militarists within the 
Party shared his view that the SADF should not be criticised 
as this played into the hands of the country's enemies. 
Rather, the government's policies should be condemned. This 
view was illuminated in an interview with Douglas Gibson: 
"I think some people have allowed themselves the 
luxury of adopting the stance that the police are 
bad per se, and that the South African Defence 
Force is, per se, bad. I think that is a 
disastrous, totally wrong approach." (51) 
His view was expressed in the belief that the SADF could 
provide a "shield" for the country behind which change could 
take place. While this was no longer official policy, the 
attitude of Party conservatives was heavily informed by this 
outlook. He said that 
51 Interview with Douglas Gibsori, 20 May 1988 
"the PFP favours law and order, and we say that 
the army has got to provide the shield behind 
which the politicians must find the political 
solutions. If the army does bad things, it is the 
politicians who must have their asses kicked and 
nobody else - not the army." (52) 
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Policy on conscientious objection and alternative service 
also drew debate. The policy proposals adopted recognised 
the right of individuals to conscientious objection, and 
that while conscription existed there should be alternative 
service, albeit of a longer duration than military service. 
Heated debate ensued when an amending motion was introduced 
by members of the PFP Youth in the Western Cape in which 
they called for the Party to back campaigns in support of 
conscientious objectors. (53) This motion not only made it 
possible for the Party to support individual objectors, but 
also the End Conscription Campaign. Amidst much emotion 
those opposing the motion managed to defeat the motion by 
only ten votes out of a total of 166. Many of those who 
motivated for the motion did so from a personal perspective 
of themselves facing, or having sons facing conscription. 
Opposition to the motion was primarily informed by a concern 
with the Party not being seen to adopt a security policy 
perceived as being too radical, and through not wishing the 
Party to be compromised into supporting militant resistance 
strategies which were not initiated by it. 
The role of the SADF in preemptive activities in southern 
African countries also caused friction. The Security 
Commission in motivating for a limited preemptive role for 
the SADF argued that there were 
"legitimate security concerns implicit in the 
presence of expatriate and foreign forces in large 
numbers in the frontline states, and of the volume 
52 ibid 
53 Beeld, 6 August 1988 
and sophistication of military equipment in such 
states. " ( 54) 
Given this scenario which accorded closely with that of the 
SADF the commission proposed a policy which stated that 
"use may have to be made of limited preemptive 
cross-border operations against forces with 
demonstrably aggressive military or other violent 
designs towards South Africa, as well as of hot-
pursuit operations in accordance with 
international practice." (55) 
An amendment to this motion was accepted which made such 
preemptive action conditional on seeing it 
"as a last resort and only after all other avenues 
have been exhausted." '( 56) 
The discussion on the debate on security issues, while 
illustrating the conservative element within the Party, also 
shows that there was a residual left element within the 
Party. This group was located largely within the PFP youth, 
and in the Western Cape Party formation where MPs such as 
Tiaan van der Merwe and Jan van Gend could be seen to be 
broadly aligned to the left. 
THE JOHANNESBURG ASSAULT 
Associated with the ascendancy of 
the power within the Party to a 
liberal base in Johannesburg. 
De Beer was the shift of 
traditional conservative 
Here the 
significant ties and interrelationships in 
Party had 
the business 
community and its dominating incrementalist ideologies and 
commitment to bourgeois interests. In the midst of the 
54 PFP, Security Commission Report, August 1988 
55 ibid 
56 Minutes and Resolutions of PFP Federal Congress, Cape 
Town, 5 and 6 August 1988 
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malaise and disorganisation within the Party 
1987 General Election a special effort was 
Southern Transvaal Party leadership to 
following the 
made by the 
rebuild the 
organisation there. Brian Goodall took over as the regional 
chairman at this time and described the local Party 
organisation as a "walking disaster". (57) 
The perception of those in power within the Party in the 
region was that something had to be done urgently to improve 
the performance and image of the Party or else it would die. 
The forthcoming national municipal elections set for October 
1988 presented the opportunity to give the Party a clear 
direction as an institution committed to free market ideas 
and with an uncompromising dedication to furthering 
liberalism. Goodall believed that if the PFP fared poorly 
in the elections for the Johannesburg City Council then the 
Party should conclude that it was not a "suitable vehicle" 
for the promotion of liberal values. This view was shared 
by the Transvaal leader of the Party Douglas Gibson who said 
that the 
"municipal elections are going to be crucial to 
the future status and image of the Party because 
if we have a substantial setback in Johannesburg-
and that's really the one that counts - then you 
are going to get the question arising among the 
public: 'Does the PFP have any substantial role to 
play?'. It is one thing being the conscience of 
the public and having two or three or ten people 
in Parliament. It is another if you are a power 
factor. If we were to win ten or 12 seats in 
Johannesburg instead of 16, 17, 18, then it would 
be a substantial setback and would bode ill ~or 
the general election which is to follow within a 
year or two." (58) 
Goodall indicated that there was a feeling among the PFP's 
supporters in the business community that the elections 
57 Interview with Brian Goodall, 23 May 1988 
58 Interview with Douglas Gibson, 20 May 1988 
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"might actually be the last chance for a liberal 
free enterprise political grouping in South 
Africa. So whatever we do, this time we mustn't 
screw it up. I've actually had businessmen who 
have been quite desperate, almost pleading, 
saying, "God, are you people going to perform?" 
(59) 
Against this background pivotal individuals set about a 
programme which would change the Party's image in the 
region. It was decided that the best way that the Party 
could do this would be to "change the nature of people who 
stood" for election. (60) Said Goodall 
"We took the view that we would go for younger 
leadership. We would in fact try and draw our 
candidates from an age group 30 to 40 who either 
had professional or managerial experience. So 
that was to try and project the image of a party 
that could at least run Johannesburg; man for man 
that would be better than the government." (61) 
The Party proceeded to assemble a group of candidates who 
could meet the demands of this image and competence. It 
meant that key members of the PFP who had been in the city 
council for many years and did not fit the bill were ousted. 
In March 1988 Tony Leon took over the leadership of the PFP 
in the Council from a long time Party stalwart Sam Moss. 
(62) Leon immediately projected a confident image warning 
the National Party in the municipality that the PFP was 
"hitting the deck running, determined to succeed 
in introducing the Party's vision of a non-racial 
democracy in Johannesburg." (63) 
59 Interview with Brian Goodall, 23 May 1988 
60 Ibid, 23 May 1988 
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This bluster was echoed by another PFP Councillor Rae Graham 
who described the Party caucus as a "mean machine". She 
went on to reflect on the election of Leon: 
"What has changed is that we have had a blood 
transfusion at the top that is set to put the 
fight back into the Party." (64) 
Amidst a carefully planned publicity campaign the PFP 
released their election manifesto which focussed on seven 
principal objectives. These were "real security"; 
"community harmony"; "clean and open government"; a 'user-
friendly' city; "a 
"creative planning' ; 
(65) 
winning partnership with business"; 
and, "towards a post-apartheid city" . 
More important than the policy positions contained in the 
manifesto was the overall image projected that the PFP team 
running for office had the ability to competently run the 
city and to implement its policies. The campaign was 
successful with the Party increasing its seats in the 
council from 17 to 18. (66) 
The most significant aspect of the Johannesburg campaign was 
that it served to elevate the politics of the Southern 
Transvaal Party into the forefront of the PFP. This 
approach, described by Leon as a "liberal toughness" made an 
important impression on a Party which was floundering at the 
National level. ( 67) It was also a key marker of the 
consolidation of the centrist liberal discourse as hegemonic 
within the Party. 
64 Star, 2 April 1988 
65 Business Day, 16 August 1988 
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DE BEER LEADS THE PARTY OUT 
Czach-- de Beer was elected to lead the PFP at its Federal 
Congress in August 1988. He was the popular choice of those 
who wished to see the Party merge with the other white 
opposition groups. His assumption of the leadership 
represented a consolidation of a centrist liberalism as the 
dominant discourse within the Party. He also represented 
interests closely associated with monopoly capital. At the 
time of his election he was an executive director of the 
Anglo American chairman of the construction 
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giant LTA, as 
Corporation, 
well as the 
subsidiaries, and the insurance 
African Life. He was also a 
corporation's two property 
companies Southern Life and 
director of several other 
companies. (68) He had been an MP for the United Party and 
was a founder member of the Progressive Party in 1959. He 
returned to Parliament from 1977 until 1980 as the PFP 
member for Parktown. 
His views represented the dominant trend in the Party's 
thinking. He saw his role as pushing forward the PFP' s 
primary goal of centrist unity. In an interview shortly 
before assuming the leadership he said that: 
"an extremely important objective would be to 
regain our former status as the Official 
Opposition, but the general strategy will remain 
one of seeking alliances with other like-minded 
groups and organisations. Dr DF Malan put it this 
way: Bring bymekaar diegene wat by innerlike 
oortuiging bymekaar hoort. ( 69) I will be doing 
everything in my power.to bring together people of 
all races, in and out of Parliament, who-believe 
in the same things we do. As far as those parties 
represented in Parliament are concerned, my ideal 
would be a full merger, a single Party on the 
Parliamentary left." (70) 
68 Leadership, 7 (3) 1988 
69 transl. "Bring together those who belong together by 
inner convictions" 
70 ibid 
A common theme of his speeches and interviews on becoming 
the leader was that of broader unity based on a common set 
of principles, or a single philosophy. In one speech he 
said that 
"while loyalty to a Party is important, loyalty to 
principles is even more important." (71) 
The . principles he believed 
associated with democratic 
to be important were those 
liberalism: equal rights, 
personal freedoms and the rule of law. (72) He was also a 
staunch advocate of the free market ideology. His views 
were well illustrated in an article he wrote for the Cape 
Times in September 1988. In it he argued that political 
systems should be determined by the degree of intervention 
the state plays in society. He contended that fascism and 
communism were therefore similar systems given the degree of 
state involvement in civil society. They represented the 
extreme of interventionism and authoritarianism. 
democracy, by contrast, represented the optimum: 
Liberal 
"As one moves away from the free society, either 
towards the right or towards the left, government 
gets bigger, more powerful, more interventionist. 
The liberty of the individual and the freedom of 
the market progressively invaded. When one 
reaches either fascism or Marxism, the two are 
extinguished." (73) 
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He stressed that, while he supported the free market, this 
did not mean that the state should not provide certain 
welfare service: 
71 Cape Times, 8 August 1988 
72 Business Day, 12 August 1988 
73 Cape Times, 23 September 1988 
j 
"To be in favour of free enterprise need not and 
should not imply any lack of compassion for the 
unfortunate." (74) 
De Beer's public speeches displayed an uncompromising class 
consciousness and promotion of capitaliim. 
There was general support for De Beer within the Party, 
although there were isolated exceptions. Marlene Webber the 
Chairman of the Party's Orange Free Sate and Northern Cape 
Region publicly voiced concern that De Beer's appointment 
could lead to the Party being associated in consequence with 
mining capital which had had a very bad record on job 
reservation. She also resigned her position at the time, 
although she denied that this was in protest at De Beer's 
election. ( 7 5) 
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The Federal Congress at which De Beer became leader was \J 
significant in its stress on the need for white 
Parliamentary unity. Five resolutions were made encouraging 
unity. A crucial motion called for the Party to merge into 
"a new, non-racial, progressive party committed to V 
the liberal values the PFP has so stoutly defended 
in the past." (76) 
Talks were conducted by de Beer with the IP and NDM. The 
Party's Federal Executive concluded in October that there 
was greater chance of unity with the NDM than with the IP. 
(77) The IP was at this time confident of its chances if it 
retained its integrity and separate identity. The Federal 
Executive mandated de Beer at this stage to make an effort 
to unify with the NDM, while keeping Worrall informed of 
developments. 
74 ibid 
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Over the subsequent months the IP became more amenable to 
considering unity. This was a possible response on its part 
to the fact that the IP was not making the gains among the 
white public at the expense of the PFP that it had 
originally anticipated. A Rapport opinion poll published in 
December 1988 showed that the PFP was supported by 10% of 
voters, the IP by 9, 1 % , while 3, 4 % of the white public 
backed the NDM. In mid-December the three parties, together 
with a fourth group of unaffiliated "new Nats" decided at a 
meeting in Johannesburg to unite into one party. They 
issued a joint statement in which it was argued that the 
unification of the different groups would have the effect of 
,maximising the strengths of the parties. The PFP was seen J to have a strong organisation and infrastructure, the IP 
would contribute its effective marketing orientation, while 
the NDM would provide important extra-Parliamentary 
contacts. (78) A joint steering committee made up of the 
leaders of the three parties as well as Wimpie de Klerk who 
represented the "fourth force" was established. (79) 
De Beer saw the new party as holding the prospect of 
becoming a fundamental force for change in South Africa 
through it seeking to be the cornerstone of a non-racial 
alliance. He said that 
"the political movement that can save South Africa 
is going to be a non-racial one. The new party 
must be able to form coalitions and alliances 
across the colour line. It has already begun to 
do so and has the potential to achieve much more." 
(80) 
The agreement came in the context of a renewed decline in 
the economy in late 1988 and rising pressure from business 
78 Cape Times, 15 December 1988 
79 Star, 15 December 1988 
80 Sunday Times, 18 December 1988 
for a coherent alternative voice to the government. The 
regime was experiencing severe internal di visions at this 
time confronted as it was by the breaking up of apartheid. 
It lacked a clear response. A growing tide of reformism 
within the business community and amongst the white middle 
classes encouraged the formation of a new party as a viable 
vehicle to represent their interests. 
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The dominant feeling within the PFP was that it should 
dominate the new organisation. This was due both to the 
fact that the PFP was the largest party, and to the fear by 
many Party members that the liberalism of the PFP would be 
lost in the new arrangement. Developments around this issue 
focussed on the prospective leader of the new party. The 
PFP proposed throughout December 1988 and January 1989 that 
the leader should be democratically elected by its members. 
The implication of this suggestion was that the Leader would 
be someone supported by the bulk of former PFP members who 
would have a clear numerical majority within the party. The 
minutes of the December PFP Federal Executive meeting read 
in part that: 
"whilst it was strongly felt that Dr. de Beer 
should lead the new Party, a compromise option of 
a leadership committee of four could be offered to 
the IP and NDM. This committee could operate for 
a short period until the founding congress is 
held." ( 81) 
The IP was seriously concerned about the attempt by the PFP 
to dominate the new party and sent a message to the PFP 
expressing its concern in this respect. It was anxious that 
the new party should not be seen as a: 
"a) recycled opposition 
b) the PFP in drag 
81 Minutes of PFP Federal Executive, 13 December 1988 
c) a mechanism for retaining suspect opposition 
seats, etc, etc." (82) 
The message went on to claim that 
"the impression (maybe wrongly gained) is that 
really the NDM and IP are going to have to finish 
their quarrelling and then slot in with the PFP 
whose concession will be to disband and reconvene 
under a new name with newly included partners." 
(83) 
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Despite the opposition to the PFP' s proposal, the Party 
:maintained its stance that the leader of the new party J 
~hould be democratically elected. Both de Beer and the Cape 
\ leader Roger Hulley made public statements to this effect. 
\ 
(84) The PFP was pursuing this course of action believing 
that its superior numbers would ultimately win the day. 
Many in the Party did not want the PFP to lose its identity. 
Party members, particularly in the Southern Transvaal, were 
also motivated by the Party's good showing in the 
Johannesburg municipal elections in October 1988. According 
to the leader of the PFP in the Johannesburg City Council, 
the election results had 
"created a great sense of vigor and renewed 
determination. People, among them many 
leading members of Parliament who had been 
extremely negative and down on the whole PFP, and 
thought it was a disaster area, suddenly 
discovered that the Party was worth preserving and 
keeping. They were very, very unenthusiastic. 
They thought we were selling out the birthrights, 
the name, the tradition, there was a lot of 
criticism of the negotiations." (85) 
82 Letter from the IP to Zach de Beer, 12 December 1988 
83 ibid 
84 Star, 16 January 1989; Cape Times 22 December 1988 
85 Interview with Tony Leon, 27 March 1990 
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Among those opposed to the merger was Harry Schwarz who also 
referred to the boost the Party received in the municipal 
elections: 
"We thought that we had reached the bottom, the 
nadir in 1987 and we were on the way up and now 
there was an endeavor for us to disappear after we 
had overcome the very difficult times ... " (86) 
The organisational and infrastructural basis of the PFP was 
a further reason given by Schw9rz----for-·-cne·--opposition to a 
merger. He said that there was the view that 
"if these chaps wanted to JOln in with us, they 
should join us. We had the Party, we had the 
organisation, we had the MPs, we had the money, we 
had whatever was going and therefore they should 
join us. There was no reason to form a new 
party." (87) ~ 
&S:::t 
J ~,There was also concern that the liberal ideals of the PFP 
, ~would be lost. Schwarz expressed the fear that the 
~~~commitment of the PFP to civil liberties would be diluted by 
}J.· ~an influx of people who until shortly before had been 
~ ~members of the National Party. He contended that as soon as 
it appeared that 
"apartheid was crumbling, the people who had been 
in the Nationalist Party, and party to the 
creation of apartheid laws, now were becoming more 
holier than thou, and that created a high degree 
of resentment amongst what could be called the 
'blue blood Progs' who were in the PFP. That 
resentment was a problem and there was a lot of 
getting used to getting people drawing up policy 
for you who had actually been part of the 
architects of apartheid." (88) 






Others who shared the views expressed by Schwarz included 
Ray Swart and Helen Suzman. (89) 
Despite the pressures for the PFP to be dominant within the 
new party, the Party leadership perceived that public 
opinion was against its refusal to have a triumvirate 
leadership. De Beer expressed this view to the Party and at 
the end of January 1989 the Federal Council gave him the 
mandate to negotiate the merger of the parties on the basis 
of there initially being a joint leadership. It was further 
proposed that a single leader be elected at the first 
congress of the Party which s
0
hould be held in August that 
year. (90) This paved the was for the finalisation of the 
negotiations to establish the new party. 
I After further negotiations the steering committee announced \, / in early February that a new party, to be known as the 
"'- Democratic Party, would be launched in April. There was 
also an agreement that the party would be co-led by De Beer, 
Worrall and Malan. 
The steering committee stated that they wished to see a "new 
political party with a personality which is distinctive from 
the PFP, the IP and the NDM. " ( 91) There was, however, 
still the belief within the PFP that after a short period of 
joint leadership De Beer would emerge as the single leader 
of the party and so ensure the hegemony of former PFP 
members. (92) This was the view at the· disbanding congress 
of the PFP in April 1988. At this Congress Tony Leon 
motivated for a resolution prepared by the PFP Federal 
Council that the Democratic Party would be best served in 
89 Interview with Helen Suzman, 9 April 1990; Minutes of 
PFP Federal Executive, 27 January 1989 
90 Minutes of PFP Federal Council, 28 January 1989 
91 Statement by Steering Committee of New Party, 5 
February 1989 
92 Interview with Helen Suzman, 9 April 1990 
\ 
the Parliamentary elections to be held later in the year by 
fighting them "under the leadership of a single leader ii. 
(93) The Congress adopted the motion. 
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The Final Congress of the PFP formally dissolved the Party. 
It was a sad day for Party members and most of the Congress 
dealt with reflections on the PFP' s history. Ray Swart 
addressed the Congress on the founding of the Progressive 
Party, Max Borkum spoke of the "lonely years" from 1961 
until 1974, while Douglas Gibson told the history of the 
period 1974 to 1989. (94) 
On the day after the dissolution of the PFP the Democratic 
Party was launched amidst much spectacle and glamour. 
Despite a commitment to a new identity for the DP the co-
leaders - De Beer, Worrall and Malan - in their addresses 
to the Congress simply restated the strategic thinking of 
their former parties in their addresses to the gathering. 
De Beer's speech repeated the views dominant within the PFP 
since the departure of Slabbert. He positioned the DP at 
the centre of South African politics pledging that it would 
only work with those who shared its values. (95) 
The formation of the Democratic Party was the culmination of 
the process of the consolidation of centrism within the PF~ 
which elevated the class aspects of the liberal discourse. 
The DP retained this aspect although it was not initially as 
imbued with the spirit and tradition of .liberalism as the 
PFP had been. Despite its centrist assertions, it was the 
ultimate irony that the formation of the Democratic Party 
once again introduced a coherent left wing into mainstream 
liberal politics. 
93 Cape Times, 7 April 1989 
94 Pretoria News, 8 April 1989 
95 Business Day, 10 April 1989 
CONCLUSION 
As South Africa departed from the eighties, the PFP had 
become no more than a part of history, so dramatic was the 
impact of the decade's events on it. At all times in the 
years from 1981 until 1989 the Party battled to come to 
terms with the changing nature of a country in the grips of 
escalating struggle and teetering on the brink of collapse. 
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This dissertation has sought to understand the response of 
the PFP to these conditions of organic and conjunctural 
crisis. An attempt has been made to understand the Party as 
an institution of the dominating classes competing with 
other class forces to determine the outcome of the country's 
dilemma. The specific characteristic of the Party which 
made its response unique was its personality as a liberal 
and ins ti tu ti on. In this respect the tensions inherent 
within liberalism have been considered as a basis to 
understanding the PFP' s responses. This conclusion will 
endeavor to explore some of the major themes that emerge out 
of this investigation. 
A distinctive aspect of the PFP's behaviour was its 
vacillating character. It constantly shifted positions and 
strategies in an effort to deal with a changing context. 
This vacillation can be periodised according to the cycles 
of the shifting conjuncture; as the economy either dipped or 
rose; and, as the popular classes escalated or deescalated 
their struggles against the exclusive state. The period 
between 1984 and 1986 was crucial in this process. It was 
during this time that shape of South Africa was to change 
for ever. Not only did the economy enter a severe phase of 
crisis, but the state floundered as its efforts at reforming 
the contradictions of apartheid failed. The black dominated 
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classes led by a reemerging liberation movement took the 
struggle to the regime and succeeded in shifting the 
polity's centre of gravity away from the white political 
state. In this context the PFP found itself increasingly 
isolated from the central terrains of struggle. Over the 
years that followed its efforts went into shifting from 
being a party devoted to contesting the politics of the 
dominating classes, to one which engaged in the total field 
of the South African struggle. In doing so it exposed 
itself to many new challenges, points of pressure and 
internal division. The most notable pressure acting on the 
Party, and limiting its capacity for coherence, was the 
tension between the class and non-class components of its 
liberal character. 
Before drawing conclusions on this tension, it is worthwhile 
to note the impact that outside forces had on the Party in 
the period covered by the dissertation. The tensions that 
manifested themselves within the Party were a reflection of 
varying responses to these external stimuli. The moves 
towards reform and the appropriation of isolated aspects of 
the liberal discourse by the regime were one such pressure. 
Another was the impact of popular mobilisation and 
resistance amongst the dominated classes. This had the dual 
effect of shifting the site of struggle away from that 
within the white dominating classes, to a broader arena. It 
also served to delegitimise the institution of Parliament, a 
process which the PFP battled to come to terms with. The 
way in which the Party ultimately resolved its attempts to 
deal with these external points of pressure, was to adopt a 
path of independent distance from both. 
The class character of the Party can be found more through 
an understanding of its relationship to other class forces, 
than through a survey of the class nature of its membership 
and support base. The PFP was a party of the dominating 
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classes. If we are, though, to accord a specific class 
character to the party, we should conclude that it was 
ultimately a bourgeois party. It projected an ideology which 
advocated the interests of capitalism and continued 
accumulation. It sought incremental constitutional change 
and worked to avoid revolution. In doing so, however, it 
was not as has been contended, a representative of monopoly 
capitalist interests. As has been shown, it was often at 
odds with the mainstream of the business community. The 
advocacy of an explicit class politics came to the fore 
especially in the latter years of the period, as the growth 
of a black middle class accorded a legitimacy to this 
activity. In.earlier years an explicit stance as a Party 
promoting class ends would have been denounced as racist due 
to the much greater coincidence of race and class at that 
time. 
Efforts to transcend the limited base of the Party and 
extend into the terrain of the dominated classes were 
failures. This was a function of the Party misreading 
prevailing conditions, in which polarisation militated 
against non-racial Parliamentary parties. The isolation of 
the Party as a whites-only institution in the years from 
1968 until 1985 led to PFP organisers having little grasp of 
the character of politics within the black community. Even 
despite this legal obstacle, the Party had never had more 
than a token presence in the black community. and it can for 
all intents and purposes be seen as a whites-only 
institution. It was also a consequence of the Party's 
location outside of the two major class blocs in South 
African society. As a party advocating the right of the 
individual as paramount, it was always unlikely to gain much 
of a foothold within the the blocs of dominated and 
dominating classes mobilised on the basis of communal 
discursive elements, such as race, class, ethnicity, and the 
common experience of political oppression. 
Oespite the failure of the attempts to create a non-racial 
Party, individual Party members succeeded in establishing 
close working relationships with oppressed communities and 
the organisations of the liberation movement. The 
dissertation has attempted to show that this behaviour had 
its roots in the non-class elements of the liberal 
discourse. In this respect we should see such liberal 
features as a commitment to non-racialism and civil rights 
as overdetermining the behaviour of Party members. Because 
of the historical moment at which this activity was taking 
place, the left within the Party assumed a role as vicarious 
"representative" of the liberation movement. The 
sensitivity of the Party as a whole to the organisations of 
the oppressed, especially in the early to mid-eighties, 
meant that the left assumed an importance far greater than 
its numbers. Their strength was directly proportional to 
that of the liberation movement. When the popular classes 
were on the march and appeared to be on the verge of a 
breakthrough we saw an assertive left within the PFP. When 
the resistance movement went onto the retreat, so the impact 
of the left receded and mainstream class-conscious liberals 
stamped their authority on the Party. 
Reflecting on the period as a whole we can conclude that the 
Party failed to become a force strong enough to assert its 
hegemony over the resolution of the South African crisis. 
The question might be asked: is it at all possible that a 
liberal programme could succeed in the South African 
context? The answer is to be found in an understanding of 
liberalism as an historically contingent tradition. 
The emergence of modern South Africa created a fissure 
between the dominating and dominated classes on the basis of 
access to state power. The form of state emerged as a 
result of the nature of the development of capitalism in 
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South Africa. Unlike the bulk of the European and American 
experience in which the development of capitalism was 
associated with the rise of liberalism, the fostering of 
capitalist relations of production within South Africa was 
premised on the authoritarian and illiberal exclusion of the 
popular classes from access to civil society, political 
society and the state. 
The chances of the dominated classes gaining access to such 
power would be through cementing their unity in antagonism 
to the dominant classes. The ideological character of this 
unity would be based on a collective striving which played 
up the common nationalist features of the bloc of oppressed 
classes. There would be little room for an individual-based 
ideology such as liberalism. The popular classes would, as 
well, have an interest in the seizure of state power through 
struggle and collective action. By contrasts, the authority 
and privilege of the dominating classes was predicated on 
the mobilisation of a unifying ideology antagonistic to the 
black dominated classes. It was materially entrenched by an 
exclusives state premised on the consent of the white 
dominating classes, and the coercion of the black oppressed. 
There was little place for a liberal ideology which 
advocated the extension of political rights within this 
schema. 
The isolation of liberalism within South Africa after the 
development of capitalism from the late nineteenth century 
found its nemesis in the failures of the PFP in its efforts 
to deal with the crisis of the eighties. Long excluded from 
power South African liberals had pursued the idealist notion 
of encouraging the entrenched regime to effect incremental 
change. When it became apparent that the regime was losing 
its grasp on power, the PFP sought to establish a new 
hegemony. But historical legacy and heightened conditions 
of crisis made for a doomed attempt. 
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Power and liberalism in the semi-colonial condition of South 
Africa appear to have been two mutually exclusive notions. 
New historical conditions which will emerge with the 
resolution of the crisis in the form of a non-racial 
democracy may well turn this contention on its head. Such 
is the contingency of history and the liberal discourse. 
Indeed, we see the rise of liberal discourses now within the 
ideologies of both the regime and liberation movement. 
Changed conditions, and the prospect of a removal of the 
fundamental divide between the empowered and the politically 
oppressed determined by access to the racially exclusive 
state, presents the opportunity for the primary blocs of 
classes to depart from past hegemonic discourses; and to 
integrate elements of the liberal discourse which had in 
years gone by been rejected as contrary to the interests of 
the dominating and dominated classes. The PFP failed 
precisely because it operated in the wrong context, at the 
wrong time, and on a limited class base. 
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